特朗普的美國與新全球秩序
Donald Trump’s stunning electoral defeat of Hillary Clinton marks a watershed not just for American politics, but for the entire world order.
唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)在選舉中意外擊敗希拉里.克林頓(Hillary Clinton)，不僅對美國政治而言標誌着一個分水嶺，對整個世界秩序也是如此。
We appear to be entering a new age of populist nationalism, in which the dominant liberal order that has been constructed since the 1950s has come under attack from angry and energised democratic majorities.
我們似乎正進入一個新的民粹民族主義時代。在這個時代，自上世紀50年代構建起的主導的自由秩序，受到了情緒激憤的民主多數的攻擊。
The risk of sliding into a world of competitive and equally angry nationalisms is huge,
世界陷入同樣憤怒的各種民族主義相互競爭的風險巨大。
and if this happens it would mark as momentous a juncture as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
如果這種情況發生，它將標誌着一個與1989年柏林牆倒塌同樣重大的關頭。
The manner of Trump’s victory lays bare the social basis of the movement he has mobilised.
特朗普獲勝的方式暴露了他動員起的這場運動的社會基礎。
A look at the voting map shows Clinton’s support concentrated geographically in cities along the coasts, with swaths of rural and small-town America voting solidly for Trump.
看一看投票地圖，我們可以發現，希拉里的支持者集中於沿海城市，而農村和小城鎮地區堅定地投票支持特朗普。
The most surprising shifts were his flipping of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, three northern industrial states that were so solidly Democratic in recent elections that Clinton didn’t even bother to campaign in the latter one.
最令人意想不到的是他在賓夕法尼亞、密歇根和威斯康星的翻盤，這三個北部工業州在最近幾次選舉中曾是如此固若金湯的民主黨州，以至於希拉里甚至沒有去威斯康星造勢。
He won by being able to win over unionised workers who had been hit by deindustrialisation, promising to make America great again by restoring their lost manufacturing jobs.
特朗普獲勝是因爲他得以爭取到那些受到去工業化衝擊的工會工人的支持，他承諾通過恢復他們失去的製造業工作崗位，讓美國再次變得偉大。
We have seen this story before.
這一幕似曾相識。
This is the story of Brexit, where the pro-Leave vote was similarly concentrated in rural areas and small towns and cities outside London.
英國退歐就是這種情況——支持退歐的投票同樣集中於農村地區、小城鎮以及倫敦以外的其他城市。
It is also true in France, where working-class voters whose parents and grandparents used to vote for the Communist or Socialist parties are voting for Marine Le Pen’s National Front.
在法國也是如此，父輩和祖父輩曾投票給共產黨或社會黨的工人階級選民，眼下正投票支持馬琳.勒龐(Marine Le Pen)的國民陣線(National Front)。
But populist nationalism is a far broader phenomenon than that.
但民粹民族主義是一個遠比這更廣泛的現象。
Vladimir Putin remains unpopular among more educated voters in big cities such as St Petersburg and Moscow, but has a huge support base in the rest of the country.
弗拉基米爾.普京(Vladimir Putin)在聖彼得堡、莫斯科等俄羅斯大城市受教育程度較高的選民中仍舊不受歡迎，但在該國其他地區卻擁有衆多支持者。
The same is true of Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has an enthusiastic support base among the country’s conservative lower middle class, or Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, who is popular everywhere but in Budapest.
對土耳其總統雷傑普.塔伊普.埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)或者匈牙利總理歐爾班.維克托(Viktor Orban)來說也是如此，前者在土耳其保守的中產階級下層中受到狂熱的支持，而後者在除了布達佩斯的整個匈牙利都受到歡迎。
Social class, defined today by one’s level of education, appears to have become the single most important social fracture in countless industrialised and emerging-market countries.
如今，由個人受教育程度界定的社會階層，似乎已經成爲很多工業化和新興市場國家中最重要的社會分割線。
This, in turn, is driven directly by globalisation and the march of technology, which has been facilitated in turn by the liberal world order created largely by the US since 1945.
這種現象受到全球化和技術進步的直接推動，而促進全球化和技術進步的正是自1945年以來主要由美國創建的自由世界秩序。
When we talk about a liberal world order, we are speaking about the rules-based system of international trade and investment that has fuelled global growth in recent years.
在我們談論自由世界秩序時，我們說的是近年來推動全球增長的、基於規則的國際貿易和投資體系。
This is the system that allows iPhones to be assembled in China and shipped to customers in the US or Europe in the week before Christmas.
正是這一體系使得蘋果手機能夠在中國組裝、並在聖誕節前一週運至美國或歐洲的消費者手中。
It has also facilitated the movement of millions of people from poorer countries to richer ones, where they can find greater opportunities for themselves and their children.
