特朗普會發動貿易戰嗎

Perhaps the most important among all the many uncertainties surrounding the economic policy of the Trump administration are those related to trade and protection. During the election campaign, the president-elect made blood-curdling promises in this area, and his official campaign documentation was no less strident. If he intends to implement a large part of this agenda in office, the chances of a global trade war would be high.

在圍繞特朗普政府經濟政策的諸多不確定性中，最重要的或許都跟貿易和保護有關。在競選期間，這位當選總統在這方面發出了一些把人嚇得血液凝固的承諾，而他的官方競選文檔也同樣強硬。如果他打算在上任後，把這一議程的大部分付諸實施，那麼全球爆發貿易戰的可能性很大。

Last week, trade issues moved to centre stage in the transition. The president-elect released a video confirming that America would immediately withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that had been intended to be the culmination of President Barack Obama’s political and economic pivot towards Asia.

在特朗普當選那周後的第二週，貿易問題成爲政府交接中的焦點問題。這位當選總統公佈了一份視頻，確認了美國將立即退出《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(TPP)。人們原本指望TPP將成爲巴拉克.奧巴馬(Barack Obama)在政治和經濟方面轉向亞洲戰略的巔峯成果。

This was no surprise, since the political supporters of the deal ran for cover during the 2016 elections, but it does mean that any further liberalisation of US trade (including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the EU) is now dead in the water.

這不令人意外（TPP的政治支持者在2016年大選中都因這個問題受到猛烈抨擊、不得不匆忙尋求掩護），但這並不意味着美國進一步貿易自由化（包括與歐盟之間的《跨大西洋貿易與投資夥伴關係協定》(TTIP)）如今已死。

It also provides China with a clear opportunity to take the lead in forming an Asian trading bloc, and they have eagerly stepped up to the plate. None of this will have immediate adverse consequences for global markets. It is an opportunity missed rather than a step backwards.

這也爲中國提供了一個領頭組建一個亞洲貿易區的明顯機會，他們已急切地行動起來了。這些都不會立即對全球市場產生負面影響。只是錯過了一個機會，而不是倒退。

The second big development is the rumoured appointment of Wilbur Ross as commerce secretary (see Gillian Tett). Mr Ross is a business person rather than an ideologue on trade. If anything, he seems to be from the supply side wing of the Republican party. The market would vastly prefer this appointment to a feasible alternative such as Peter Navarro, who is an outright hawk on trade relations with China (and, somewhat ironically, the only PhD economist in Trump’s advisory team).

第二大重要動態是，人們傳言威爾伯.羅斯(Wilbur Ross)會被任命爲商務部長（參見吉蓮.邰蒂(Gillian Tett)的文章）。羅斯是個商人，並不來自某個特定的貿易思想派別。如果非要說的話，他似乎來自共和黨的供給側一派。相比其他可行人選（比如在對華貿易關係上持徹底鷹派立場的彼得.納瓦羅(Peter Navarro)），市場將非常樂見這項任命。（具有諷刺意味的是，納瓦羅也是特朗普顧問團隊中唯一的經濟學博士）。

Although Mr Ross clearly believes that the US should be far more assertive in its trade negotiations with other countries, he has played down the likelihood of dramatic initiatives such as Mr Trump’s threat of a 45 per cent tariff on all imports from China. He has also said clearly that “there will be no trade wars”.

羅斯顯然認爲，美國在與其他國家進行貿易談判時的立場應當遠比目前強硬，但他淡化了一些誇張提議（比如特朗普威脅要對所有中國進口商品徵收45%的關稅）的可能性。他還明確表示，“不會發生貿易戰”。

If this turns out to be the dominant tone of the Trump administration, then the tide of globalisation may not be rolled back very far in the next few years, and the global markets will breathe a huge sigh of relief.

