國際投資者重新看好中國經濟

The terracotta army of China bulls is back. It is More than a year since the Chinese economy started to show a sharp turnround. At that point, investors were braced for an economic “hard landing” and a currency devaluation. The turnround since then had its most direct effect on the stocks of the western companies most exposed to China for their revenues, and on the prices of commodities that China buys.

看好中國的“兵馬俑”又回來了。中國經濟出現急劇好轉跡象已有一年多時間。當時投資者正準備迎接經濟“硬着陸”和貨幣貶值。自那以來中國經濟明顯好轉，受影響最直接的是收入最依賴中國市場的西方公司的股票，以及中國購買的大宗商品的價格。

That sentiment has at last reached international investors. Last month, for the first time in three years, China enjoyed net inflows of capital, rather than outflows, according to the International Institute of Finance. China continues to dominate inflows to emerging markets. EM stocks are up 41 per cent since last January’s lows. Meanwhile, EM bond issuance hit an all-time record in this quarter while their currencies also enjoyed a great rebound, as fears recede that an “America First” US would inflict damage on global trade.

這種情緒最終傳遞到國際投資者。國際金融協會(Institute of International Finance)的數據顯示，2月，中國出現了資本淨流入而非淨流出，這是3年來的首次。中國繼續主導了新興市場的資金流入。新興市場股票與去年1月的低點相比上漲了41%。與此同時，新興市場債券發行量在本季度創出歷史最高紀錄，而它們的貨幣也大幅升值，原因是對奉行“美國優先”立場的美國破壞全球貿易的擔憂消退。

These numbers ratify in cold dollars and cents a victory for optimists on China. In the very long term, it will grow; few deny that. But there are reasons to fear that the message about China’s latest credit-driven resurgence has been received just in time for that resurgence to peak and go into reverse.

這些數據實打實地證明了看好中國人士的勝利。從非常長的時期來說，中國經濟將會增長，很少有人否認這一點。但人們有理由擔心，剛剛收到有關中國最新由信貸驅動的復甦的信息，這種復甦就已經見頂並開始逆轉。

And the ever more urgent questions of recent years remain unanswered. Can China avoid the “middle income trap”, which has seen many countries reach about China’s current level of wealth and then stall? And can it somehow avoid all previous precedents for growth on so wide and rapid a scale and avert a “sudden stop” or financial crisis at some point.

最近幾年日益迫切的問題依然沒有得到解答。中國能夠避免“中等收入陷阱”嗎？“中等收入陷阱”已使許多國家達到與中國當前相當的財富水平之後就停滯不前。它能以某種方式避免步所有那些如此快速而廣泛增長國家的後塵，防止在某個時點發生“驟停”或金融危機嗎？

The middle income trap is an acute one. Many countries have moved swiftly from being underdeveloped or poverty-stricken to gaining a middle income but in the last three decades only two countries with a population of more than 20m have managed to make the transition to “middle income”: Poland and South Korea.

中等收入陷阱是一個尖銳的問題。許多國家迅速從欠發達或貧窮國家轉變爲中等收入國家，但在最近的30年裏，只有兩個人口超過2000萬的國家成功地走出中等收入陷阱——波蘭和韓國。

Bulls suggest that China can get there. That was the central contention of a huge document Morgan Stanley published recently, with the unambiguous title “Why we are bullish on China”. If it can manage the transition from its current export-led economy to one built around domestic consumption, then the investment bank predicts that it can reach “high income” status by 2027, with average incomes rising from $8,100 now to $12,900.

看好中國的人認爲，中國可以走出中等收入陷阱。這是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)最近發表的一份長篇報告的核心論點，該報告毫不含糊地以《我們爲什麼看好中國》(Why we are bullish on China)作爲標題。這家投行預測，如果中國能夠從當前的出口主導經濟轉向國內消費驅動型經濟，那麼它到2027年就能夠成爲“高收入”國家，人均收入從當前的8100美元增長至1.29萬美元。

The greatest risks to its scenario include a return to trade protectionism and China’s demographic issues as its population begins to age.

這一預測面臨的最大風險包括，貿易保護主義迴歸以及隨着中國開始老齡化而出現的人口結構問題。

But can China avoid a financial “sudden stop”? China has pumped stimulus into its economy to a seemingly reckless degree. According to the New York Federal Reserve, the country accounts for half of all the new credit created in the world since 2005.