這一體系還方便了數以百萬計的人口從較貧困國家遷移至較富裕國家——在那裏他們可以爲自己和子女找到更好的發展機會。
This system has worked as advertised: between 1970 and the US financial crisis of 2008, global output of goods and services quadrupled, bringing hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, not just in China and India but in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.
這一體系如宣傳的那樣奏效：從1970年到2008年美國金融危機，全球商品和服務產出翻了兩番，讓數億人口擺脫了貧困——不僅包括生活在中國和印度的人，還包括生活在拉丁美洲和撒哈拉以南非洲地區的人。
But as everyone is painfully aware now, the benefits of this system did not filter down to the whole population.
但正如現在大家都已痛苦地意識到的，該體系所帶來的好處並沒有層層惠及所有人羣。
The working classes in the developed world saw their jobs disappear as companies outsourced and squeezed efficiencies in response to a ruthlessly competitive global market.
隨着企業爲應對競爭殘酷的全球市場而進行外包並儘可能提高效率，發達國家工人階級失去了工作。
This long-term story was hugely exacerbated by the US subprime crisis of 2008, and the euro crisis that hit Europe a couple of years later.
這一長期問題因2008年美國次貸危機以及幾年後歐洲遭遇的歐元危機而大大加劇。
In both cases, systems designed by elites — liberalised financial markets in the US case, and European policies such as the euro and the Schengen system of internal migration — collapsed dramatically in the face of external shocks.
在這兩場危機中，精英們設計的體系——美國的自由金融市場以及歐洲的歐元和管理內部人口流動的申根(Schengen)體系等政策——在面對外部衝擊時都迅速崩潰。
The costs of these failures were again much more heavily borne by ordinary workers than by the elites themselves.
這些失敗的代價又一次更多地由普通工人、而非精英自身承擔。
Ever since, the real question should not have been why populism has emerged in 2016, but why it took so long to become manifest.
從此以後，真正的問題不應再是爲什麼民粹主義在2016年出現，而是爲什麼它過了這麼久才顯現出來。
In the US, there was a political failure insofar as the system did not adequately represent the traditional working class.
在美國，政治上出現了這樣一個錯誤：政治體制未充分代表傳統工人階級。
The Republican party was dominated by corporate America and its allies who had profited handsomely from globalisation, while the Democratic party had become the party of identity politics: a coalition of women, African-Americans, Hispanics, environmentalists, and the LGBT community, that lost its focus on economic issues.
從全球化中獲利頗豐的美國企業界及其盟友主導了共和黨；而民主黨已變成一個玩弄身份政治的政黨：一個由女性、非洲裔美國人、西裔美國人、環保主義者以及LGBT（女同性戀者、男同性戀者、雙性戀者與跨性別者）等羣體組成的聯盟，不再關注經濟問題。
The failure of the American left to represent the working class is mirrored in similar failures across Europe.
美國左翼未能代表工人階級，歐洲各地的左翼也犯下同樣的錯誤。
European social democracy had made its peace with globalisation a couple of decades ago, in the form of Blairite centrism or the kind of neoliberal reformism engineered by Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democrats in the 2000s.
二十年前，歐洲的社會民主主義就已經同全球化和解了，和解的表現就是布萊爾中間路線，以及德國前總理格哈德.施羅德(Gerhard Schröder)的社會民主黨在本世紀頭十年設計的新自由主義改革。
But the broader failure of the left was the same one made in the lead-up to 1914 and the Great war, when, in the apt phrase of the British-Czech philosopher, Ernest Gellner, a letter sent to a mailbox marked class was mistakenly delivered to one marked nation.
但左翼的更大錯誤跟一戰前的那個是同一個，當時的情況——借用捷克裔英國哲學家埃內斯特.格爾納(Ernest Gellner)形象的描述——是一封本應投進標爲階級(class)的郵箱的信件，被錯誤地投進了標爲民族(nation)的郵箱。
Nation almost always trumps class because it is able to tap into a powerful source of identity, the desire to connect with an organic cultural community.
民族幾乎總是壓倒階級，因爲它能利用一種強烈的身份認同感，那種與一個有機的文化共同體建立聯繫的渴望。
This longing for identity is now emerging in the form of the American alt-right, a formerly ostracised collection of groups espousing white nationalism in one form or another.
這種對身份認同的渴望正以美國新右翼(alt-right)的形式顯現出來，新右翼包括各種以前受到排斥的形形色色的白人至上主義團體。
But even short of these extremists, many ordinary American citizens began to wonder why their communities were filling up with immigrants, and who had authorised a system of politically correct language by which one could not even complain about the problem.
但即使沒有這些極端主義者，很多普通美國公民也開始奇怪爲什麼他們的社區中出現越來越多的移民，又是誰授權建立了一套講究語言的政治正確性的體制，在這個體制中人們甚至不能抱怨這一問題。
This is why Donald Trump received a huge number of votes from better-educated and more well-off voters as well, who were not victims of globalisation but still felt their country was being taken from them.
