年美國國務卿克林頓在美國和平研究所的講話
Remarks at the United States Institute of Peace
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
October 21, 2009, Renaissance Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.
重振不擴散體制：美國主導的外交行動
美國國務卿希拉里.克林頓在美國和平研究所的講話
華盛頓哥倫比亞特區 五月花萬麗酒店
2009年10月21日
Good morning. Thank you. Thank you very much.
上午好。謝謝你們。非常感謝你們。
It’s a great honor to be introduced by Ambassador Moose. George and I have had the privilege of working together in the past, and I look forward to his good advice and counsel as we move forward on many of these important matters. I want to thank Ambassador Solomon. Dick has done an extraordinary job, as you all know, both in his prior incarnation with the State Department and now, of course, with the United States Institute of Peace. And Tara, thank you for your leadership and your commitment to these issues.
由穆斯（Moose）大使將我介紹給大家，令我深感榮幸。喬治（George）和我曾有幸共事，我期待着在我們推動諸多重要事務的過程中得到他的指教。我要感謝所羅門（Solomon）大使。迪克（Dick）的工作極爲出色，正如你們大家所知，在他過去任職國務院期間及目前在美國和平研究所的工作中都是如此。還有特拉（Tara），感謝你在這些事務中的領導作用和不懈努力。
This is an audience that has many familiar faces in it, people who have been on the frontlines of American foreign policy on conflict resolution and so many specific issues. And I want to particularly just thank two people who have really stepped up to assume new responsibilities on behalf of the Obama Administration, someone who was on the board of USIP, now Under Secretary Maria Otero, and also Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher who — both of whom I’m delighted are part of the team at the State Department. And sitting right there in the front row is one of my role models, Betty Bumpers, who started beating the drums for world peace and for an end to much of the behavior that is so troublesome and threatening between nations. And I am so pleased to see her.
今天在座的有很多熟悉的面孔，你們一直站在美國外交政策的最前沿，致力於解決衝突及許許多多具體問題。我特別要感謝兩位代表奧巴馬政府切實承擔起新責任的人：前任美國和平研究所理事會成員及現任副國務卿瑪麗亞?奧特羅（Maria Otero）以及副國務卿埃倫?陶謝爾（Ellen Tauscher）。我非常高興她們兩人都是國務院團隊的成員。坐在最前排的是我的一位學習榜樣，貝蒂?邦珀斯（Betty Bumpers），你們都知道，她率先爲世界和平以及制止國家間令人擔憂並構成威脅的種種行爲而大聲疾呼。我很高興見到她。
It’s an honor to have been asked to give this second annual Dean Acheson lecture. The Institute has many friends at the State Department and we’re looking forward to the day when we’re not only friends, but neighbors. I know that your new building across the street will allow for even closer cooperation as we work together to build peace and end conflict. I also know that Monday marked your 25th anniversary, and I thank you for the extraordinary work and leadership you’ve provided over the last two and a half decades, including the work you’ve done to review our nuclear posture.
應邀成爲第二屆年度迪安?艾奇遜演講的主講人令我感到榮幸。貴所在國務院有很多朋友，我們期待着不僅是朋友而且是鄰居的那一天早日到來。我知道，貴所與國務院隔街相望的新樓將使我們能在共同建設和平與結束衝突的過程中進行更密切的合作。我還知道，本週一是貴所成立25周年紀念日，我感謝你們25年來的卓越努力和領導作用，包括你們爲審議我們的核態勢所做的工作。The Institute has helped drive the foreign policy debate on nuclear weapons, on conflict prevention and many other critical issues, and you are continuing that essential role. Now, some of you may recall that Secretary Gates’ remarks on this occasion last year when he argued eloquently — and I might add, very convincingly — for providing additional resources to the State Department was a signal event. To have the Secretary of Defense come before a distinguished audience like this and to argue very forcefully on behalf of our civilian capacity is still reverberating throughout Washington.
貴所爲推動有關核武器問題、防止衝突問題及其他很多關鍵性問題的外交政策辯論提供了幫助，而且你們正在繼續發揮這種重要作用。在座各位中有人可能記得，國防部長蓋茨（Gates）去年在上屆演講中以雄辯的口才指出——我認爲也是極有說服力地指出——必須爲國務院增撥資源，這是一個具有象徵性的表態。國防部長來到與今天類似的由傑出人士組成的聽衆面前爲增強我們這個非軍事機構的能力而大聲疾呼，這一呼籲至今仍在整個華盛頓引起迴響。
In advocating a budget increase for a department other than his own, Secretary Gates said he was returning a favor, because as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson had argued that the United States needed a strong military when cutbacks threatened to gut U.S. forces after the Second World War. Acheson was involved in another vital foreign policy issue where his position transcended bureaucratic allegiances, and his actions provide a useful historical backdrop for my subject today.
