特朗普的“工廠拜物教”

Donald Trump and his economic team love manufacturing. That much is clear from Mr Trump’s speeches; from what his strategist Steve Bannon has said about his self-avowed economic nationalism; and from his trade adviser Peter Navarro’s attacks on Germany and stated goal to repatriate international supply chains.

唐納德?特朗普(Donald Trump)和他的經濟團隊對製造業情有獨鍾。關於這一點，從特朗普的發言中、從其戰略師史蒂夫?班農(Steve Bannon)圍繞其自稱的經濟民族主義的說法中、以及從其貿易顧問彼得?納瓦羅(Peter Navarro)對德國的攻擊和其宣示的將國際供應鏈遷回國內的目標中，都能看得十分清楚。

There is a certain method in their factory worker machismo. As a matter of economic logic, a fetish for mercantilism — exports are good, imports are bad — goes hand in hand with one for manufacturing. The high productivity of manufacturing means a country with a large proportion of its workforce in factories needs to ship a lot of its output abroad: it will simply be producing too many goods for its own population to consume. Since it is harder to import services than goods, an industrial power will find it difficult to consume the full value of its excess production. Instead, it tends to become a financial creditor to the rest of the world, lending its customers the funds to buy its goods.

在他們這種對工廠工人的大男子情結中，存在着某種邏輯。出於經濟上的邏輯，重商主義（那種認爲出口是好事、進口是壞事的觀念）的拜物教和製造業拜物教是成對出現的。製造業的高產意味着工廠工人佔勞動力很大比例的國家需要輸出許多產品：它生產的商品數量超出本國人口消費能力。由於進口服務比進口商品更難，一個工業大國會發現很難消費其過剩產出的全部價值。相反，該國往往會成爲世界上其他國家的金融債權國，向客戶出借資金，讓對方買下該國的商品。

On a global level, there is only so much demand for manufacturers, and therefore only so many manufacturing jobs to be had. Only in a few countries, therefore, can manufacturing be the preponderant economic activity. For the past two generations, there are three countries that have traditionally been goods producers to the world: Germany, Japan and China. It is no coincidence that these have been both industrial powerhouses and surplus economies.

在全球層面，對製造業的需求只有這麼多，所以製造業崗位也只能有這麼多。因此，製造業只能在少數國家成爲佔優勢的經濟活動。過去兩代人期間，只有三個國家成爲傳統意義上的世界工廠：德國、日本和中國。並非巧合的是，這三國既是工業強國，又是貿易順差經濟體。

The economic nationalism of President Trump and Messrs Navarro and Bannon can be described as Germany-envy. In those manufacturing powers, they see countries that have fought to hold on to the good, manly jobs that validate the status of the native working class. Like so often with machismo, the envy is rooted in insecurity — a feeling of inadequacy compared with the perceived strength sported by these economies. Since export surpluses cannot be enjoyed by all countries (unlike broader gains from trade), manufacturing fetishism leads logically to a zero-sum view of trade policy. It entails an attempt to displace the current surplus of manufacturing producers. Thus, in the context of a Germany-envying inferiority complex, the desire to repatriate global supply chains, limit imports and boost manufacturing makes sense.

特朗普總統以及納瓦羅和班農的經濟民族主義可以被描述爲對德國的嫉妒。在他們看來，這些製造業強國努力保住了那些待遇不錯的、男子氣概的工作崗位，從而捍衛了本土工人階級的地位。正如大男子情結所經常伴隨的，這種嫉妒的根源在於不安全感——與那些經濟體貌似具有的實力攀比所帶來的不足感。由於不是所有國家都能享有出口順差（這一點不同於通過貿易來擴大受益面），因此製造業拜物教合乎邏輯地得出對於貿易政策的零和看法。它涉及一種與製造業國家爭奪經常賬戶順差的企圖。因此，在嫉妒德國的自卑情結的大背景下，把全球供應鏈遷回國內、限制進口和提振製造業的想法是可以自圓其說的。

But, outside the fetishists’ fantasies, it will not produce the desired effect. First, manufacturing machismo itself is a handicap when it comes to grasping the opportunities for a thriving economy. By far the largest number of jobs to be created in the US over the next decade will be in services, in particular the caring professions.