這就是爲什麼特朗普從受教育程度更高、更富裕的選民那裏也得到了不少選票，這些人不是全球化的受害者，但仍感到有人正從他們手中奪走他們的國家。
Needless to say, this dynamic underlay the Brexit vote as well.
不用說，英國投票退歐本質上也是因爲同樣的原因。
So what will be the concrete consequences of the Trump victory for the international system? Contrary to his critics, Trump does have a consistent and thought-through position: he is a nationalist on economic policy, and in relation to the global political system.
那麼，特朗普獲勝對國際體系將帶來哪些實際影響？與他的批評者相反，特朗普確實擁有始終如一、經過深思熟慮的立場：他在經濟政策和全球政治體系方面是一個民族主義者。
He has clearly stated that he will seek to renegotiate existing trade agreements such as Nafta and presumably the WTO, and if he doesn’t get what he wants, he is willing to contemplate exiting from them.
他明確表示，將尋求就現有貿易協議重新進行談判，如北美自由貿易協定(NAFTA)，可能還有世貿組織(WTO)。
And he has expressed admiration for strong leaders such as Russia’s Putin who nonetheless get results through decisive action.
如果他得不到自己想要的，他願意考慮讓美國退出。
He is correspondingly much less enamoured of traditional US allies such as those in Nato, or Japan and South Korea, whom he has accused of freeriding on American power.
他對普京等通過果斷行動一樣辦成了事情的強人領袖表示了讚賞。相比之下，他對北約成員國或日本、韓國等美國的傳統盟國要冷淡得多，並指責這些國家搭美國力量的便車。
This suggests that support for them will also be conditional on a renegotiation of the cost-sharing arrangements now in place.
這意味着，對這些盟友的支持將依據對現有費用分擔安排的重新談判而定。
The dangers of these positions for both the global economy and for the global security system are impossible to overstate.
這些立場對全球經濟和全球安全體系的威脅，怎樣往嚴重了說都不爲過。
The world today is brimming with economic nationalism.
當今世界充滿經濟民族主義。
Traditionally, an open trade and investment regime has depended on the hegemonic power of the US to remain afloat.
一直以來，一個開放的貿易和投資體系的正常運轉，依靠的都是美國的霸權。
If the US begins acting unilaterally to change the terms of the contract, there are many powerful players around the world who would be happy to retaliate, and set off a downward economic spiral reminiscent of the 1930s.
如果美國開始單方面採取行動修改這一契約的條款，全世界範圍內有很多強大的參與者都將樂於展開報復，並引發一場上世紀30年代那樣的經濟螺旋式下行。
The danger to the international security system is as great.
這些立場對國際安全體系的威脅同樣巨大。
Russia and China have emerged in the past decades as leading authoritarian great powers, both of whom have territorial ambitions.
過去幾十年間，俄羅斯、中國已崛起爲重要的威權主義大國，且兩國都有領土野心。
Trump’s position on Russia is particularly troubling: he has never uttered a critical word about Putin, and has suggested that his takeover of Crimea was perhaps justified.
特朗普對俄羅斯的立場尤其令人擔憂：他從未對普京有過半句批評，還暗示後者吞併克里米亞或許是合理的。
Given his general ignorance about most aspects of foreign policy, his consistent specificity with regard to Russia suggests that Putin has some hidden leverage over him, perhaps in the form of debts to Russian sources that keep his business empire afloat.
考慮到特朗普對外交政策大多數方面整體的無知，他對俄羅斯的始終如一的特殊態度暗示着，普京對特朗普擁有某種隱形的影響力，或許後者的商業帝國賴以維繫的債務幕後的債主是俄羅斯人。
The first victim of any Trumpist attempt to get along better with Russia will be Ukraine and Georgia, two countries that have relied on US support to retain their independence as struggling democracies.
特朗普與俄羅斯改善關係的任何嘗試，最先傷害的將是烏克蘭和格魯吉亞，這兩個身處困境的國家一直依靠美國的支持才得以保持獨立的民主國家地位。
More broadly, a Trump presidency will signal the end of an era in which America symbolised democracy itself to people living under corrupt authoritarian governments around the world.
更廣泛地說，特朗普擔任總統將標誌着一個時代的終結，在那個時代，美國對世界各地生活在腐敗威權政府統治之下的人們而言就是民主的象徵。
American influence has always depended more on its soft power rather than misguided projections of force such as the invasion of Iraq.
美國的影響力一直更多地依賴於其軟實力，而非像入侵伊拉克那樣的不明智的武力使用。
America’s choice last Tuesday signifies a switching of sides from the liberal internationalist camp, to the populist nationalist one.
