放棄北約對美國無益 特朗普是歐洲的提神劑
Snap out of it. Donald Trump is just the jolt Europe needed.
振作起來；唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)正是歐洲所需的一針提神劑；
Too long coddled by the US, Europeans should welcome the president-elect’s admonition to stand on their own feet.
太長時間享受美國庇護的歐洲人，應該對這位當選總統敦促歐洲人自力更生表示歡迎。
Stunned by the outcome of the US election, European policymakers have gone in desperate search of silver linings.
震驚於此次美國大選結果的歐洲政策制定者爲了尋找烏雲的金邊可謂不遺餘力。
There are none.
這金邊是找不到的。
Whatever Europe’s shortcomings as a partner to the US — and there have been plenty — Mr Trump promises to make the world, including Europe, a more unstable and dangerous place.
無論作爲美國合作伙伴的歐洲有什麼缺點（肯定不少），特朗普一定會讓包括歐洲在內的整個世界變得更不穩定、更危險。
That this approach may encourage Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security is all to the good but it does not alter the essential prognosis.
他或許會激勵歐洲人爲自身安全擔負起更大的責任，因而不失爲一件好事，但這一點不改變上述基本論斷。
Mr Trump’s foreign policy is a work in progress.
特朗普的外交政策還在醞釀當中。
Measured by the public statements of the president-elect and his closest advisers, it is shot through with contradictions.
觀察這位當選總統及其最親密顧問的公開聲明，可以看出其中充滿了矛盾。
America-first isolationism jostles with pledges to increase military spending.
一邊宣揚美國爲先的孤立主義，一邊承諾增加軍費開支。
The recurring themes, though, are economic nationalism and withdrawal from the global responsibilities the US has assumed since 1945.
然而，反覆出現的主題是經濟民族主義以及不再承擔美國自1945年以來一直承擔的全球責任。
Mr Trump, whose criticisms of Nato are longstanding, seems clear that allies — whether Japan, the Republic of Korea or Nato members such as Germany, Poland, France or Britain — should look after themselves.
長期對北約(Nato)持批評態度的特朗普似乎已經清楚地表明，美國的盟友——無論是日本、韓國，還是德國、波蘭、法國、英國等北約成員國——都應自食其力。
The disdain for globalism catches the public mood in the US.
特朗普對全球主義的蔑視契合了美國的公衆情緒。
After costly wars of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq there is not much of a market in the midwest for overseas adventurism.
經過了阿富汗、伊拉克這兩場不是非打不可且代價高昂的戰爭，海外冒險主義在美國中西部地區已沒有多大市場。
The Iraq war was intended as a demonstration of American might. As things turned out, it illuminated national weakness.
發動伊拉克戰爭本是爲了顯示美國的實力，結果卻暴露了美國的弱點。
Superior military hardware takes you only so far unless you have political consent.
優勢武器裝備的作用是有限的，除非能獲得政治上的同意。
The charge that Europe has been a free-rider on the US defence budget broadly speaking is a fair one.
廣義來說，指責歐洲一直搭乘美國國防預算的便車也不爲過。
It has been acknowledged, if then ignored, by many European politicians.
許多歐洲政治家都承認了這一點——如果不是後來又忽視了這一點的話。
I never understood why newly democratic governments in eastern Europe — with most to fear from Russian revanchism — cut so deeply into defence budgets.
我一直不明白東歐新成立的民主政府爲何如此大規模地削減國防預算，它們最有理由憂懼俄羅斯復仇主義。
Some Europeans presented a philosophical justification for the unequal contribution to Nato.
一些歐洲人爲北約內部這種不平均的費用分攤提出了哲學上的理由。
Europe’s role after the collapse of communism was that of a normative power, spreading liberal internationalism by example.
共產主義垮臺後，歐洲扮演的角色是一個標杆大國，通過樹立榜樣傳播自由國際主義。
As the sole superpower, the US could keep the peace.
作爲全球唯一的超級大國，美國可以維持這種和平。
Seen from Washington this was never a good bargain.
從華盛頓的角度來看，這從來都不是一筆合算的買賣。
And, anyway, things have moved on from that glorious moment of innocence when it was possible, just, to imagine a world order recast in Europe’s postmodern image.
此外，無論如何，形勢已經發生變化，不再是那個剛剛可以想象一種按照後現代歐洲形象塑造的世界秩序的光榮時刻。
All this said, American altruism has always been a myth.
話雖如此，美國的利他主義從始至終根本就不存在。
From the outset the US commitment to the alliance was rooted in self-interest.
美國對北約的承諾從一開始就根植於自身利益。
Roosevelt, Truman and the rest had weighed the cost of isolationism during the 1920s and 1930s.
