特朗普當選將威脅美國和世界經濟
On June 23, the UK will vote on whether to remain in the EU. On November 8, the US will vote on whether to elect Donald Trump as president. These elections have much in common. Both could lead to outcomes that would have seemed inconceivable not long ago. Both pit angry populists against the political establishment. And in both cases, polling suggests that the outcome is in doubt, with prediction markets suggesting a probability of between one in four and one in three of the radical outcome occurring.
6月23日，英國將投票決定是否繼續留在歐盟(EU)內。11月8日，美國將投票決定是否選舉唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)爲總統。這兩場投票有很多相似之處。它們可能導致的結果，在不久前看來都還讓人覺得不可思議。兩者都是憤怒的民粹主義者對上政治建制派。對於兩場投票，民調均顯示結果難以預料，預測市場顯示極端結果出現的可能性在四分之一至三分之一之間。
It is interesting to contrast the way that financial markets are reacting to these uncertainties. The markets are highly sensitive to Brexit news: the pound and the British stock market move with every new opinion poll. Analysis of option pricing suggests that if Britain votes to leave the EU, sterling could easily fall by more than 10 per cent and the British stock market by almost as much. It is widely believed that the uncertainties associated with Brexit are consequential enough to affect the policies of the US Federal Reserve and other major central banks.
對比金融市場對待這兩種不確定性的方式十分有趣。市場對“英國退歐”(Brexit)消息高度敏感：英鎊匯率和英國股市隨着每一次新的民調結果而波動。期權定價分析表明，如果英國投票決定退出歐盟，英鎊匯率會輕鬆下跌10%以上，英國股市也差不多。人們普遍認爲，與英國退歐相關的不確定性足以影響美聯儲(Fed)和其他主要央行的政策。
It would in all likelihood be economically very costly for Britain to leave the EU and would raise questions about the future cohesion of the UK. It would also threaten London’s role as a financial centre and curtail British exports to Europe.
如果英國退出歐盟，很可能付出高昂的經濟代價，並引發人們對英國未來凝聚力的質疑。這還會威脅倫敦作爲金融中心的地位，並使得英國向歐洲的出口下滑。
What I find surprising is that US and global markets and financial policymakers seem much less sensitive to “Trump risk” than they are to “Brexit risk”. Options markets suggest only modestly elevated volatility in the period leading up to the presidential election. While every Fed watcher comments on the implications of Brexit for the central bank, few, if any, comment on the possible consequences of a victory for Mr Trump in November.
讓我感到意外的是，美國、全球市場以及金融政策制定者對“特朗普風險”的敏感性似乎比對“英國退歐風險”低得多。期權市場顯示，在美國總統大選之前的這段時間內，波動性只是小幅上揚。所有的美聯儲觀察人士都對英國退歐對這家央行的影響進行了評論，但是很少有人（如果有的話）對特朗普11月勝選的可能結果進行評論。
Yet, as great as the risks of Brexit are to the British economy, I believe the risks to the US and global economies of Mr Trump’s election as president are far greater. If he is elected, I would expect a protracted recession to begin within 18 months. The damage would be felt far beyond the United States.
而我認爲，儘管英國退歐對英國經濟造成的風險很大，特朗普當選美國總統對美國乃至全球經濟的影響要大得多。如果他當選，我預計美國18個月內將陷入曠日持久的衰退。受到損害的將遠不止美國。
First, there is a substantial risk of highly erratic policy. Mr Trump has raised the possibility of more than $10tn in tax cuts, which would threaten US fiscal stability. He has also raised the possibility of the US restructuring its debt in the manner of a failed real estate developer. Perhaps this is just campaign rhetoric. But historical research suggests that presidents tend to carry out their major campaign promises.
首先，存在政策高度不穩定的巨大風險。特朗普提出了減稅逾10萬億美元的可能性，這將威脅美國的財政穩定。他還提出了以破產房地產開發商的方式對美國債務進行重組的可能性。或許，這只是競選口號。但是，歷史研究表明，美國總統往往會兌現他們的主要競選承諾。
The shadow boxing over raising the debt limit in 2011 (where all participants recognised the danger of default) was central to the stock market falling by 17 per cent.
2011年圍繞提高債務上限的激辯（各方均認識到了違約風險），是股市下跌17%的核心原因。
Second, in a world economy defined by global integration, Mr Trump’s economic nationalism is highly dangerous. Exports have been a major driver of the American economy in recent years. What would happen to exports if the US were to build a wall along its southern border and abrogate all its trade treaties? Withdrawal from trade agreements does not currently require congressional approval. If Mr Trump did even half of what he has promised, he would surely set off the worst trade war since the Great Depression.
其次，在全球一體化定義的世界經濟中，特朗普的經濟民族主義高度危險。近年來，出口一直是美國經濟的主要推動力。如果美國沿着南方邊境建起隔離牆並廢除一切貿易條約，美國出口會出現何種結果？目前，退出貿易協定並不需要國會批准。哪怕特朗普只兌現他的一半承諾，也一定會挑起自“大蕭條”(Great Depression)以來最嚴重的貿易戰。
Third, prosperity depends on a secure geopolitical environment. Requiring Japan and Korea to defend themselves and scaling back Nato is a prescription for emboldening China and Russia and promoting nuclear proliferation. A perception that the US is at war with Islam rather than with radical elements within Islam is an invitation to terrorism. In such an environment, investment and trade are unlikely to flourish.
第三，繁榮取決於安全的地緣政治環境。要求日本和韓國自我防禦、縮減北約(Nato)規模，會慫恿中國和俄羅斯，並刺激核擴散。如果美國被認爲是與整個伊斯蘭世界、而不僅是與伊斯蘭極端分子開戰，這無異於向恐怖主義發出邀請。在這樣的環境中，投資和貿易不太可能蓬勃發展。
Fourth, Mr Trump’s authoritarian style and cult of personality surely would take a toll on business confidence. He has proposed to bring back torture as a tool of US foreign policy and to change the law so he can sue and punish publications he does not like. The country was paralysed by Watergate and to a lesser extent the Iran-Contra scandal, both of which involved extralegal activity by the president’s staff and the abuse of power. Who will rest secure with President Trump controlling the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency?
第四點，特朗普的獨裁風格和個人崇拜必然會對商業信心造成負面影響。他提議把酷刑重新作爲美國外交政策的工具，修改法律以使他可以起訴和懲罰他不喜歡的出版方。美國曾因“水門事件”(Watergate)和“伊朗門”(Iran-Contra)醜聞而癱瘓（後者影響相對較輕）——兩起事件均涉及總統工作人員的法外活動和濫用職權。若特朗普總統控制聯邦調查局(FBI)和中央情報局(CIA)，誰能高枕無憂？
Finally, there is the question of uncertainty and confidence. Improving business confidence is the cheapest form of stimulus. Creating an environment where every tenet of the rule of law, internationalism and consistency in policy is up for grabs would be the best way to damage a still fragile US economy. In no election in my lifetime has a major party candidate for president been so dangerous for the economy.
最後是不確定性和信心方面的問題。改善商業信心是成本最低的刺激方式。製造一個將法治、國際主義和政策一貫性的所有原則都拋到空中的環境，是損害仍然脆弱的美國經濟的最佳方式。我有生以來從來沒見過任何一次選舉出現某一政黨的總統候選人對經濟構成如此大的威脅。
Markets are discounting the possibility of a Trump presidency. Let us all pray they are right.
市場低估了特朗普當選美國總統的可能性。讓我們一起祈禱他們是正確的吧。
