與中國打貿易戰 特朗普贏不了
Who gains from a trade war with China?
誰從與中國打貿易戰中獲利？
At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru over the weekend, one of the biggest questions was whether Donald J. Trump,
上週末，在祕魯舉行的亞太經濟合作組織峯會上，一個最大的問題是，
as the next president, will stick to his threat to erect steep trade barriers against Beijing, dragging the United States into a tit-for-tat confrontation with the world’s second-largest economy.
作爲下一任總統唐納德•J•特朗普是否會堅持他的威脅，即針對北京建立高貿易壁壘，將美國拖入一場與世界第二大經濟體針鋒相對的對抗。
No such war has begun, yet it seems clear that the United States has already lost.
這種戰爭尚未開始，但似乎很明顯美國已經失敗了。
China has been steadily gaining in the global economic system.
中國在全球經濟體系中的獲利一直在穩步增長。
Waging war against globalization, America is making China’s case.
美國發動的反全球化攻勢，正在讓中國的地位得到提升。
Eswar Prasad, a former head of the Chinese division at the International Monetary Fund, argues that over the long term China comes out a winner no matter what.
國際貨幣基金組織（簡稱IMF）前中國部門負責人埃斯瓦爾•普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)稱，從長遠來看，中國無論如何都是贏家。
China’s economy would surely suffer if the United States were to impose a 45 percent tariff on nearly $500 billion worth of Chinese imports.
如果美國對價值近5000億美元的中國進口商品徵收45％的關稅，中國經濟肯定會受到損害。
The United States absorbs only 16 percent of Chinese exports, but it is China’s healthiest export market.
雖然美國只吸收了中國出口的16％，但美國是中國最健康的出口市場。
Fears of American protectionism are already stoking capital flight from China.
對美國保護主義的恐懼已經激起了中國的資本外逃。
But China might be better placed than the United States to take the blow.
但中國或許能比美國更好地經受住這種打擊。
And it would certainly counterpunch.
中國肯定也會反擊。
An editorial in China’s Global Times, a Communist Party mouthpiece, is probably not far-off in its warning that American action would mean: A batch of Boeing orders will be replaced by Airbus.
中國共產黨喉舌《環球時報》的一篇社論做出的警告也許與實際情況差得並不太遠，社論稱美國的行動將意味着：大量波音飛機的訂單將轉到歐洲空客手裏，
US auto and iPhone sales in China will suffer a setback, and US soybean and maize imports will be halted.
美國汽車的在華銷售將受重挫，蘋果手機差不多要被擠走，美國大豆、玉米將從中國絕跡。
China has several ways to retaliate.
中國有幾種報復方式。
It could bar state-owned companies from doing business with American businesses.
它可以禁止國有企業與美國公司做生意。
It could limit access to essential commodities, as it did in response to a fishing dispute with Japan by stopping exports of so-called rare earth minerals essential to the electronics industry.
它可以限制基本商品的出口，就像中國曾停止向日本出口電子工業必不可少的所謂稀土礦石，以作爲對與日本漁業爭端的迴應。
It could soft-pedal efforts to combat the piracy of American patents and copyrights.
中國還可以放鬆對盜版美國專利和版權的打擊。
Some of the United States’ most successful companies would be in for a rough ride.
美國一些最成功的企業將面臨艱難的前景。
The vast majority of Apple’s iPhones, for example, are assembled in China.
比如，絕大多數蘋果手機在中國組裝。
The assembly costs, though, account for less than 4 percent of the value added of the device.
但是，組裝成本只佔不到4％的設備附加價值。
That means China could force a halt in iPhone production at little cost to itself, while Apple would face a deeply disruptive, expensive effort to shift production elsewhere.
這意味着中國可以迫使iPhone停止生產而不給自己帶來多少代價，蘋果公司卻得把生產轉移到其他地方去，將需要做出破壞性極大的高成本努力。
Building it from scratch in the United States is nearly impossible.
