“第四屆許淵衝翻譯大賽”的原文

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大賽原文

第四屆許淵衝翻譯大賽英譯漢原文

[1] The term law probably recalls to the reader, in the first place, the rules of conduct proclaimed by the state and enforced under more or less heavy penalties against certain classes of its citizens. Austin, the most luminous English writer on jurisprudence, who has devoted a very large portion of his well-known work to a discussion of the meaning of the word law, remarks: " A law, in the most general and comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him."[2] He further goes on to observe that where there is such a rule there is a command, and where there is a command a corresponding duty. From this standpoint Austin proceeds to discuss the various types of law, such as civil, moral, and divine law. It will be at once seen that with Austin's definition of law there is no place left for law in the scientific sense. He himself recognises this, for he writes: “Besides the various sorts of rules which are included in the literal acceptation of the term law, and those which are by a close and striking analogy, though improperly, termed laws, there are numerous applications of the term law, which rest upon a slender analogy and are merely metaphorical or figurative. Such is the case when we talk of laws observed by the lower animals; of laws regulating the growth or decay of vegetables; of laws determining the movements of inanimate bodies or masses. For whereintelligence is not, or where it is too bounded to take the name of reason, and therefore is too bounded to conceive the purpose of a law, there is not the will which law can work on, on which duty can incite or restrain. Yet through the misapplications of a name, flagrant as the metaphor is, has the field of jurisprudence and morals been deluged with muddy speculation” (p.90).

[3] Now Austin was absolutely in the right to emphasize the immense distinction between the use of the term law in science and its use in jurisprudence. There can be no doubt that the use of the same name for two totally different conceptions has led to a great deal of confusion. But on the one hand, if the flagrant misapplication of the scientific meaning of the word law to the fields of jurisprudence and morals has deluged them with "muddy speculation," there is equal certainty on the other hand that the misapplication of the legal and moral sense of the term has been equally disadvantageous to clear thinking in the field of science. Austin probably had in his mind, when he wrote the above passage, works like Hegel's Philosophy of Law, in which we find the conception of the permanent and absolute character of scientific law applied to build up a system of absolute civil and moral law which somehow realizes itself in human institutions. To the mind which has once thoroughly grasped the principle of evolution in its special factor of natural selection, the civil and moral laws of any given society at a particular time must appear as ultimate results of the struggle for existence between that society and its neighbors. The civil and moral codes of a community at any time are those which are on the average best adapted to its current needs, and best calculated to preserve its stability. They are very plastic, and change in every age with the growth and variation of social conditions. What is lawful is what is not prohibited by the laws of a particular society at a particular time; what is moral is what tends to the welfare of a particular society at a particular time. We are all well acquainted with the continual change of civil law; in fact we maintain an important body, Parliament, the chief function of which is to modify and adapt our laws, so that they shall be best fitted at each period to assist the community in its struggle for existence. Of the changes in moral law we are, perhaps, less conscious, but they are none the less real. There are very few acts which have not been moral at some period in the growth of one or other society, and there are in fact many questions with regard to which our moral judgment is totally different from that of our grandfathers. It is the relativity, or variability with age and community, of civil and moral law, which led Austin, I think, to speak somewhat strongly of the speculation which confuses such law with law in the absolute sense of science. A law in the legal or moral sense holds only for individuals and individual communities, and is capable of repeal or modification. A law of science will be seen in the sequel to hold for all normal human beings so long as their perceptive and reasoning faculties remain without material modification. The confusion of these two ideas is productive of that "muddy speculation" which finds analogies between natural laws and those of the spiritual or moral world.

[4] Now if we find that two quite distinct ideas unfortunately bear the same name, we ought, in order to avoid confusion, to re-name one of them, or failing this, we ought on all occasions to be quite sure in which of the two senses we are using the name. Accordingly in my first chapter, in order to keep clear of the double sense of the word law, I endeavored to replace it, when used in the scientific sense by some such phrase as the "brief statement or formula which resumes the relationship between a group of facts." Indeed it would be well, were it possible, to take the term formula, as already used by theologians and mathematicians, and use it in place of scientific or natural law. But the latter term has taken such root in our language that it would be hard indeed to replace it now. Besides, if the word law is to be used in one sense only, we may ask why it is the scientist rather than the jurist who is to surrender his right to the word? The jurists say that historically they have the older claim to the word — that civil law existed long anterior to scientific law.

