印度尼西亞將爲"吃老本"付出代價

Indonesia has often been described as the next India. With 250m people, it has a huge population of aspiring consumers. Like India, it is a deMocracy, albeit a far more recent convert. Like India, too, its solid record of growth has been propelled not by manufactured exports but by domestic demand. When the global financial crisis struck, both economies weathered the storm better than most.

印尼經常被描述爲下一個印度。它有着2.5億人口，憧憬美好生活的消費者人數巨大。與印度一樣，它也是一個民主國家，儘管走上民主道路的時間短得多。同樣地，其穩定的增長紀錄不是出口製造業推動的，而是國內需求推動的。當全球金融危機襲來的時候，這兩個經濟體都比大多數國家更好地挺過了風暴。

Suddenly, however, the comparison with India does not sound so sweet. After India, Indonesia has been the Asian economy that has received most scrutiny from markets concerned about its current account deficit and reliance on capital inflows. More fundamentally, market pressure is raising awkward questions about the growth model of an Indonesian economy that has cruised along without laying the policy foundations for sustained development. Such doubts apply equally to a number of other emerging economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa that have floated on a tide of easy money and high commodity prices.

然而，突然之間，與印度相提並論聽上去不再那麼順耳。繼印度之後，印尼是受到市場最多關注的亞洲經濟體，市場擔憂其經常賬戶赤字和對資本流入的依賴。更爲根本的是，市場壓力正對印尼經濟的增長模式提出一些棘手的問題；近年印尼經濟藉助一些有利條件蓬勃發展，但未能奠定持續發展的政策基礎。亞洲、拉美、非洲的其他很多新興經濟體也有同樣的問題，近年他們都在搭寬鬆貨幣和高大宗商品價格的順風車。

The comparisons between India and Indonesia, the world’s second and fourth most populous nations, are many. Indonesia is now running a hefty trade deficit after years of surplus came to an abrupt end last year. The rapid deterioration since 2012 has largely been a result of weaker prices for commodities such as coal and palm oil, undermining the notion that Indonesia’s economy is not export-dependent.

世界第二和第四人口大國印度和印尼之間有很多可比之處。多年的貿易順差在去年突然消失之後，印尼現在面對相當高的貿易赤字。2012年以來的快速惡化主要是由於煤炭和棕櫚油等大宗商品價格的下降，這削弱了印尼不是出口依賴型經濟體的說法。

India, in common with Indonesia, has not developed a sufficiently sophisticated manufacturing industry capable of generating big foreign exchange receipts or, just as important, jobs. Both countries share a supposed demographic dividend. Yet unless the economy can create enough employment, a young, restless population can be more of a curse than a benefit.

與印尼類似，印度沒有發展起一個足夠複雜的製造業帶來大筆外匯收入或者同樣重要的就業。兩國在理論上都擁有“人口結構紅利”，然而，除非一個經濟體能夠創造足夠的就業，否則年輕而浮躁的人羣可能在更大程度上是一種詛咒，而不是效益。

India is the more extreme case. Services account for most of its growth, commanding two-thirds of national output with just one-third of its workforce. (More than half the adult population are farmers.) Some of those services are exported via the country’s formidable technology industry. Still, its economy invites comparison with the fabled South Sea island whose model relies on everybody doing each other’s laundry. In the end, unless a country can make the things required by an aspiring middle-class economy – from iPads to power stations – it must earn the money to import them.

印度是一個更爲極端的例子。服務佔其增長的大部分，三分之一的勞動力貢獻了全國產出的三分之二。（一半以上的成年人是農民。）其中一些服務是通過該國強大的技術行業出口的。但其經濟模式仍讓人聯想起傳說中的南海島，依靠衆人相互幫忙。最終而言，如果一個國家不能生產中產階層經濟所需的商品（從iPad到發電站），那麼它就必須掙錢去進口。

Indonesia’s economy is less skewed to services, which account for 39 per cent of output against 47 per cent for industry. Still, few would argue that it has done enough to build up manufacturing capabilities commensurate with its potential. As in India, building factories has been made unnecessarily difficult by power and transport constraints, by the problems related to acquiring land, and by overly-complex regulations that facilitate bribe-taking.