羅斯福(Roosevelt)、杜魯門(Truman)等領導人權衡了上世紀二、三十年代實行孤立主義的代價。
Nato was the first line of defence against the global, and anti-American, ambitions of Soviet communism.
北約是抵禦蘇聯共產主義全球（反美）野心的第一道防線。
Likewise, the postwar international economic architecture was drawn to American specifications.
同樣，戰後的國際經濟體系也是根據美國的意願打造的。
A secure and prosperous Europe provided a rich market for US multinationals.
安全、繁榮的歐洲爲美國跨國公司提供了廣闊的市場。
American business was the big winner from an open international order.
美國企業是開放的國際秩序的大贏家。
The assumption was modified only slightly once the Berlin Wall came down.
柏林牆倒塌後，這種設定僅稍有調整。
The Atlantic alliance would at once entrench democracy in the former communist states and spread the liberal Washington consensus to rising states in the south and east.
這個跨大西洋聯盟立刻在前共產主義國家鞏固民主，並向南方和東方崛起的國家傳播信奉自由主義的華盛頓共識。
The economic calculus has changed during the past decade — mainly because China has been the biggest winner from the open trading system — but it is hard to find a significant US business that thinks America would benefit from a retreat into protectionism.
雖然過去十年全球經濟格局已經改變——主要因爲中國已成爲開放貿易體系的最大贏家——但很難找到一家認爲美國將從迴歸貿易保護主義中受益的重要美國企業。
It would not take much to upend the alliance.
拆散北約也不是很難。
Now, as during the cold war, Nato stands or falls on the credibility of the US commitment to defend its allies.
像冷戰期間那樣，如今北約的成敗依然繫於美國保衛盟友承諾的可信度上。
If Mr Trump shares the view of his friend Newt Gingrich that Estonia is little more than a suburb of St Petersburg the game is lost.
如果特朗普贊同友人紐特.金裏奇(Newt Gingrich)的觀點——愛沙尼亞不過是聖彼得堡的郊區——那這場博弈就輸了。
No manner of increase in European defence budgets will sustain Nato deterrence if Russia sees the US dumping the alliance’s Article 5 mutual defence arrangements.
如果俄羅斯看到美國放棄北大西洋公約第五條關於共同防禦的安排，無論歐洲國家如何增加國防預算都無法維持北約的威懾作用。
A part of Mr Trump may say: who cares? He can certainly find realists in the US and European foreign policy establishments who would turn over parts of the former Soviet space to a Russian sphere of influence.
特朗普內心有一個聲音或許會說：管他呢？他一定可以在美歐外交政策建制派中，找到會聽任俄羅斯把部分前蘇聯地區收入自己勢力範圍之內的現實主義者。
But the true realist question is what does the US get from Moscow in return? Not much beyond a damaging reputation as an unreliable ally.
但真正現實的問題是，美國能從莫斯科得到什麼回報？除了留下不可靠的盟友的壞名聲外，美國不會得到什麼。
Beyond its economic interest in European stability — the EU may have its troubles but it is America’s richest overseas market — the US has much to lose from a break-up of the alliance.
不僅是歐洲的穩定關係到美國的經濟利益（歐盟或許遭遇了麻煩，但仍是美國最富裕的海外市場），北約解體還將讓美國損失更多。
You do not restore American power and prestige by ditching old friends.
拋棄了老朋友的美國是不會恢復實力和威望的。
Europe’s role during these past several decades has been to offer the US a stamp of international legitimacy in the pursuit of its national interests.
歐洲過去幾十年一直扮演爲美國追求國家利益提供國際合法性證明的角色。
Some would say it has sold itself too cheaply.
有人會說，歐洲要價太低了。
As Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, wrote recently in The New York Times: Wherever Mr Trump looks, he will not find better partners to work with to secure America’s strategic interests.
慕尼黑安全會議(Munich Security Conference)主席沃爾夫岡.伊申格爾(Wolfgang Ischinger)最近在《紐約時報》(The New York Times)上撰文稱：無論在哪兒，特朗普都找不到（比歐洲）更好的、保護美國戰略利益的合作伙伴了。
So yes, Europeans should spend more on defence.
沒錯，歐洲應當在國防上投入更多。
As importantly, they need a strategy to confront the threat from Moscow and the chaos on its southern borders.
同樣重要的是，他們需要一項應對莫斯科的威脅以及南部邊境外混亂局面的戰略。
But no one should pretend that the US would be a winner were Mr Trump to rupture permanently one of the most successful alliances in history.
但如果特朗普永久瓦解這個歷史上最成功的聯盟之一的話，誰都不應假裝美國會成爲贏家。