蓋茨部長在要求爲這個並不由他領導的部門增加預算時說，他要還一份人情，因爲在二戰後的削減措施使美國軍隊面臨被抽去精髓的危險時，時任國務卿的迪安?艾奇遜曾主張美國必須擁有一支強大的軍隊。在另外一項至關重要的外交政策事務中，艾奇遜所持的立場也超越了山頭主義，他所採取的行動爲我今天要談的主題提供了有益的歷史背景。
At the close of World War II, Acheson was serving as Under Secretary of State. Secretary of State — or Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the country’s leading advocate for nuclear arms control. But Stimson had a tough opponent in then-Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who wanted to leverage the United States’s nuclear advantage to the maximum extent possible. Acheson looked beyond the confines of his bureaucracy and joined with the Secretary of War in favor of arms control. He recognized that the world was at a crossroads. And he saw that the United States had an obligation and an interest in working with other nations to curb the spread of the most dangerous weapons in history.
在二戰接近尾聲時，艾奇遜擔任副國務卿。擔任國務卿——我是說戰爭部長（Secretary of War）——的史汀生（Henry Stimson）是美國主張控制核軍備的先鋒， 但他的主張遭到了時任國務卿的詹姆斯?貝爾納斯（James F. Byrnes）的堅決反對，因爲貝爾納斯想要最大限度地利用美國的核優勢。艾奇遜沒有侷限於他所在的部門，而是與戰爭部長共同主張實行軍備控制。他認識到世界當時正處在一個十字路口，他認爲美國出於義務和利益應當同其他國家一道遏制有史以來最危險的武器的擴散。
Well, today, we find ourselves at yet another crossroads. During the Cold War, we feared an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in October 1962, the world came close. But President Kennedy realized that a nuclear war was profoundly unwinnable. And over time, he and successive administrations took steps to mitigate that risk and curtail the spread of nuclear weapons.
今天，我們處於又一個十字路口。冷戰期間，我們擔心在美國與蘇聯之間爆發一場全面核戰爭。1962年10月，世界就曾瀕臨這樣一場戰爭的邊緣。但是，肯尼迪（Kennedy）總統認識到，在一場核戰爭中根本不可能有勝利者。隨着時間的推移，他和其後歷屆政府都採取步驟降低這種風險，阻遏核武器的擴散。
We now face a different kind of threat, a threat that is more diffuse and perhaps even more dangerous. The range and intensity of current nuclear proliferation challenges is alarming. The international community failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We are now engaged in diplomatic efforts to roll back this development. Iran continues to ignore resolutions from the United Nations Security Council demanding that it suspend its enrichment activities and live up to those international obligations.
我們今天面臨着一種不同的威脅，這一威脅的範圍更廣，危險性可能更大。當前核擴散問題發展到了令人擔心的範圍和程度。國際社會未能制止北韓發展核武器。我們目前正爲扭轉這一變化而進行外交努力。伊朗繼續無視聯合國安理會要求其停止鈾濃縮活動、履行其國際義務的各項決議。
The International Atomic Energy Agency doesn’t have the tools or authority to carry out its mission effectively. We saw this in the institution’s failure to detect Iran’s covert enrichment plant and Syria’s reactor project. Illicit state and non-state proliferation networks are engaging in sensitive nuclear trade and circumventing laws designed to protect us against the export and import of nuclear materials.
國際原子能機構缺乏有效執行其使命的手段或權威。我們可以從該機構未能發現伊朗的祕密濃縮鈾工廠和敘利亞的核反應堆項目這樣的事實中看到這一點。非法的國家和非國家擴散網正在進行敏感的核交易，規避旨在制止核材料進出口以保護我們的相關法律。Working through Senator Lugar’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we have deactivated or destroyed thousands of nuclear weapons. But vast stocks of potentially dangerous nuclear materials remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. With growing global energy needs and the threat of climate change, the demand for nuclear power is expanding, and we do need to continue to facilitate the legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, this expansion has not been accompanied by corresponding measures that could reduce the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.
通過參議員盧格（Lugar）提出的《減少威脅合作計劃》，我們使數以千計的核武器退役或予以銷燬，但大量有潛在危險的核材料依然有可能被偷竊或被轉用。隨着全球能源需求的增長和氣候變化的威脅，對核電的需求也不斷擴大，因此我們確實需要繼續促進核能的合法與和平利用。然而，在覈電擴大使用的同時，並沒有相應的措施來降低核武器擴散的危險。
We also know that unless these trends are reversed, and reversed soon, we will find ourselves in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states, and increasing likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons.
我們還知道，除非扭轉這些趨勢，而且迅速扭轉，我們將會置身於一個有核國家數量不斷增加、恐怖分子染指核武器可能性日益增大的世界。
President Obama recognizes this danger. In April, in Prague, he presented the United States’ vision for how to meet these challenges. He reinforced the core bargain of the global nonproliferation regime, calling on all states to live up to their responsibilities and put down a marker for every nation when he called for a world free of nuclear weapons. And last month, when President Obama became the first United States President to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council, he presided over the unanimous passage of a resolution that set forth a robust nonproliferation and arms control agenda.