在美國從零開始製造iPhone幾乎不可能。
How long could American resolve hold? An analysis by the pro-trade Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded that a full-blown trade war with China and Mexico would push unemployment in the United States to nearly 9 percent in 2020, from 4.9 percent today.
美國的決心可以持續多久？支持貿易的彼得森國際經濟研究所的一份分析給出的結論是，與中國和墨西哥進行全面貿易戰爭，將在2020年讓美國的失業率提高到近9％，如今的失業率是4.9％，
That would not improve the economic outlook for millions of working-class Americans in whose name Mr Trump proposed this fight.
這將無法改善數百萬工薪階層美國人民的經濟前景，而特朗普正是以他們的名義提出要打貿易戰的。
And that may not even be the worst part.
這可能還不是最糟糕的部分。
Circling the wagons around the American border plays directly into China’s hands in other ways.
美國從國際舞臺上抽身也讓中國在其他方面有機可乘。
Washington would be cast as the villain in the fight.
華盛頓將在這場貿易戰中被視爲反面角色。
No matter how many tricks the Chinese government might deploy against American interests, it would remain the victim in the eyes of many nations, a champion for the cause of open rules-based trade.
無論中國政府在反抗美國利益上可能採取多少伎倆，它仍會在許多國家眼裏保持着受害者的身份，保持着爲開放、以規則爲基礎的貿易事業擔當倡導者的地位。
Even if Mr Trump is just bluffing, as many of his allies say, to gain leverage in some future negotiation, much of the damage has been done.
即使像許多盟友所說的那樣，特朗普只是在虛張聲勢，爲的是在未來的談判中獲得優勢，但這已經造成了很大的損害。
His bluster has changed the perception of the role the United States will play in the world.
他的威嚇已經改變了人們對美國在世界上所起到的作用的看法。
Amid a turn toward populist nationalism in other rich countries — like Britain and France — China has emerged in the unlikely role of defender of globalized capitalism.
在其他富裕國家（如英國和法國）轉向民粹的民族主義之際，中國已搖身一變，擔當起資本主義全球化捍衛者這個不太可能的角色。
China is the one major power still talking about increased integration, said Nicholas Lardy, a China specialist at the Peterson Institute.
中國是仍在談論提高一體化程度的唯一大國，彼得森研究所的中國問題專家尼古拉斯•拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)說。
China is the only major country in the world projecting the idea that globalization brings benefits.
中國是世界上唯一展示全球化帶來好處觀念的主要國家，
And that is the United States’ loss.
這是美國的損失。
A great many countries in the developing world still believe prosperity depends on their successful integration into the supply chains that traverse the global economy.
絕大多數發展中國家仍相信，它們的繁榮依賴於在貫穿全球經濟的供應鏈中找到自己成功的位置。
By turning inward — a move already reinforced by the rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership — the United States appears to have little to offer.
美國的向內轉移讓這個國家似乎不再能爲世界提供什麼，這已經強有力地體現在美國對跨太平洋夥伴關係的拒絕上。
Steven Ciobo, Australia’s trade minister, conveyed that point only a few days after the American election by saying that his nation would work to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — a Chinese initiative among 16 Asian and Pacific countries that excludes the United States — and would support Beijing’s proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.
澳大利亞貿易部長史蒂文•喬博(Steven Ciobo)在美國大選後僅幾天就表示了這種看法，他說，他的國家將爲締結區域全面經濟夥伴關係做出努力，這是中國倡議的、不包括美國在內的16個亞太國家的貿易協定，協定將支持北京提出的亞太自由貿易區。
Ditto for Peru and Chile, which, according to a senior Chinese official in Lima, are also now seeking to join the Chinese trade initiative.
根據利馬的一位中國高級官員的說法，祕魯和智利也正在尋求加入中國倡議的貿易協定。
Almost certainly every economy in the Asian region sees its future lying more closely linked with China, Mr Prasad, the former I.M.F. official, told me.
