年秋季高級口譯筆試閱讀原題出處: 歐洲爲何不再舉足輕重

Why Europe no longer matters
歐洲爲何不再舉足輕重

When Defense Secretary Robert Gates devoted his final policy speech this month to berating NATO and our European allies, he was engaging in a time-honored tradition: Americans have worried about Europeans shirking their share of global burdens since the start of the 60-year-old alliance.
美國國防部長羅伯特·蓋茨本月在最後一次發表政策講話時痛批北約和我們的歐洲盟友，他這是在追隨一個由來已久的傳統：自從北約這個聯盟60 年前成立以來， 美國人就一直擔心歐洲推卸其所承擔的那份全球重任。

Gates sounded a pessimistic note, warning of “the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance.” Yet, the outgoing Pentagon chief may not have been pessimistic enough. The U.S.-European partnership that proved so central to managing and winning the Cold War will inevitably play a far diminished role in the years to come. To some extent, we’re already there: If NATO didn’t exist today, would anyone feel compelled to create it? The honest, if awkward, answer is no.
蓋茨語氣悲觀，警告"這個跨大西洋聯盟存在着前景不說悽慘至少也是黯淡的切實可能" 。不過， 這位即將離職的五角大樓統帥也許還不夠悲觀。美歐夥伴關係曾在應對並打贏冷、冷戰中發揮首要作用， 但在未來的歲月裏，它的作用將不可避免地大大降低。從某種程度上講， 我們現在已經到了這步田地：如果現在沒有北約，有誰會覺得必須建立這樣一個組織嗎? 誠實但令人尷尬的回答是: 沒有。

In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined.
未來幾十年，歐洲對自身邊界以外事務的影響力會遠比現在有限，最爲清晰地塑造並界定2 1 世紀的將是其他地區，而不是歐洲。

Certainly, one reason for NATO’s increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members. The problem is not the number of European troops (there are 2 million) nor what Europeans collectively spend on defense ($300 billion a year), but rather how those troops are organized and how that money is spent. With NATO, the whole is far less than the sum of its parts. Critical decisions are still made nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that — talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. The alliance’s effort in Libya — the poorly conceived intervention, the widespread refusal or inability to participate in actual strike missions, the obvious difficulties in sustaining intense operations — is a daily reminder of what the world’s most powerful military organization cannot accomplish.
當然，北約日益邊緣化的一個原因是其歐洲成員國的表現。問題不在於歐洲成員國在北約的量(目前有200 萬)，也不在於歐洲各國共同的防禦開支( 每年有3 000億美元)，而是在於如何組織這些軍人、如何花這些錢。對北約來說. 無論是軍人數量還是防禦開支. 總數遠小於各成員國相關部分之和。關鍵的決策仍然由各國政府作出；關於共同防禦政策的討論在很大程度上只停留在討論上。談不上專業化，也沒有協調可言。將軍事力量投放到遙遠戰場所需的許多後勤保障和情報資源也處於缺失狀態。北約在利比亞採取的行動是一次籌劃得很糟糕的軍事幹預，成員國普遍拒絕或無力參與實際的空襲行動，要保持猛烈的軍事行動顯然存在困難。這次行動在不斷提醒人們北約這個全球最重要的軍事組織所不能勝任之事。

With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. (Britain and France, which each spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense, are two of the exceptions here.) Even where a willingness to intervene with military force exists, such as in Afghanistan, where upward of 35,000 European troops are deployed, there are severe constraints. Some governments, such as Germany, have historically limited their participation in combat operations, while the cultural acceptance of casualties is fading in many European nations.
冷戰和蘇聯威脅都已成爲遙遠的回憶， 各國沒有多少政治意願向軍隊提供充足的公共資金。(英國和法國在這方面是個例外，兩國各自將國內生產總值2% 以上用於國防。) 即便是在各國願意實施軍事幹預的地方，比如部署了超過3. 5 萬名歐洲軍人的阿富汗，也存在着嚴重的制約因素。包括德國在內的一些政府向來限制本國參與作戰行動， 此外，許多歐洲國家越來越不能接受戰爭造成的傷亡。

But it would be wrong, not to mention fruitless, to blame the Europeans and their choices alone. There are larger historical forces contributing to the continent’s increasing irrelevance to world affairs.
但是如果把問題只歸咎於歐洲各國和它們作出的選擇，那將是錯誤的， 更不要說這樣做毫無意義了。歐洲之所以在全球事務上越來越無足輕重，還有一些較大的歷史因素在發揮作用。

Ironically, Europe’s own notable successes are an important reason that transatlanticties will matter less in the future. The current euro zone financial crisis should not obscure the historic accomplishment that was the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century. The continent is largely whole and free and stable. Europe, the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical competition, will be spared such a role in the new century — and this is a good thing.
具有諷刺意味的是，歐洲自身取得的巨大成功是導致大西洋兩岸的關係未來不那麼舉足輕重的重要原因。當前歐元區爆發金融融危機不應該掩蓋半個世紀來在建立一體化歐洲方面取得的歷史性成就。歐洲大陸基本上是一個整體，自由而穩定。歐洲是20世紀地緣政治競爭的主要場所，在新的世紀，它將不會扮演這樣的角色.而這是一件好事。

The contrast with Asia could hardly be more dramatic. Asia is increasingly the center of gravity of the world economy; the historic question is whether this dynamism can be managed peacefully. The major powers of Europe — Germany, France and Great Britain — have reconciled, and the regional arrangements there are broad and deep. In Asia, however, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, the two Koreas, Indonesia and others eye one another warily. Regional pacts and arrangements, especially in the political and security realms, are thin. Political and economic competition is unavoidable; military conflict cannot be ruled out. Europeans will play a modest role, at best, in influencing these developments.
歐洲與亞洲的反差大得幾乎不能再大了。亞洲日益成爲全球經濟的重心，重要的問題是， 這樣的勢頭能否得到和平的處理。歐洲大國——德國、法國和英國已經實現了和解， 歐洲的區域性安排廣泛而深入。然而在亞洲，中國、日本、印度、越南、朝韓兩國、印度尼西亞以及其他國家警惕地關注着彼此。區域性條約和約定，在政治和安全領域尤爲缺少。政治和經濟競爭元法避免; 軍事衝突的可能性不能排除。對於亞洲的這些事態， 歐洲最多隻能發揮不大的影響力。