奧巴馬總統認識到這一危險。今年4月，他在布拉格提出了美國關於如何應對這些挑戰的設想。他在呼籲建立一個無核世界時，充實了全球防擴散體制的核心條件，要求所有國家履行自己的責任，也提出了每一個國家都不應當逾越的界線。上個月，奧巴馬總統成爲主持聯合國安理會會議的首位美國總統。在他的主持下，會議一致通過決議，制定了一個內容充實的防擴散和軍備控制議程。
Pursuing these goals is not an act of starry-eyed idealism or blind allegiance to principle. It is about taking responsibility to prevent the use of the world’s most dangerous weapons, and holding others accountable as well. The policies that take us there must be up to the task: tough, smart, and driven by the core interests of the United States. As the President has acknowledged, we might not achieve the ambition of a world without nuclear weapons in our lifetime or successive lifetimes. But we believe that pursuing this vision will enhance our national security and international stability.
尋求這些目標並非某種不切實際的理想主義行爲或拘泥於原則，而是關係到承擔防止使用世界上最危險武器的責任，同時也要求其他國家承擔責任。爲實現我們的目標而制定的政策必須不辜負這項使命：有力、明智、符合美國的核心利益。如同總統所承認，在我們這一代或未來若干代時間內，我們也許無法實現無核世界的宏偉目標。但我們相信，追求這一願景將增強我國的安全與國際穩定。
We also believe that the United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies and partners while we pursue our vision.
我們還相信，在追求這一願景的同時，美國必須保持一個安全、有效的核武庫，以阻遏任何敵人，保衛我們的盟友和夥伴。
All countries have an obligation to help address the challenges posed by nuclear weapons, beginning with the nuclear weapons states. As the permanent members of the Security Council and the only nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT, we all have a responsibility to stop the erosion of the nonproliferation regime and to address the current crisis of compliance in which some countries apparently feel they can violate their obligations and defy the Security Council with impunity.
世界各國都有義務爲應對核武器構成的挑戰作出貢獻，這首先要從有核國家做起。作爲安理會常任理事國以及《不擴散核武器條約》承認的核武器國，我們都有責任遏制對不擴散體制的侵蝕，並消除在條約執行方面存在的危機，一些國家顯然認爲它們可以違背其義務，蔑視安理會，而不受懲罰。The non-nuclear weapon states also have a responsibility to work to prevent further proliferation. That responsibility does not end with their decision to forgo their own weapons ambitions and accept safeguards to demonstrate the sincerity of that decision. It must continue with active participation in resolute efforts to impede additional countries from crossing the nuclear threshold, because their own security and well-being are profoundly affected by the outcome of such efforts.
無核國家也有責任爲防止進一步的擴散而進行努力。這一責任不僅限於決定放棄尋求核武器並接受保障體制以就該決定表示出誠意，還必須體現於繼續積極參與，作出果斷努力，阻止更多國家突破核門檻， 因爲它們自身的安全和利益將深受這些努力結果的影響。所有核材料或核技術擁有國都有責任防止它們被偷盜或被非法轉運。
All states with nuclear materials or technology have a responsibility to protect them against theft or illicit transfer. Now if all countries step up to these responsibilities, as we are doing, we can revitalize the nonproliferation regime for decades to come. The cornerstone of that regime, the NPT, remains sound and need not be altered. But as we have done for 40 years, we must build on that essential foundation by supplementing the treaty and updating the overall regime with measures designed to confront emerging challenges.
如果所有國家像我們一樣加快步伐履行這些責任，我們就能在今後數十年重振不擴散體制。該體制的基石——即《不擴散核武器條約》——依然是健全的，並不需要改變。然而，正如我們過去40年來所做的那樣，我們必須加強這一關鍵性基礎，完善條約，全面更新體制，採取旨在應對新挑戰的措施。
The Administration’s blueprint for our efforts is based on the hard, day-to-day work of active diplomacy — confronting proliferators, strengthening the capabilities of the IAEA and ensuring that all nations abide by the rights and obligations of the nonproliferation regime, negotiating a new treaty with Russia to reduce our nuclear arsenal, seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prompt negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, undertaking a review of the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’s defense strategy, and supporting budgetary priorities that guarantee the safety and effectiveness of our deterrent.
