美國不再企圖摻和世界秩序(下)
Those calls came as APEC ministers on Friday instructed officials to develop a work plan to pursue a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, which Beijing has been pushing as an alternative to the TPP.
這些呼呼正值上週五APEC部長會議上各部長命令官員制定工作計劃，推動建立亞太自貿區（Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific，北京方面一直在推動讓它成爲TPP之外的另一個選擇）。
A growing number of countries have also said in recent days that they are examining joining another Chinese-led TPP rival, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP.
近日，還有越來越多的國家表示，正在考慮加入另一箇中國主導的、與TPP競爭的協定——《區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定》(RCEP)。
APEC officials said that Mr Trump’s election and what was being read as a signal that the US would pull back from its current leadership role in the region had created a new atmosphere ahead of this weekend’s leaders summit.
APEC成員國官員稱，特朗普當選美國總統以及外界將這解讀爲美國將放棄目前在該地區領導角色的信號，改變了上週末APEC領導人會議前的氣氛。
There is a different dynamic around the table.
會議桌上是不一樣的狀態。
People are hedging their bets, said one senior official from an APEC country.
人們在爲自己下的賭注對衝風險，APEC某成員國的一位高級官員表示。
Mike Froman, the US trade representative, said at a meeting of TPP ministers on Friday that other countries had discussed moving ahead without the US —
美國貿易代表邁克.弗羅曼(Mike Froman)上週五在與TPP國家的部長們舉行的會議上表示，其他國家討論了在沒有美國的情況下繼續推進TPP的可能。
Republican leaders in Congress have said since Mr Trump’s victory that they would not allow its ratification to go forward.
自從特朗普獲勝以來，美國國會的共和黨領袖一直稱，他們不會允許再推進批准TPP的進程。
Mr Trump put his opposition to the TPP at the heart of his campaign, which used an antitrade message to cater to disgruntled blue-collar voters in rust belt swing states such as Ohio and Michigan.
特朗普把反對TPP放在了其競選的核心位置，在俄亥俄和密歇根等鐵鏽地帶的搖擺州，他的競選造勢利用了反對貿易的信息來迎合不滿的藍領選民。
But other APEC countries were also making clear to the US that they were looking to China for leadership now, he said.
但是，弗羅曼稱，APEC其他成員國也向美國明確表示，他們現在正期望中國擔任領導角色。
This is playing out in real time, Mr Froman told reporters.
這眼下就在上演，弗羅曼向記者表示，
We see people around the table here that are now saying that if the TPP doesn’t move forward they are going to have to put their eggs in an RCEP basket.
我們看到來這裏參加會議的人說，如果TPP無法推進，他們將不得不把自己的雞蛋放進RCEP的籃子裏。
Eduardo Ferreyros, Peru’s trade minister, said APEC ministers meeting on Friday had agreed that we are not going back to protectionism.
祕魯外貿部長愛德華多.費雷羅斯(Eduardo Ferreyros)表示，上週五的APEC部長會議已經達成一致，我們不會退回貿易保護主義。
We understand that the challenges ahead are great, but we strongly believe that if we continue working on trade liberalisation and facilitation, we will contribute to greater efficiency and competitiveness, he said.
我們清楚未來的挑戰巨大，但我們堅信，如果我們繼續致力於貿易自由化和便利化，我們將大大提高效率和競爭力，他說。
But other leaders warned that governments needed to do a better job of helping to address the gripes of those who felt left behind by globalisation.
但其他領導人警告稱，各國政府需要更妥善地幫助化解那些感覺被全球化拋在後面的羣體的不滿。
It is not just a matter of education.
這不僅僅是教育問題。
It is also a matter of making sure the [economic] reality matches the rhetoric [about free trade and globalisation], said Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s prime minister.
也是一個確保（經濟）現實與（關於自由貿易和全球化的）宣傳之詞相匹配的問題，新加坡總理李顯龍(Lee Hsien Loong)說，
People have to feel that they have a brighter future and that this is the way forward.
人們必須感覺到自己擁有一個光明的未來，感覺到這是前進的途徑。
All this was profoundly in US interests, but only when viewed from a most enlightened perspective.
這一切都極大地符合美國的利益，但必須有大智慧才能看出這一點。
Americans came to that enlightenment only after a world war, followed by the rise of Soviet communism, which persuaded them to define their interests broadly and accept responsibility for a liberal world order that benefited others as much as, sometimes more than, it benefited them.
美國人在經歷一場世界大戰、接着又經歷了蘇聯共產主義的崛起後才擁有了這樣的大智慧，那段歷史說服美國人開始用開闊的眼光定義本國利益，承擔起維護自由世界秩序的責任，這一秩序造福美國，也造福其他國家，後者的獲益有時還會超過美國自身獲益。
Enlightenment doesn’t last for ever, however, and with Mr Trump’s election Americans have chosen, as in 1920, a return to normalcy.
但大智慧不會一直保持，隨着特朗普當選，像1920年一樣，美國人選擇了迴歸正常。
So what does the normal solipsistic superpower do? It looks for immediate threats to the homeland and finds only one: radical Islamist terrorism.
