培根經典哲理散文閱讀

弗朗西斯·培根是英國文藝復興時期最重要的散文家、哲學家。他不但在文學、哲學上多有建樹，在自然科學領域裏，也取得了重大成就。他的第一部重要著作《隨筆》最初發表於1597年，以後又逐年增補。該書文筆言簡意賅、智睿奪目，它包含許多洞察秋毫的經驗之談，其中不僅論及政治而且還探討許多人生哲理。下面本站小編爲大家帶來培根經典哲理散文閱讀，希望大家喜歡!

　培根經典哲理散文：論貴族

We will speak of nobility, first as a portion of an estate; then as a condition of particular persons. A monarchy, where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny; as that of the Turks. For nobility attempers sovereignty, and draws the eyes of me people somewhat aside from the line royal. But for democracies, they need it not; and they are commonly more quiet, and less subject to sedition, then where there are stirps of nobles. For men's eyes are upon the business, and not upon the persons: or if upon the persons, it is for the business' sake, as fittest, and not for flags and pedigree.

關於貴族，我們將先以之爲國家中的一個階級，再以之爲個人底一種品質而論之。一個完全沒有貴族的君主國總是一個純粹而極端的專制國;如土耳其是也。因爲貴族是調劑君權的，貴族把人民底眼光引開，使其多少離開皇室。但是說到民主國家，它們是不需要貴族的;並且它們比較有貴族巨室的國家，通常是較爲平靜，不易有叛亂的。因爲在民主國中，人們底眼光是在事業上而不在個人上的;或者，即令眼光是在個人身上，也是爲了事業的原故，要問某人之適當與否，而不是爲了標幟與血統的。

We see the Switzers last well, notwithstanding their diversity of religion, and of cantons. For utility is their bond, and not respects. The united provinces of the Low Countries, in their government, excel: for where there is an equality, the consultations are more indifferent, and the payments and tributes more cheerful. A great and potent nobility addeth majesty to a monarch, but diminisheth power, and putteth life and spirit into the people, but presseth their fortune. It is well, when nobles are not too great for sovereignty, nor for justice; and yet maintained in that height, as the insolence of inferiors may be broken upon them, before it come on too fast upon the majesty of kings.

我們看得到瑞士人底國家很能持久，雖然他們國中有很多宗教派別，而且行政區也不一致：這就因爲維繫他們的是實利而不是對在位者個人的崇仰也。荷蘭合衆國政治很優良;因爲在有平權的地方，政治上的集議是比較重事而不重人的，並且人民對於納稅輸款也是較爲樂意的，一個巨大有力的貴族階級增加君王底威嚴，可是減少了他底權力;使人民更有生氣，更爲活潑，可是壓抑了他們底福利。最好，貴族不要高出君權或國法之上，同時卻要被保持在一種高位上，使下民想犯上的時候，那種桀鶩之氣，必得在過速地達到人君底威嚴以前，先與貴族衝撞，如水擊石而分散其勢力然。

A numerous nobility causeth poverty and inconvenience in a state: for it is a surcharge of expense; and besides, it being of necessity, that many of the nobility fall in time to be weak in fortune, it maketh a kind of disproportion, between honour and means.

貴族人數衆多則國貧而多艱;因爲這是一種過度的消費;並且，貴族中人有許多在經過相當時間後必然變爲貧乏，結果在尊榮與財富之間將造成一種不相侔的情形。

As for nobility in particular persons; it is a reverend thing, to see an ancient castle or building not in decay; or to see a fair timber tree, sound and perfect: how much more, to behold anancient noble family, which hath stood against me waves and weathers of time.

至於個人之身爲貴族者——我們看見一座古壘或建築物依然完好，或者一棵好樹堅實而完美的時候，總覺得那是一種令人生敬的景象。如斯，要是見到一個曾經度過時間底風浪的古老貴族之家，其可敬之甚較上述者又當多出若干。

For new nobility is but the act of power, but ancient nobility is the act of time. Those that are first raised to nobility are commonly more virtuous, but less

innocent, than their descendants: for there is rarely any rising, but by a co-mixture, of good and evil arts. But it is reason the memory of their virtues remain to their posterity; and their faults die with themselves.

因爲新的貴族不過是權力所致，而老的貴族則是時間所致也。頭一個升到貴族階級的那些人多是比他們底後人富於才力而不如其純潔的;因爲很少有能夠騰達而在手段中不是善惡交混的。但是這些人留給後代的記憶中只有長處，而他們底短處，則與身俱滅，這也是合理的。

Nobility of birth commonly abateth industry: and he that is not industrious envieth him that is. Besides, noble persons cannot go much higher, and he that standeth at a stay, when others rise, can hardly avoid motions of envy. On the other side, nobility extinguished! the passive envy, from others towards them;

because they are in possession of honour. Certainly kings, that have able men of their nobility, shall find ease in employing them; and a better slide into their business: for people naturally bend to them, as born in some sort to command.

生爲貴族則多半輕視勞作;而自己不勤勞的人是要嫉妒勤勞的人的。再者，貴族中人不能再升到多高的地位去了;而那自己停留在某種地位而目睹他人上升的人是難免嫉妒之念的。在另一方面，貴族身分能消滅別人對他們的那種消極的嫉妒;因爲貴族中人好象生來就應享某種榮華富貴似的。無疑地，爲人君者，在他們底貴族中若有人材而能用之，則他們將得到安適，並且國事底進行也要得到順利;因爲人民會自自然然地服從他們，以爲他們是生來就有權發號施令的。

　培根經典哲理散文：論王權

It is a miserable state of mind, to have few things to desire, and many things to fear: and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and shadows, which makes their minds the less clear.