本屆政府爲我們的行動所制定的藍圖系基於積極的日常外交努力；勇敢地面對擴散者；加強國際原子能機構的能力，確保所有國家遵循不擴散體制規定的權利與義務；與俄羅斯談判新協議以減少我們的核庫存；尋求批准《全面禁止核試驗條約》，並立即開始談判《裂變材料禁產條約》；對核武器在美國防禦戰略中的作用進行審議；支持那些確保我們威懾力的安全及有效性的重點預算項目。
Now, I am well aware of the difficult road ahead to uphold the NPT, restore the international nonproliferation consensus, and reinvigorate the global nonproliferation regime. Progress will not be easy. At times, our achievements may [seem] incomplete and unsatisfying, but we are committed to seeing this through, and we believe the world is depending on our success. The reality is that the nuclear threat cannot be checked by us acting alone. Whether we seek to prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear materials, establish a new international framework for civil nuclear energy cooperation, increase the IAEA’s budget, or persuade governments with nuclear weapons ambitions to abandon their quest, we can only achieve our goals through cooperation with others. In recent years, however, polarization within the international community on proliferation issues between states with nuclear weapons and those without have created obstacles to the cooperation that is needed.
我非常清楚，要維持《不擴散核武器條約》，恢復國際不擴散共識以及重振全球不擴散體制，未來的道路是艱難的。進展將不會一帆風順。有時，我們的成就可能看似不徹底、不能令人滿意。然而， 我們有決心完成這項事業。我們認爲世界有賴於我們的成功。現實情況是，僅靠我們單獨行動是不能遏制核威脅的。無論是防止危險的核材料的偷運，建立新的民用核能合作的國際框架，增加國際原子能機構的預算，還是說服有核武器企圖的政府放棄其計劃，我們只有通過與別國合作才能實現我們的目標。然而，近年來國際社會在擴散問題上出現了兩極分化，有核國家與無核國家之間的分歧爲必要的合作帶來障礙。
Overcoming these obstacles must start from the premise that the nuclear threat is a danger that all nations face together, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is not just in the interests of the existing nuclear weapon states, as it is sometimes asserted. Indeed, the non-nuclear weapon states have as much or more to lose if these weapons spread or are ever used again. The same logic applies to our work to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. A nuclear terrorist bomb detonated anywhere in the world would have vast economic, political, ecological and social consequences everywhere in the world.
要克服這些障礙，就必須接受一個前提：核威脅是所有國家共同面對的危險；防止核武器擴散並不像有些人所說的那樣僅僅符合有核國家的利益。的確，如果這些武器得以擴散或再度使用，那麼無核國家會遭受同樣甚至更大的損失。我們抗擊核恐怖主義威脅的工作也是如此。在世界上任何地方引爆恐怖主義核彈均會給全球帶來巨大的經濟、政治、生態乃至社會後果。It’s easy to advocate a go-it-alone approach that ignores the cooperation needed to address universal challenges. But we have seen the failed results of this approach. The more difficult, but more productive path is to engage our allies and partners around the world in that hard work of diplomacy. Because as President Obama has said, we must pursue a path that is grounded in the rights and responsibilities of all nations. We must continue to strengthen each of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of global nonproliferation — preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And to those three pillars, we should add a fourth: preventing nuclear terrorism. Stopping terrorists from acquiring the ultimate weapon was not a central preoccupation when the NPT was negotiated, but today, it is, and it must remain at the top of our national security priorities.
忽視應對全世界面臨的挑戰所必需的合作、提倡單獨行動的做法是容易的，但我們已看到這一做法所導致的失敗結果。更艱難但卻更富有成效的道路是，促使我們在世界各地的盟國及合作伙伴參與這一艱鉅的外交工作，因爲正如奧巴馬總統所言，我們必須尋求一條基於所有國家的權利與義務的道路。我們必須繼續加強全球不擴散相輔相成的三大要素：防範核武器擴散、推動裁軍進程和便利和平使用核能。在這三者基礎之上，我們還應增加第個四要素：防範核恐怖主義。在談判《不擴散核武器條約》時，防範恐怖分子獲取這一終極武器尚不是一個核心議題，但今天它是。它必須是我們國家安全的首要議程。
As we advance this agenda, we can reduce the size and scope of the proliferation threat to our nation, our children, and future generations. The U.S.-led diplomatic campaign began with countering immediate proliferation threats, and will seek over time to improve verification, stiffen penalties, disrupt illicit proliferation networks, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and allow nations to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear power, while deploying safeguards against proliferation.
在我們推進這項議程時，我們能夠縮小擴散對我國和我們的子孫後代構成威脅的規模和範圍。美國領導的外交行動首先要反擊擴散的直接威脅。今後，我們將努力改進覈查、加重懲處措施、搗毀非法擴散網絡、減少核恐怖主義威脅，並在採取保障措施防擴散的同時使各國能夠享受和平使用核能帶來的好處。
Thwarting the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran is critical to shoring up the nonproliferation regime. Within the framework of the six-party talks, we are prepared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Korea’s return to the negotiating table is not enough. Current sanctions will not be relaxed until Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps toward complete denuclearization. Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea.