但中國能夠避免金融“驟停”嗎？中國出臺的經濟刺激方案達到了似乎不顧危險的程度。紐約聯儲(New York Federal Reserve)表示，在2005年以來的全球新增信貸中，中國佔到了一半。

Symptoms of the imbalances that led to the Lehman debacle are already apparent: the most recent numbers on China’s housing market show new house price inflation running at 22.1 per cent over the past year in Beijing, and 21.1 per cent in Shanghai. And the $11tn market for “wealth management products” (WMPs), which invest in money markets to get a higher yield than on bank deposits, shows similarities to pre-Lehman financial engineering. Some WMPs invest in other WMPs, just as collateralised debt obligations used to invest in each other to create “CDOs squared”.

導致雷曼兄弟(Lehman)破產的那種失衡徵兆已變得明顯：有關中國房地產市場的最新數據顯示，過去一年，北京新房價格上漲22.1%，上海上漲21.1%。規模達11萬億美元的理財產品市場顯示出與雷曼破產前的“金融工程”的相似點。理財產品投資於貨幣市場，旨在獲得高於銀行存款的收益。一些理財產品投資於其他理財產品，就像用債務抵押債券(CDO)互相投資，製造出“二次CDO”。

How can China escape its own comeuppance? The bullish Morgan Stanley view is that its debt is being largely funded domestically (or in other words “China is mis-allocating its own excess saving”). It remains a creditor to the world with a current account surplus, and does not face inflationary pressures, so that the central bank will be able to continue to inject liquidity to “manage any potential risk aversion in the domestic financial system”.

中國如何能避免這種結局呢？摩根士丹利的樂觀看法是，中國的債務主要在國內融資（換句話說，“中國正錯誤配置其過剩儲蓄”）。中國仍然是一個擁有經常賬戶盈餘的債權國，而且沒有面臨通脹壓力，因此中國央行能夠繼續注入流動性，“以管理國內金融體系中的任何潛在避險情緒”。

A more cautious view comes from George Magnus, of Oxford university’s China Centre. He points out that China’s financial system has changed markedly since 2008 and not in healthy ways. “Financial system assets, which are basically loans, have grown from around 250 per cent of GDP to 440 per cent in 2016.”

更謹慎的觀點來自牛津大學(Oxford university)中國中心(China Centre)的喬治?馬格納斯(George Magnus)。他指出，自2008年以來中國的金融體系已發生巨大變化，而且不健康。“金融體系資產（基本爲貸款）已從GDP的大約250%增至2016年的440%。”

He adds that China’s “credit gap” (the deviation of credit growth away from its long-term trend) is, at 27 per cent, very high “compared with say, Japan, Thailand and Spain, which all opened up smaller gaps before they experienced financial crises, and subsequent deleveraging”.

他補充稱，中國的“信貸擴張差額”（credit gap，信貸增速對長期趨勢的偏離幅度）爲27%，“與日本、泰國和西班牙等國相比”非常高，“這些國家在遭遇金融危機以及之後的去槓桿之前都出現了較小的信貸擴張差額。”

His sombre assessment is “the scale of the gap and the length of time it persists is positively associated with the onset of a serious financial crisis. The level of debt to GDP, variously estimated at between 260-300 per cent of GDP, the speed with which it has risen, and the eight or so years in which it has been continuing all make China a classic risk case for a fall.”

他的悲觀看法是“信貸擴張差額的規模以及持續的時間與嚴重金融危機爆發是正相關的。中國債務與GDP之比（各種估計值介於260%至300%）、這個比率上升的速度以及8年左右的持續上升，都讓中國變成了一個經典的危機風險案例。”

China is now evidently attempting to apply the brakes gently, which will in turn mean lower levels of activity and lower commodity prices, yet international money has started to arrive.

顯然，中國現在正試圖溫和剎車，這進而將意味着經濟活動減少和大宗商品價格下跌，但國際資金已開始到來。

China’s economic model is very different from that of the US, and it is buoyed by far stronger growth. The temptation to extrapolate directly from the western crisis of a decade ago should be avoided.

中國的經濟模式與美國迥然不同，中國經濟的增長強勁得多。應避免直接按照10年前西方的金融危機來推測中國。

But the similarities in the underlying dynamics are undeniable and no issue is more important for world markets than China’s effort to avoid a similar denouement. For now, Chinese growth is a fact that has lifted many other boats around the world.

但基本因素的相似性是不可否認的，對於全球市場而言，任何事情都沒有中國努力避免類似結局重要。目前，中國的增長讓全球很多其他地區水漲船高。