但是，在拜物者幻想的世界以外，它並不會產生想要的效果。首先，就抓住一個繁榮經濟體的機遇而言，念念不忘製造業的大男子情結本身是一大障礙。今後10年，美國創造的服務業崗位數量（尤其是護理工作）將遠超其他經濟部門。

Factory fetishists might retort that it is this development they want to oppose by resurrecting factory employment. But this runs headlong into a second obstacle. Regardless of trade, automation is reducing the need for manufacturing jobs everywhere. As the economist Brad DeLong pointed out in a recent essay, that is true in Germany, too, which has seen a fall in factory employment almost as sharp as in the US (the same holds for Japan). Yes, manufacturing employment may be higher in Germany, and factory fetishists can regret that the US did not fight harder to hold on to dwindling manufacturing employment. But doing so would do nothing to stop the overall decline. No advanced economy, whether the US or Germany, will ever return to the high manufacturing employment shares of the mid-1970s or earlier. Besides, many German workers have faced long wage stagnation. And all the big industrial economies have chosen to internationalise their supply chains. Things are not as different from the US as the Trumpteam imagine.

工廠崇拜者們可能會反駁，他們想要復興工廠就業，正是爲了頂住這種發展趨勢。但這樣就會直接撞向第二個障礙。撇開貿易不談，自動化正在減少各地的製造業崗位需求。正如經濟學家布拉德?德朗(Brad DeLong)在最近的一篇論文中指出的，這一點也適用於德國，其工業就業的降幅幾乎和美國一樣劇烈（日本也是如此）。沒錯，德國的製造業就業比例或許高一些，而工廠崇拜者可以對這樣一點表示遺憾：當初美國在保住不斷減少的製造業就業方面不夠努力。但即使努力了也無助於遏止製造業就業的整體下滑。無論是美國還是德國，沒有哪個發達經濟體會回到上世紀70年代中期或者更早時期的那種高比例的製造業就業。此外，很多德國工人已多年面臨薪資停滯，同時所有大型工業經濟體都選擇將供應鏈國際化。這些經濟體的情況不像特朗普團隊所想的那樣，與美國存在什麼重大差異。

It gets worse. If the factory fetishists are obsessed enough to throw themselves into a battle for a steadily shrinking type of employment, they may well find that their most obvious weapons are doubled-edged at best. Suppose the Trump administration forced through changes in the North American Free Trade Agreement so as to repatriate all parts of the car production process, the most salient of the supply chains Mr Navarro says he wants to bring back. The result will be to make US-produced cars more expensive. How is that going to help expand American car exports?

還有更糟糕的問題。如果這些工廠崇拜者一意孤行，爲了保護一類穩步萎縮的就業而不惜一戰，他們很可能發現，自己手中最明顯的武器往好了說也只是一把雙刃劍。假設特朗普政府強行通過對《北美自由貿易協定》(NAFTA)的修改，從而把納瓦羅希望遷回國內的供應鏈中最顯著的汽車生產供應鏈遷回國內。結果將是使美國生產的汽車更昂貴。這怎麼會幫助擴大美國汽車出口？

Or suppose that a border tax, or some other protectionist device, is put in place and successfully cuts imports. This would reduce the living standards of many Americans who would pay more for their consumer goods. But would it at least reduce the trade deficit or even create a surplus? No: the most likely effect would be to cut exports, too.

或者假設出臺邊境稅，或者利用其他一些保護主義手段成功地削減進口。這將降低很多美國人的生活標準，因爲他們需要爲消費品花費更多的錢。不過，這能否至少降低貿易逆差，甚至創造貿易盈餘？答案是否定的：最有可能的影響是出口也會減少。

Supporters of a border tax argue that the downward pressure on imports will temper the sale of dollars, causing an appreciation that will rebalance trade. Others cite the “backhaul problem”: shipowners adjust prices to discourage one-way shipments that leave vessels empty on half of their routes. If protectionism means they have fewer imports to bring in, they will charge more to take exports out.

邊境稅的支持者主張，進口所受的下行壓力會限制美元的賣出，從而導致美元升值，推動貿易再平衡。其他人則引述“回程問題”：船東會調整價格，以抑制船舶在回程期間空載的單程運輸。如果保護主義意味着船東運送到美國的進口減少，他們將擡高把美國的出口運往海外的運費。

Thus, protectionist policies are likely to shrink imports and exports, leaving the protected economy worse off than before and in no better position even by the misguided measures of the manufacturing fetishists themselves.

因此，保護主義政策很可能同時減少進口和出口，讓受到保護的經濟的狀況比之前更糟，即使採用製造業崇拜者自己的具有誤導性的衡量標準，也不會處於一個更好的境地。

Like all visions rooted in insecurity and envy, factory fetishism reflects a real problem. But pursuing it risks producing conflict, with little of the good effect the fetishists expect.

就像所有植根於不安全感和嫉妒的願景一樣，工廠拜物教反映了一個切實的問題。但是與這個問題“死磕”有可能製造衝突，而不會帶來工廠崇拜者期待的良好效果。