挫敗北韓和伊朗發展核武器的野心對加強不擴散體制至關重要。我們在六方會談的框架內準備與北韓舉行雙邊會談。但是北韓僅僅回到談判桌前還不夠。在平壤向全面去核化邁出可覈查、不可逆轉的步驟之前，我們不會放鬆目前的制裁。北韓領導人不應幻想美國會與一個擁有核武器的北韓建立正常關係並取消制裁。
Together with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, the United States is pursuing a dual-track approach toward Iran. If Iran is serious about taking practical steps to address the international community’s deep concerns about its nuclear program, we will continue to engage both multilaterally and bilaterally to discuss the full range of issues that have divided Iran and the United States for too long. The door is open to a better future for Iran, but the process of engagement cannot be open-ended. We are not prepared to talk just for the sake of talking.
美國與其他聯合國安理會常任理事國及德國一起對伊朗實行雙軌做法。如果伊朗確實打算基於國際社會對其核項目的深切關注採取切實措施，我們將繼續與伊朗進行多邊和雙邊接觸，商討長期以來造成伊朗和美國之間分歧的全部議題。通向更美好未來的大門對伊朗敞開着。但是接觸的進程不可能是無限期的。我們不準備僅僅爲談判而談判。
As President Obama noted after the October 1st meeting in Geneva, we appear to have made a constructive beginning, but that needs to be followed up by constructive actions. In particular, prompt action is needed on implementing the plan to use Iran’s own low-enriched uranium to refuel the Tehran research reactor, which is used to produce medical isotopes.
正如奧巴馬總統10月1日在日內瓦會談後所指出的，我們看來有了一個建設性開端，但接下來必須有建設性行動。尤其必須立即採取行動，執行有關用伊朗自己提煉的低濃度濃縮鈾爲德黑蘭作研究用的反應堆提供燃料的計劃——該反應堆用於生產醫用同位素。
Enhancing the IAEA’s capabilities to verify whether states are engaging in illicit nuclear activity is essential to strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The IAEA’s additional protocol, which allows for more aggressive, short-notice inspections should be made universal, through concerted efforts to persuade key holdout states to join.
加強提高國際原子能機構覈查有關國家是否在從事非法核活動的能力對加強不擴散體制至爲關鍵。國際原子能機構的附加議定書——它允許進行更嚴格的突擊檢查——應當通過共同協調的努力使之在世界通用，以說服拒不參加的主要國家加入其中。
Our experience with Iraq’s nuclear program before the 1991 Gulf War showed that the IAEA’s rights and resources needed upgrading. The additional protocol is the embodiment of those lessons. A failure to make this protocol the global standard means the world will have failed to heed the lessons of history at our collective peril. The IAEA should make full use of existing verification authorities, including special inspections. But it should also be given new authorities, including the ability to investigate suspected nuclear weapons-related activities even when no nuclear materials are present. And if we expect the IAEA to be a bulwark of the nonproliferation regime, we must give it the resources necessary to do the job.
我們在1991年海灣戰爭前在伊拉克核項目方面的經驗教訓說明，需要提升國際原子能機構的權力並增加它的資源。附加議定書是汲取這些教訓的體現。如不使此議定書成爲全球通行的標準，則意味着世界未能吸取歷史教訓，其後果將危害我們所有人。國際原子能機構應當充分利用現有核查授權，包括進行特別覈查的授權。但也應當授予它新的權力，包括即使在沒有當場發現核材料的情況下也能調查與核武器相關的嫌疑活動。如果我們期望國際原子能機構成爲不擴散體制的一個堡壘，我們就必須讓它獲得做好這項工作的必要資源。Improving the IAEA’s ability to detect safeguard violations is not enough. Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. That is certainly not the case today. Despite American efforts, the international community’s record of enforcing compliance in recent years is unacceptable. Compliance mechanisms and procedures must be improved. We should consider adopting automatic penalties for violation of safeguards agreements; for example, suspending all international nuclear cooperation, or IAEA technical cooperation projects until compliance has been restored.
僅僅提高國際原子能機構覈查違反保障機制做法的能力還不夠。試圖違規的國家必須清楚，它們一旦被發現，將付出高昂的代價。但今天的情況顯然不是這樣。儘管有美國的努力，但近幾年來國際社會確保執行保障機制的記錄仍是不能接受的。對遵守機制與程序必須作出改進。針對違反保障機制協議的行爲，我們應該考慮採用自動懲罰措施。例如，中斷所有的國際核合作或國際原子能機構技術合作項目，直至恢復遵守協議爲止。
And because the role of the Security Council is so important on compliance issues, we are working to rebuild the consensus among the five permanent members on NPT enforcement.