亞洲地區的每個經濟體都幾乎可以肯定地認爲，自己的未來與中國有着更密切的聯繫，IMF前官員普拉薩德對我說。
With Trump talking about withdrawing from trade deals and making allies pay for protection, it will be tough for Asian countries to resist China’s embrace.
在特朗普大談特談退出貿易協議、讓盟國爲防禦掏錢的同時，亞洲國家將很難抵擋中國的擁抱。
And if Washington’s actions against China start to disrupt Asia’s supply chains, the United States could quickly become the region’s economic pariah.
如果華盛頓針對中國的行動開始擾亂亞洲的供應鏈的話，美國可能很快會被該地區的經濟所遺棄。
The question is, to what purpose? It can’t simply be about stopping currency manipulation.
問題是，要達到什麼的目？不可能只是關乎於阻止貨幣操縱。
That’s an outdated fear.
這種恐懼已經過時了。
Instead of working to lower the value of its currency to improve its exports,
中國已不再爲增加進出口努力降低其貨幣的價值。
China has spent about $1 trillion lately to prop up the value of the renminbi in the face of capital flight.
面對資本外逃，中國最近花了大約1萬億美元來支撐人民幣的價值。
If it stopped, the currency would drop like a stone, enhancing China’s trade competitiveness.
如果中國停止這種做法，人民幣的價值就會直線下降，從而提高中國的貿易競爭力。
Moreover, slapping trade barriers against China would do little to narrow the American trade deficit.
此外，給中國貿易設置壁壘對縮小美國貿易逆差幾乎沒有作用。
American companies building things in China wouldn’t bring much manufacturing home; in most cases they would go to some other country with cheap labor.
在中國製造產品的美國公司不會帶回多少製造業；在大多數情況下，它們會去另外一些有廉價勞動力的國家。
And to the extent they did reshore production, most of it would be highly automated, employing few additional Americans.
而且，就算迴流到國內，這種生產在很大程度上也會是高度自動化的，不能給美國人提供多少額外就業。
It does not make economic sense for Trump to want to balance trade with China, said Derek Scissors, a China specialist at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.
特朗普要與中國平衡貿易的說法在經濟上講不通，史劍道(Derek Scissors)說，他是保守派的美國企業研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的中國問題專家。
Balanced trade doesn’t bring back jobs.
平衡貿易並不能把就業帶回來。
Initially, Mr Trump might look like a winner, resolute in his defense of the working class.
特朗普起初可能看似是贏家，有決心保衛工人階級。
But any increase in popularity would be unlikely to last as the consequences started to become apparent.
但隨着這些做法的後果開始變得明顯，任何特朗普受歡迎程度的提升都不太可能持久。
Washington has already been playing a relatively weak hand trying to contain China’s influence.
相對來說，華盛頓在試圖遏制中國的影響力上已經沒有多少手牌可打。
China has skillfully deployed investments to win over countries from Africa to Latin America, broadening its network of influence.
中國已通過巧妙地利用投資，贏得了從非洲到拉丁美洲的不少國家，擴大了自己的影響範圍。
Its proposed Asian infrastructure bank proceeded, despite opposition from the Obama administration, after Britain and other American allies jumped on board.
中國建議的亞洲基礎設施銀行已經成形，儘管亞投行受到奧巴馬政府的反對，但得到了英國和其他美國盟友的參與。
China is becoming a leading member of the international community, Mr Prasad wrote in his new book Gaining Currency, but not, as the West prefers, by being co-opted into existing institutions under the current rules of the game.
中國正在成爲國際社會的主導成員，普拉薩德在他的新書《人民幣的崛起》中寫道，但不是以西方喜歡的方式，在現行的遊戲規則下，被納入了現有的體系。
Instead, China is co-opting other countries into the system of rules it wants to dictate.
相反，中國正在把其他國家納入它想要建立的規則體系中。
Mr Trump just gave China’s alternative system of rules a big push forward.
特朗普恰好爲中國非傳統規則體系的前行提供了一臂之力。