那麼，正常的唯我論超級大國會做什麼？它會尋找對美國國土的直接威脅，然後發現威脅只有一個：激進的伊斯蘭恐怖主義。
Its foreign policy becomes primarily a counterterrorism strategy.
其外交政策基本變成反恐戰略。
Nations are judged not by whether they are allies or nominal adversaries, democracies or autocracies, only by their willingness to fight Islamists.
對一個國家的判斷不再依據是盟友還是名義上的對手，是民主國家還是專制國家，而只依據它們打擊伊斯蘭恐怖主義的意願。
Mr Putin’s Russia, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s Egypt, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, Israel: all are equal partners in the fight and all are rewarded with control, spheres of influence and defence against critics within and without.
普京的俄羅斯、阿卜杜勒.法塔赫.塞西(Abdel Fattah al-Sisi)的埃及、巴沙爾.阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)的敘利亞，還有以色列——在反恐鬥爭中都是平等的夥伴，它們得到的回報是對本國的控制、勢力範圍以及面對國內外批評者的自我防衛權。
Most countries, by this calculus, are irrelevant.
按照這種標準來看，大多數國家都無關緊要。
The rest is a matter of money.
剩下的就是錢的問題。
Foreign policy should serve US economic interests, and where it doesn’t should be changed.
外交政策應爲美國的經濟利益服務，不爲這個目的服務的政策就應修改。
Trade deals should be about making money, not strengthening the global order or providing reassurance to allies living in the shadows of great powers.
簽訂貿易協議的目的應該是賺錢，而非強化全球秩序或是向生活在大國陰影下的盟友提供保證。
The US is no longer in the reassurance business.
美國將不再負責爲別國提供保障。
For decades an abnormal US foreign policy has aimed at denying Russia and China spheres of interest.
幾十年來，美國的非正常外交政策，一直以阻止俄羅斯和中國獲得利益範圍爲目標。
That made sense when upholding an order to avoid a breakdown like that of the first half of the 20th century.
這種做法是合理的——它支撐起一種秩序，避免再次出現20世紀上半葉那種崩潰。
But a narrower reading of US interests does not require it.
但這種做法對狹隘意義上的美國利益而言是多餘的。
What interest is it of the US who exercises hegemony in east Asia and in eastern and central Europe? Existing alliances need not be re¬nounced — that would be messy — but, if allies have to adjust to new realities, that is to be welcomed rather than resisted.
誰是東亞和中東歐地區的霸主，與美國的利益何干？無需聲明拋棄現有的聯盟（那將造成混亂），但如果美國的盟友不得不適應新的現實，美國應歡迎、而非反對。
As for the projection of US military power abroad, there should be no need.
至於在海外使用美國的軍事力量，應該沒有必要。
No foreign army threatens the homeland.
沒有任何外國軍隊可以威脅美國國土。
Nuclear powers can be deterred by America’s nuclear arsenal.
美國的核武庫能夠威懾住幾個核大國。
(Note to US hawks: there will be no bombing of Iran under a Trump administration.)
（美國鷹派請注意：特朗普政府不會對伊朗進行轟炸。）
Almost every intervention of the past 70 years was primarily to defend someone else or to uphold some principle of global order.
過去70年間，美國的幾乎每一次干預主要都是爲了防衛別的國家，或是維護全球秩序的一些原則。
They were wars of choice, not required by a narrow definition of US interests.
這些都是非必選的戰爭，而非維護狹義意義上的美國利益所必需的。
The war against radical Islamist terror can be fought by drone strikes a few special forces and by our partners on the ground.
打擊伊斯蘭極端恐怖勢力的戰爭，可以利用無人機、少量特種部隊以及我們在地面的合作伙伴。
None of this should sound far-fetched.
這一切聽上去應該都不牽強。
This narrow, interest-based approach to foreign policy was dominant in the 1920s and 1930s.
這種狹隘、基於利益的外交政策路徑在上世紀二、三十年代曾占主導地位。
It is the preferred strategy of many American academics today.
它仍是如今許多美國學者偏愛的策略。
More importantly, it plays well with an American public that has come to believe the US has been taken to the cleaners.
更重要的是，它迎合了美國公衆的心理——他們漸漸相信美國被外國人佔盡了便宜。
Mr Trump promises they will not be taken for suckers any more.
特朗普承諾，不會再讓他們被人當成傻子。
How long can this new era last? Who knows?
這樣一個新時代能持續多久？天曉得。
Americans after 1920 managed to avoid global responsibility for two decades.
1920年後，美國人曾成功地逃避了全球責任20年。
As the world collapsed around them, they told themselves it was not their problem.
當週圍的世界崩塌時，他們告訴自己，這不關他們的事。
Americans will probably do the same today.
如今，美國人很可能重走舊路。
And for a while they will be right.
短期來看，他們沒有錯。
Because of their wealth, power and geography they will be the last to suffer the consequences of their own failures.
得益於自身的財富、力量和地理位置，美國人將最後一個嚐到自己種下的苦果。
Eventually they will discover, again, that there is no escape.
但最終，他們會再次發現自己無路可逃。
The question is how much damage is done in the meantime and whether, unlike in the past, it will be too late to recover.
問題在於這期間會造成多大破壞，以及（與以往不同）是否還來得及挽回。