鑑於安理會在遵守協議問題上的作用如此重要，我們正在努力在五個常任理事國中就執行《不擴散核武器條約》問題重新建立共識。
We must also use financial and legal tools to better disrupt illicit proliferation networks. This will mean tightening controls on transshipment, a key source of illicit trade, and strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. A reinvigorated nonproliferation regime should enable countries, especially developing countries, to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, while providing incentives for them not to build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities. These facilities are inherently capable of producing both fuel for nuclear reactors and the fissile cores of nuclear weapons and should not be allowed to proliferate.
我們還須運用金融和法律手段，更有效地瓦解從事擴散的非法網絡。這將意味着更嚴格地控制轉運——這是非法貿易的重要來源，並加強核供應國集團（Nuclear Suppliers Group）對濃縮與再加工技術轉讓的限制。一個更有力的不擴散體制應該使各國——尤其是發展中國家——能夠享受和平利用核能的好處，同時爲它們帶來不建造自身鈾濃縮與再加工設施的種種好處。這些設施的性質註定它們既能生產核反應堆燃料，也能生產核武裂變材料，因此不應增多。
But we need to ensure that states have access to nuclear fuel, a right guaranteed under the NPT. The best way to accomplish this goal is by expanding fuel cycle options. Multilateral fuel supply assurances, international fuel banks, and spent fuel repositories can enhance the confidence of states embarking on or expanding their nuclear power programs. These initiatives will encourage countries to pursue legitimate civil nuclear plans without assuming the risk and expense of constructing their own fuel cycle facilities. So we will support international fuel banks and effective fuel service arrangements as key components of our nonproliferation policy.
但我們需要確保各個國家都可以獲得核燃料，這是《不擴散核武器條約》予以保證的權利。實現這個目標的最好辦法是擴大燃料循環的各種途徑。多邊的燃料供應保證、國際燃料庫和廢燃料儲存庫能增強正在開展或擴大核電力項目國家的信心。這些積極措施將鼓勵各國實施合理的民用核計劃，而不必承擔建造自身燃料循環設施的風險與費用。因此，我們將把支持國際燃料庫和有效的燃料服務安排作爲我們不擴散政策的重要內容。
Now, we cannot divorce nonproliferation efforts from the challenge of reducing existing nuclear arsenals, both are part of the core bargain of the NPT. All countries face a common danger from nuclear weapons, but the nuclear arms states, and especially the United States and Russia, have an obligation to reduce their weapons stockpiles. And the Obama Administration is actively pursuing these steps. We are negotiating an agreement with the Russians that will succeed the soon-to-expire START treaty, and significantly reduce the nuclear forces of both sides. It will also set the stage for even deeper cuts in the future.
然而，我們無法把不擴散的努力與減少現有核武庫的挑戰截然分開。兩者都是《不擴散核武器條約》的重要條件。所有國家都面臨來自核武器的共同危險，但有核國家——尤其是美國和俄羅斯——有責任減少各自的武器庫存，而奧巴馬政府正在積極採取這些步驟。我們正在與俄羅斯方面談判一項協議，接替即將到期的《削減戰略武器條約》（START Treaty），並大幅度削減雙方的核軍備。它也將爲今後作出更大削減創造條件。
Let me be clear: the United States is interested in a new START agreement because it will bolster our national security. We and Russia deploy far more nuclear weapons than we need or could ever potentially use without destroying our ways of life. We can reduce our stockpiles of nuclear weapons without posing any risk to our homeland, our deployed troops or our allies.
我要明確表示，美國有意在《削減戰略武器條約》後達成一項新協議是因爲它將增強國家安全。我們和俄羅斯部署的核武器遠遠超過了我們的需要，遠遠超過萬一動用而又不給我們的生活方式造成毀滅的程度。我們能夠做到在不給國土、駐軍和盟國構成危險的同時，減少核庫存。So in addition to supporting a robust nuclear complex budget in 2011, we will also support a new Stockpile Management Program that would focus on sustaining capabilities. This is what the military leaders, charged with responsibility for our strategic deterrent, need in order to defend our country. General Chilton, Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, has said repeatedly that he doesn’t need new nuclear weapons capabilities — but he must be confident in the capabilities that we have.
因此，我們除了支持一個強有力的2011年核設施預算案外，還要支持建立一個致力於維持相關能力的新的核武庫管理項目。這是肩負戰略威懾職責的軍事領袖們保家衛國的需要。美國戰略司令部（STRATCOM）指揮官奇爾頓（Chilton）上將曾不止一次地表示，他並不需要新的核武器能力，但是必須對我們已擁有的能力有信心。
As we establish that confidence through Stockpile Management, we are making preparations for securing Senate approval for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and working globally to convince other hold-out states to bring that treaty into force. Bringing the treaty into force will strengthen and reenergize the global nonproliferation regime and, in doing so, enhance our own security.