印尼經濟的服務業比重沒那麼高，服務佔總產出的39%，而工業佔比爲47%。然而，幾乎沒有人認爲這個國家的製造業實力與其潛力相稱。與印度類似，電力和運輸限制、與獲得土地相關的問題，以及滋生受賄的過度複雜的監管，都給建造工廠帶來了不必要的困難。

India at least boasts some world-class entrepreneurs in such areas as outsourcing and pharmaceuticals. Many of Indonesia’s most successful businessmen are rent-seekers whose political connections and entrenched monopolies allow them to build easy fortunes. Too many are content to ship out raw materials or sell foreign goods at home under licence. The lure of a quick buck often trumps notions of improving productive capacity or nation building.

在外包和製藥業等領域，印度至少有一些世界級的企業家。印尼最成功的商人中，有很多人其實是尋租者，他們的政治人脈和固化的壟斷地位，使得他們能夠輕鬆積累財富。有太多人滿足於出口原材料或者在國內特許銷售外國產品。快速獲得收益的誘惑，往往勝過了發展生產力或者國家建設的理念。

There are also political parallels. Both countries are staggering towards the end of their leader’s second term. Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s president, will have served 10 years apiece by the time each country holds general elections next year.

還有政治方面的可比性。兩國現任領導都將結束第二任期。到明年大選的時候，印度總理曼莫漢•辛格(Manmohan Singh)和印尼總統蘇西洛•班邦•尤多約諾(Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono)都將已經主政十年。

Mr Singh was once hailed as the superman of Indian reform. In his second term, he has turned back into Clark Kent. There have been stop-start attempts to open up industries from retail to insurance. But foreign investors have not been convinced. They have been put off by red tape, shifting tax policy and regulations as unreliable as the electricity supply. Public fury at the corrupt nexus between businessmen and politicians has been commendable, but in the absence of strong leadership, the result has been paralysis.

辛格曾被譽爲印度改革的超人。但在第二任期，他已變回了克拉克•肯特（Clark Kent，超人的常人形象——譯者注）。近年印度有過一些開放國內行業（從零售業到保險業）的走走停停的嘗試。但外國投資者並不買賬。他們在官僚體制、變化無常的稅收政策以及像供電那樣不可靠的監管面前卻步。公衆對商人和政客之間腐敗關係的憤怒值得肯定，但在沒有強有力領導的情況下，結果便是癱瘓。

SBY, as Indonesia’s army general turned civilian leader is known, has also coasted in his second term. There has been very little structural reform or coherent industrial policy. He has been more preoccupied with cementing the political transition by keeping the country’s power brokers happy than with taking on vested interests for the sake of the nation.

作爲從印尼軍事將領轉變爲文職領導人的蘇西諾，也在第二任期抱有求穩心態，沒有推出什麼結構性改革或者連貫的產業政策。他在更大程度上注重通過取悅權力掮客來鞏固政治轉型，而不是爲了國家而對付既得利益。

Indonesia has pursued a radical decentralisation of power. This has brought certain advantages, but has also multiplied the regulatory layers and opportunities for corruption. One reform that its government did pass was to cut a fuel subsidy that had pushed the budget into deficit. While the price rise has had an inflationary impact, it is the right thing to do. Trying to help the poor through ill-targeted subsidies is another policy mistake Indonesia shares with India.

印尼實行了大刀闊斧的地方分權。這帶來了一定的優勢，但也導致監管層面倍增，產生腐敗機會。印尼政府的確通過的一項改革是削減導致預算陷入赤字的燃油補貼。雖然價格上漲產生了通脹影響，但這確實是正確之舉。通過針對性不強的補貼來幫助窮人，是印尼與印度另一個相同的政策錯誤。

Indonesia’s growth, which has dropped below 6 per cent, has not fallen as far as India’s. Its people are already more than twice as well off, with nominal gross domestic product per capita of $3,900 against $1,500. Still, like India, Indonesia has rested on its laurels when it should have been advancing. Unless it can gain a new sense of urgency, in the long run its inaction will prove costly.

印尼的增長率已經下降到6%以下，跌幅比印度小一點。印尼的人均收入已經達到印度的兩倍多，人均名義國內生產總值(GDP)達到3900美元，而印度爲1500美元。然而，就像印度一樣，印尼在應該前進的時候陶醉於已經取得的成就。如果它不能夠產生一種新的緊迫感，長期來看這種不作爲將帶來巨大的代價。