（Source: Karl Pearson. The Grammar of Science. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1911:79-82.）

第四屆許淵衝翻譯大賽漢譯英原文

[1] 書是讀不完的。在福建德化，瓷也是讀不完的。

[2] 瓷何以用讀呢？這是因爲在我看來，瓷的誕生過程，完全是一次藝術創造的過程。尤其在德化，優質的陶瓷原材料是大自然賜給德化最珍貴的原生態物質，但單有豐富的瓷土原料，沒有良好的開發、加工、利用，就不能昭顯原材料的質地美，從而成爲優秀的作品。更重要的是，如果沒有一代代德化能工巧匠的不斷探索和實驗，沒有創造者的文化積累和堅持不懈的藝術追求，就不可能產生出質地優美、風格獨特的陶瓷產品，從而使德化成爲世界著名的陶瓷產區。因此，面對德化如陽光一樣燦爛與絢麗的瓷器，我只有用讀的姿勢,才能表達內心的激動和遐想，並且在讀的過程中，以靜思，以感悟，去領略德化瓷器獨特的韻味。

[3] 德化做陶製瓷歷史悠久，最早可追溯到新石器時期燒造印紋陶器。到明、清兩代，瓷器大量流傳歐洲，許多瓷器作品在海外被視爲珍寶。更值得自豪的是，以青白瓷爲代表的德化瓷器，在歷史上曾有力地推動了“海上絲綢之路”的興盛。有着如此豐富的文化底蘊，有着如此強盛的藝術生機，怎能不叫來這裏的世人心揣敬意、虔誠細讀呢？

[4] 然而讀瓷，又該如何讀起？

[5] 迄今爲止，在德化，已發現的古窯址有二百七十多處，倘要一一嘗讀，大概無人能及。事實上，德化有多少古瓷今瓷遍佈世界，其間又有誰能數得過來？由此看來，在德化讀瓷,心不能太大，更不能太貪，須沿着做陶製瓷的歷史發展的節奏，把握一個經脈，細細探源,深深體會，徐徐吐納，久久體味，或許可窺一斑而知全豹。

[6] 當然，不同的人，自會讀出不同的感覺和韻味。有的人從中讀出德化水的靈秀，有的人從中讀出土的本真，有的人從中讀出火的明豔，有的人從中讀出美的質感。還有的人讀瓷追溯，從瓷窯廢墟的殘片讀出瓷的柔性、寧靜、從容、潔淨、堅貞，即使破碎也棱角分明，找到了“以瓷爲魂”的精神啓示……讀瓷讀出這些感覺，又佐證了德化陶瓷的神奇獨特和精美絕倫。

[7] 今年暮春，我再次來到德化，在當地陶瓷博物館，瀏覽一件件光彩熠耀的藝術珍品，感覺自己正打開德化陶瓷這一本博大精深的大書，隔着重重歲月，一頁頁凝眸那些傳奇，那些智慧，其低迴婉轉，如訴如歌。眼睛已不夠用了，只能用心去感受那多彩多姿的世界,感受陶瓷那些美好的色澤，那些蘊含於其中的情感，甚至蘊含於其中的魂魄，併爲之發出讚歎。

[8] 瓷確是可讀的。尤其是德化瓷，細讀時常常會感受一種歷史和現實的交替，一種深刻的人生認知。這些作品，個個單純素潔，極具腴潤、典雅之美，特別是在造型樣式、裝飾圖案、工藝技法等諸多方面，都顯示了自身的顯著特點，表現出高超的水準，凸現了經典作品的風範和令人難以忘懷的傳承精神。

[9] 都說瓷器宜作生活用品，但當這些用品加強了表現力和獨特形式感，便可能上升爲作品。當作品以多種的形式和手法進行大膽嘗試與發展後，便可能上升爲精品，從而展示製作人的進取精神和創造智慧。而面對這樣的作品，我感覺讀到的是一種緣分，讀時會情不自禁地接受作品對我的一種緩緩的浸潤。如實說，我對瓷器的認識是極膚淺的，只是在讀瓷的過程中，懷着對製作人的勞動的敬意，以及對他們睿智的一種認知，靜靜享受這一藝術帶給我的樂趣，體味作品傳達出的美感，感悟作品給予我的明澈而單純的心境。在細讀它們的時候，我彷彿看到了德化歷代陶工的心血和智慧，看到了德化人勇於表現美、創造美的審美軌跡，那時，我的心中便會有古老和現代的音樂零散卻又和諧地響起，承載着陽光和鮮花，泅渡時間的長河……我甚至還發現，在我讀瓷的許多瞬間，瓷也無限度地釋放自身能量，使我溫暖，使我激動，使我找不到一個恰當的詞語來讚美它們。不過一想，又覺得在德化讀瓷而“自說自話”，也不失爲一種真實的流露，而充盈着的這種發自內心的讀瓷感受，蓋源於一個外地人對德化瓷器的喜愛和粗淺的認識。

——朱谷忠：《人民日報2016年散文精選》.北京：人民日報出版社2017年，第78-80頁《讀瓷》一文。