我們正通過庫存管理建立這樣的信心，與此同時，我們還爲爭取參議院批准《全面禁止核試驗條約》做準備，並在全球範圍內積極勸說其他尚未簽署的國家促使這項條約生效。這項條約生效有助於全球不擴散體制得到加強並煥發新的活力，從而增強我們本身的安全。
For almost two decades, and over four successive administrations, the United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing. So we are already honoring the fundamental obligation of the treaty. A test ban treaty that has entered into force will allow the United States and others to challenge states engaged in suspicious testing activities — including the option of calling on-site inspections to be sure that no testing occurs anywhere. CTBT ratification would also encourage the international community to move forward with other essential nonproliferation steps. And make no mistake, other states — rightly or wrongly — view American ratification of the CTBT as a sign of our commitment to the nonproliferation consensus.
近20年以來，經過連續4屆政府，美國始終堅持不進行核試驗。因此，我們已經承擔了條約的基本義務。禁止核試驗條約生效有利於美國及有關方面對從事可疑的核試驗活動的國家採取反制措施——包括要求進行現場覈查，以保證任何地方都不發生核試驗活動。批准《全面禁止核試驗條約》還可促使國際社會進而採取其他重要的不擴散行動。毫無疑問，其他國家——無論如何——都會認爲美國批准《全面禁止核試驗條約》是我們堅持不擴散共識的一個標誌。
In coming months, several important events can accelerate progress on our nonproliferation and arms control agenda. In April, President Obama will host a global summit on nuclear security, an unprecedented gathering that will help promote a common understanding of the threat of nuclear terrorism and build international support for effective means of countering that threat. The following month, the NPT Review Conference, held every five years, will seek a consensus among NPT parties on a program of work for strengthening the NPT regime. We hope that these meetings will provide a launching pad for our global efforts to address this challenge.
今後幾個月，幾項重大的活動有助於我們的不擴散和軍備控制議程加速取得進展。4月，奧巴馬總統將主持全球核安全峯會（Global Summit on Nuclear Security）。 這個前所未有的重要活動有助於增進人們對核恐怖主義威脅的共同認識，同時爲採取有效措施抗擊這項威脅爭取國際社會的支持。此後一個月，每5年舉行一次的《不擴散核武器條約》審議大會（NPT Review Conference）將尋求《不擴散核武器條約》締約國爲加強核不擴散體制的工作綱領取得共識。我們希望上述會議爲我們應對這個挑戰的全球行動提供一個啓動平臺。
The nuclear threats facing the international community today cannot be overstated. They pose a grave challenge. And as with other global threats, most notably climate change, we are all in the same boat. Unless we act decisively and act now, the situation may deteriorate catastrophically and irreversibly.
國際社會今天面臨的核威脅構成了一項嚴峻的挑戰，其嚴重性不容忽視。與我們面對的其他全球性挑戰一樣——其中最值得關注的是氣候變化問題——大家都在同一條船上。如果我們不採取果斷行動，不立即採取行動，形勢就可能繼續惡化並導致災難性的後果，造成無法挽回的局面。
Some experts looking at current nuclear threats and the pressures bearing down on the global nonproliferation regime have come to pessimistic conclusions about our nuclear future. They talk about nuclear cascades and terrorists getting their hands on the bomb. According to them, future proliferation is inevitable; stopping it is futile.
目睹當前核威脅以及全球不擴散體制承受的壓力，一些專家對我們的核未來得出了悲觀的結論。他們談論核級聯（nuclear cascades），聲稱恐怖分子將掌控核武器。他們認爲，未來核擴散是不可避免的，阻止該趨勢的努力將是徒勞的。
Further proliferation and nuclear terrorism are not foregone conclusions. These dangers can be impeded and even prevented. But countering these threats requires us to realize that all states have a common interest in reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime — and that all states bear a responsibility in advancing that effort.
進一步擴散與核恐怖主義不是註定要發生的事情。這些危險能夠予以抗擊甚或消除。但是，要抗擊這些威脅，我們必須認識到，在加強不擴散體制方面，所有國家有着共同的利益，所有國家都必須爲推動這項努力而承擔責任。
Dean Acheson recognized these truths in his day. They have not dimmed with the passage of time. And the United States will do all it can to carry on this work, and ensure that our efforts succeed.
迪安?艾奇遜在他那個時代就認識到這些真理，它們並沒有隨着時間的推移而褪色。美國將竭盡全力繼續這項工作，確保我們的努力獲得成功。
As we stand at this new crossroads our path forward is clear. It is a path that leads from the streets of Prague, through the milestones I’ve spoken of today, and eventually, some day, to a world without nuclear weapons.
今天，我們站在這個新的十字路口，我們的前進道路是明確的。這條道路以布拉格的街道爲起點，經過我今天講到的那些里程碑，最終有一天將到達一個沒有核武器的世界。
Just as Acheson did in his time, we must meet this challenge by acting boldly, wisely, hopefully, and in concert with other nations. And once again, if we do so, American leadership will ensure our security and the peace of future generations.