如果這將是特朗普政府的主導性論調，那麼在未來幾年內，全球化浪潮或許不會倒退得太厲害，而全球市場將長舒一口氣。

But can we rely on this? Trump’s victory in the electoral college relied heavily on abnormally high levels of support in the rust belt states. The temptation to “do something” to reward these supporters by punishing those countries that are believed to have caused America’s economic decline – notably China and Mexico – will be hard to resist.

但我們可以指望情況會如此嗎？特朗普在選舉人團中的勝利，嚴重依賴那些“鏽帶州”異常高的支持。“做點兒什麼”回報這些支持者、懲罰那些被認爲導致了美國經濟衰退的國家——主要是中國和墨西哥——的誘惑，將是很難抵制的。

The president has wide-ranging executive authority to introduce trade controls, much of which is hard to challenge through Congress and the courts. Some form of action is inevitable. The question is how severe it will be.

總統在實施貿易管控方面享有廣泛的行政權力，其中很多是難以通過國會和法院挑戰的。採取某種形式的行動是不可避免的。問題是這種行動會有多麼嚴厲。

At the less disruptive end of the spectrum, the administration could simply expand the activities of the Obama administration in pursuing particular cases of unfair trading practices that are the subject of loud political complaints. US action against Chinese tyre producers in 2009, and Chinese steel exporters in 2016, are example of this approach, which could be widened and pursued much more aggressively, even though it has not been very successful in safeguarding US domestic producers in the past.

在破壞性不那麼大的一端，特朗普政府可能只是擴大奧巴馬政府的做法：針對不公平貿易活動的個案動手。不公平貿易活動在政治上招致很大怨言。2009年美國起訴中國輪胎生產商、以及2016年起訴中國鋼鐵出口商，都是這種做法的例子。儘管這種做法過去在保護美國國內生產商方面收效一般，但它可能被擴大，並採取激進得多的方式。

Aggressive action of this sort might be increasingly outside the WTO’s legal framework, but Trump might be willing to push these agreements to the limit, in effect using American buying power to “get a better deal” for his country. This would be noisy, and subject to the risk of retaliation from China, but it would be unlikely to bring down the entire edifice of global free trade – at least, not at first.

這種激進行動或許會越來越多地超出世貿組織(WTO)的法律框架，但特朗普也許有意願把這些協議推向極致，實際上利用美國的購買力達成“對本國更有利的協議”。這將帶來嘈雜聲，並面臨中國發起報復行動的風險，但這不大可能會推倒全球自由貿易的整座大廈——至少一開始不會。

Nor is it likely to match the political expectations that have been fuelled by the inflammatory language that Trump used during his campaign. It is easy to imagine political pressure building on the White House to live up to its campaign rhetoric on trade. If so, two targets will loom very large: car imports from Mexico, and manufactured goods (especially basic materials and technological products) from China.

這也不可能符合被競選期間特朗普的煽動性語言推高的政治期望。不難想象到，白宮將面臨越來越大的政治壓力，要求兌現特朗普競選時在貿易方面的承諾。如果是這樣，將有兩個醒目的目標：從墨西哥進口的汽車和從中國進口的製成品（特別是基礎材料和技術產品）。

Candidate Trump issued some very concrete threats in these areas, including of course declaring China a currency “manipulator”, imposing a 45 per cent tariff on all Chinese imports into the US and a 35 per cent tariff on Ford car imports from Mexico, and withdrawing from Nafta and the WTO.

在競選階段，特朗普在這些領域發出了一些非常具體的威脅，其中顯然包括宣佈中國爲匯率“操縱國”、對美國從中國進口的所有商品徵收45%的關稅、對進口自墨西哥的福特(Ford)汽車徵收35%的關稅、以及退出北美自貿協定(Nafta)和WTO。

It is possible that these threats are just a form of bluster, intended to elicit voluntary concessions from the countries concerned, but this could escalate into something far more concerning, especially in the circumstance of a US recession, or a large rise in the dollar, with expanding US trade deficits.