美國11月8日作出的選擇意味着，它脫離自由國際主義陣營，改投了民粹民族主義陣營。
It is no accident that Trump was strongly supported by Ukip’s Nigel Farage, and that one of the first people to congratulate him was the National Front’s Marine Le Pen.
特朗普受到英國獨立黨(UKIP)領袖奈傑爾.法拉奇(Nigel Farage)如此強烈的支持並非偶然，國民陣線的馬琳.勒龐是最早對特朗普獲勝表示祝賀的人之一也非偶然。
Over the past year, a new populist-nationalist internationale has appeared, by which like-minded groups share information and support across borders.
過去一年，一個新的民粹-民族主義國際已經浮現，想法相同的組織通過這個新的國際跨境共享信息和支持。
Putin’s Russia is one of the most enthusiastic contributors to this cause, not because it cares about other people’s national identity, but simply to be disruptive.
普京領導的俄羅斯是這一事業最熱心的支持者之一，不是因爲它關心其他民族的民族認同，而只是爲了製造混亂。
The information war that Russia has waged through its hacking of Democratic National Committee emails has already had a hugely corrosive effect on American institutions, and we can expect this to continue.
俄羅斯通過侵入民主黨全國委員會(Democratic National Committee)郵件系統發動的信息戰，已然對美國的制度造成了巨大的侵蝕，我們可以預期這種狀況還將持續。
There remain a number of large uncertainties with regard to this new America.
關於這個新美國，目前仍存在若干較大的不確定因素。
While Trump is a consistent nationalist at heart, he is also very transactional.
雖然特朗普本質上是一個一貫的民族主義者，但他也非常善做交易。
What will he do when he discovers that other countries will not renegotiate existing trade pacts or alliance arrangements on his terms? Will he settle for the best deal he can get, or simply walk away? There has been a lot of talk about the dangers of his finger on the nuclear trigger, but my sense is that he is much more isolationist at heart than someone eager to use military force around the world.
當特朗普發現其他國家不會按照他的條件，就現有貿易協定或同盟安排重新進行談判時，他會怎麼做？他會退而接受自己能得到的最好交易，還是會一走了之？對於由他來控制核按鈕的危險性，人們已經談論了很多，但我的感覺是，他內心深處更是一個孤立主義者，而非一個渴望在全世界使用武力的人。
When he confronts the reality of dealing with the Syrian civil war, he may well end up taking a page from the Obama playbook and simply continue to sit this one out.
在他面對處理敘利亞內戰這個現實時，他最後很可能會借鑑奧巴馬的劇本，繼續袖手旁觀。
This is the point at which the matter of character will come into play.
在這一點上，性格特徵將會發揮作用。
Like many other Americans, I find it hard to conceive of a personality less suited to be the leader of the free world.
像許多美國人一樣，我覺得很難想象有性格比特朗普更不適合擔當自由世界領袖的人了。
This stems only in part from his substantive policy positions, as much from his extreme vanity and sensitivity to perceived slights.
他實質性的政策立場只是部分原因，其他原因還包括他極端的虛榮心以及敏感的自尊心。
Last week, when on a stage with Medal of Honor winners, he blurted out that he too was brave, financially brave.
不久前，在與榮譽勳章(Medal of Honor)獲得者同臺時，他脫口而出，稱自己也很勇敢——在財務上很大膽。
He has asserted that he wants payback against all his enemies and critics.
他聲稱要對自己所有的敵人和批評者進行報復。
When faced with other world leaders who will slight him, will he react like a challenged Mafia boss, or like a transactional businessman?
當面對輕視他的其他世界領導人時，他的反應是會像一個受到挑戰的黑手黨老大，還是會像一個善做交易的商人？
Today, the greatest challenge to liberal democracy comes not so much from overtly authoritarian powers such as China, as from within.
如今，對自由民主的最大挑戰，與其說來自中國等公開實行威權主義的國家，不如說來自於自由民主世界內部。
In the US, Britain, Europe, and a host of other countries, the democratic part of the political system is rising up against the liberal part, and threatening to use its apparent legitimacy to rip apart the rules that have heretofore constrained behaviour, anchoring an open and tolerant world.
在美國、英國、歐洲以及其他許多國家，政治體制中民主的部分正在反抗自由的部分，並有可能利用其表面上的合法性來撕毀現行的一些規則，正是那些規則一直以來約束了行爲，支撐起一個開放、包容的世界。
The liberal elites that have created the system need to listen to the angry voices outside the gates and think about social equality and identity as top-drawer issues they must address.
創造了這一體系的自由主義精英們需要傾聽門外憤怒的聲音，把社會平等和身份認同作爲他們必須解決的最重要問題來思考。
One way or the other, we are going to be in for a rough ride over the next few years.
不管怎樣，我們在未來幾年都免不了經歷一段艱難旅程。