正如艾奇遜在他那個時代所做的那樣，我們必須勇敢、明智、充滿希望地與其他國家一道迎接這一挑戰。如果我們這樣做，美國將再次發揮領導作用，確保我們這一代人的安全以及子孫後代的和平。
Thank you all very much.
非常感謝大家。
繼續保持超出我們安全所需的核武器不會讓美國更安全。目前的核局面既不可取，也無法持續。它使其他國家有動機、有藉口發展它們各自的核方案。
The right way to reduce our excess nuclear forces is in parallel with Russia. Verifiable mutual reductions through a new START treaty will help us build trust and avoid surprises. We are working hard to ensure that the new agreement will continue to allow for inspections and other mechanisms that allow us to build confidence. We are under no illusions that the START agreement will persuade Iran and North Korea to end their illicit nuclear activities. But it will demonstrate that the United States is living up to its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligation to work toward nuclear disarmament. In doing so, it will help convince the rest of the international community to strengthen nonproliferation controls and tighten the screws on states that flout that their nonproliferation commitments.
減少我們過剩核力量的正確途徑是與俄羅斯齊頭並進。通過一項新的削減戰略武器條約實現可覈查的共同削減將有助於我們建立信任，避免意外。我們正在作出積極努力，確保新協議將繼續包含能夠讓我們建立信心的檢查和其他機制。我們絕不幻想新的削減戰略武器條約會說服伊朗和北韓結束它們的非法核活動。但是，它將表明美國奉行《不擴散核武器條約》的義務，在爲核裁軍作出努力。這樣做也將有助於說服國際社會其他成員加強不擴散控制，對那些無視其不擴散承諾的國家給與更有力的鉗制。
For the same reason, the United States seeks to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with appropriate monitoring and verification provisions. A universal FMCT will halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, capping the size of existing arsenals, and reducing the risk that terrorist groups will one day gain access to stockpiles of fissile materials.
基於同樣的原因，美國在爭取儘快就制定一項含有相應監督與覈查條款的《裂變材料禁產條約》展開談判。一項全球性裂變材料禁產條約將制止武器級鈈和高濃鈾的生產，限制現存核武規模，減少恐怖主義組織未來獲取裂變材料的危險。
But we must do more than reduce the numbers of our nuclear weapons. We must also reduce the role they play in our security. In this regard, the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will be a key milestone. It will more accurately calibrate the role, size, and composition of our nuclear stockpile to the current and future international threat environments. And it will provide a fundamental reassessment of U.S. nuclear force posture, levels, and doctrine. Carried out in consultation with our allies, it will examine the role of nuclear weapons in deterring today’s threats and review our declaratory policies with respect to the circumstances in which the United States would consider using nuclear weapons.
但是，我們所必須做的不僅僅是減少我們的核武器數量。我們還必須降低核武器在保障我們的安全中的作用。在這方面，持續進行的《和態勢評估報告》（Nuclear Posture Review）將成爲重要的里程碑。它將根據當前和未來國際環境中存在的威脅，更準確地調整我們核庫存的作用、規模和結構，對美國核武力勢態（U.S. Nuclear Force Posture）的級別和方針提出根本性再評估。這項報告將結合與盟國的磋商，檢視核武器在今天的威懾作用，審視涉及美國在何種情況下考慮動用核武器的核威懾政策。
As part of the NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, we are grappling with key questions: What is the fundamental purpose of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal? Will our deterrence posture help the United States encourage others to reduce their arsenals and advance our nonproliferation agenda? How can we provide reassurance to our allies in a manner that reinforces our nonproliferation objectives?
在《核態勢評估報告》中，我們將努力回答一些關鍵問題。美國核武庫的根本目的是什麼？我們的威懾姿態是否將有助於美國鼓勵其他國家減少它們的庫存和推動我們的核不擴散議程？我們將如何能夠爲盟國提供保障而同時推進我們的核不擴散目標？
We believe now is the time for a look — a fresh look at the views on the role of the United States nuclear weapons arsenal. We can’t afford to continue relying on recycled Cold War thinking. We are sincere in our pursuit of a secure peaceful world without nuclear weapons. But until we reach that point of the horizon where the last nuclear weapon has been eliminated, we need to reinforce the domestic consensus that America will maintain the nuclear infrastructure needed to sustain a safe and effective deterrent without nuclear testing.
我們認爲，現在應該是對美國核軍備的作用作出重新審視的時侯了。我們不能繼續依靠翻新的冷戰思維。我們真誠追求一個沒有核武器的安全、和平的世界。但在達到最後一枚核武器被消除的那一遠景目標之前，我們需要強調這樣一個內部共識，即美國將爲保持一種沒有核試驗的安全、有效的威懾力而維持必需的核基礎設施。