這些威脅可能只是某種形式的威嚇，旨在誘導有關國家自願做出讓步，但這可能升級爲更令人擔心的事態——特別是在美國經濟發生衰退或美元大幅上漲，同時美國貿易赤字加大的情況下。

That is what happened during the Reagan years, when a great deal of political pressure was placed on Japan, resulting in “voluntary” restrictions on car exports to the US. The global structure of free trade survived on that occasion, but the markets would certainly start to worry that it might be much worse this time. China would be a much tougher nut for the US to crack than Japan three decades ago.

這就是里根(Reagan)時代發生的事情，當時美國對日本施加了很大的政治壓力，導致日本“自願”限制對美汽車出口。那一次，全球自由貿易結構挺過去了，但市場肯定會開始擔心，這次可能會比那次糟得多。對美國而言，中國將是比30年前的日本難磕開得多的堅果。

The next key litmus test in this area will be whether the new administration rapidly labels China as currency manipulator. While this may have been a defensible step a few years ago, almost all economists now agree with the US Treasury’s latest published assessment, to the effect that China meets only one of the three criteria used to define “manipulation”.

貿易領域的下一場關鍵考驗將是，美國新政府是否迅速將中國列爲匯率操縱國。雖然在幾年前，這麼做也許是站得住腳的，但目前幾乎所有經濟學家都同意美國財政部最新公佈的評估結果，即中國只符合“操縱國”的三條界定標準中的一條。

China is running a large trade surplus with the US, but is not recording an excessive current account surplus versus the world as a whole, and is certainly not using foreign exchange intervention to hold the currency down. In fact, the opposite.

中國對美國存在龐大的貿易順差，但中國相對整個世界的經常賬戶順差並不太大，而且肯定沒有通過干預匯市來壓低匯率。事實上，中國所做的事情與之恰好相反。

Despite this evidence, the Trump campaign documentation baldly states that the president will “instruct the Treasury Secretary to label China as a currency manipulator”. The new Treasury Secretary probably has the legal authority under the 2015 Trade Enforcement Act to change the precise, official definition of “manipulation” to achieve this, without further Congressional approval. In any event, there seem to be Congressional majorities in favour of action on this front.

儘管存在這一證據，特朗普的競選文檔直截了當地表示，特朗普當選後將“指示財政部長將中國列爲貨幣操縱國”。根據2015年的《貿易執法法》(Trade Enforcement Act)，新財長很可能擁有法律權限，能夠在不經國會批准的情況下更改“操縱”的精確官方定義。反正，國會中似乎都會有多數議員贊成在這方面採取行動。

If that occurred, it would give the president authority to set in train a process leading to direct trade controls, though there could be time delays and legal challenges. Pending more definitive legal opinion on this, it seems to me that Mr Trump could probably use the 2015 Act or some other legal authority to impose a general US tariff on Chinese imports as the quid pro quo for an undervalued exchange rate.

如果發生這種情況，總統將有權啓動一個導致直接貿易管制的程序，儘管可能存在時滯和法律挑戰。在沒有更確切的法律意見的情況下，我感覺，特朗普可能會使用2015年這份法案或某一其他法律授權，對中國進口商品徵收美國普通關稅，作爲對人民幣匯率被低估的懲罰。

That, in turn, could trigger a dangerous trade “war”, in which China devalues further, and the US imposes even higher tariffs. A recent briefing by the Peterson Institute concludes that a full trade war of this type would result in zero GDP growth in the US in 2018-19.

這接下來可能引發一場危險的貿易“戰爭”——中國讓人民幣進一步貶值，美國則進一步提高關稅。彼得森研究所(Peterson Institute)最近的一份簡報認爲，這種全面貿易戰爭將導致美國2018-19年度的國內生產總值(GDP)增長爲零。

In the past week, investors have become hopeful that a modicum of sense might prevail on the trade front. But that confidence would rapidly be shattered if the administration recklessly pressed the “manipulator” button against China.

在特朗普當選那周後的第二週，投資者開始寄望於些許理智或許會在貿易領域佔據上風。但是，如果美國政府魯莽地對中國按下“操縱國”按鈕，這種信心將很快被打碎。