所欲者甚少而所畏者甚多，這種心理是一種痛苦可憐的心理;然而爲帝王者其情形多是如此。他們因爲尊貴已極，所以沒有什麼可希冀的，這就使得他們底精神萎靡不振;同時他們又有許多關於危難暗禍的想象，這又使他們底心智不寧了

And this is one reason also of that effect, which the scripture speaketh of; that the king's heart is inscrutable. For multitude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart hard to find, or sound. Hence it comes likewise, that princes, many times, make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys: sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an order, sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as Nero for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible unto those that know not the principle; that the mind of man is more cheered, and refreshed, by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay in great We see also that kings, that have been fortunate conquerors in their first years; it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes; turn in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy: as did Alexander the Great;Dioclesian; and in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for he that is used go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour, and is not the thing he was.

這也就是《聖經》中所謂“君心難測”的那種情形底原因之一。因爲畏忌多端而沒有一宗主要的慾望可以指揮並約束其餘的慾望，這種心理會使得任何人底心都是難以測度也。因此有許多君王常爲自己造慾望，並專心於細事;這些細事有時是一座建築，有時是建立一個教宗，有時是擢升一人，有時是要專精一藝或一技，如尼羅之於琴，道密先之於射，可謨達斯之於劍，卡剌卡拉之於御，以及類此者皆是也。這對於那些不知道下列的原理的人好象是不可思議的，那原理就是人底心理樂於在小事上得益，而不樂於在大事上滯留。我們也常見那些在早年曾爲幸運的勝利者的帝王，因爲他們不能永遠進取，而在幸運中不得不受限制的原故，在晚年變爲迷信而且寡歡;例如亞歷山大大帝，代奧克里賢;還有我們都記得的查理第五，以及其他的君王之所爲是也。因爲那一向慣於進取的人，在後來碰了釘子的時節，不免要自輕自賤，非復故我的。

To speak now of the true temper of empire: it is a thing rare, and hard to keep: for both temper and distemper consist of contraries. But it is one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian is full of excellent instruction;

現在且說王權底真氣質;那是很不容易保持的;因爲真的氣質和失調的氣質二者都是由矛盾衝突之物所成者也。然而攙和相反的事物爲一事，交換相反的事物又爲一事。阿波郎尼亞斯答外斯帕顯的話是滿含最好的教訓的。

Vespasian asked him; What was Nero's overthrow? He answered;Nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.

外斯帕顯問他：“招致尼羅底顛覆者是什麼”?他答道：“尼羅善於調絃弄琴;可是在政治上，他把軸栓有時擰得太緊，有時放得太鬆了”。無疑地，忽然大施威迫，忽然過度鬆弛，這種不平衡不合時的政策之變換，再沒有比它更能破壞威權的了。

This is true; that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes' affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with fortune: and let men beware, how they neglect, and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared: for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come.

近代的講人君之事者，其智多在巧避與轉移臨近的危難，而不在堅固合理的，使人君超然危難之上的常軌，這是真的。但是這種辦法簡直是與幸運之神爭短長了。人們也應當小心，不可忽視或容忍變亂底資料之漸積，因爲沒有人能防止那星星之火，也沒有人能夠看出這火星子將從何方來也。

The difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories. Sunt plerumque.'region voluntates vehementes et inter se contrariae. For it is the solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.

人君事業中的艱難是多而且大的;然而其最大的艱難卻常是在他們自己心裏的。因爲(如泰西塔斯所說)作帝王的人而有矛盾的慾望乃是常事也：“君王們底慾望多是強烈而又自相矛盾的”。蓋權勢底自然弱點就是想要達到某種目的而卻不肯忍受那必需的手段也。

Kings have to deal with their neighbours; their wives; their children; their prelates or clergy; their nobles; their second-nobles or gentlemen; their merchants; their commons; and their men of war, and from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.

爲帝王者必須應付其鄰國，后妃，子女，高級僧侶或教士，貴族，第二流的貴族或紳士，商人，平民，兵士;從所有的這些方面都可以興起危難，假如他不小心謹慎的話。

First for their neighbours; there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one; which ever holdeth; which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were. And this is, generally, the work of standing councils to foresee, and to hinder it During that triumvirate of kings. King Henry Vffl of England, Francis I, King of France, and Charles V, Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war: and would not, in any wise, take up peace at interest And the like was done by that league (which, Guicciardine saith, was the security of Italy) made between Ferdinando King of Naples; Lorenzius Medices, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan.

先說他們底鄰國。關於這點除了一條永遠可靠的定理外別無普遍的定理可說，因爲情勢是十分易於變化的。那一條永遠可靠的定理就是爲人君者應當監視不懈，毋使任何鄰國(或以領土之擴張，或由商業之吸引，或用外交的手腕，以及類此的種種)強大到比以先更能爲患於本國的程度。要預料並防止這種情形是政府中某項永久機關底工作。在從前三大君主——就是英王亨利第八，法王法蘭西斯第一，皇帝查理第五——爲歐洲領袖的時候，他們三位之中誰不能得尺寸之土，若果有一位得着了尺寸之土，其餘的兩位立刻就要把那種情形糾正過來，其方法或以聯盟，或以戰爭(如果必要的話)，並且無論如何決不貪一時之利而與之講和，其互相監視之嚴有如此者。又奈波爾斯王飛迭南，勞倫斯·麥地奇與盧道維喀斯·斯福爾察(二人都是霸君，一個是佛羅倫斯底，一個是米蘭底)之間的那個聯盟(即貴恰底尼所謂意大利之保障者)其所爲亦與此相同。

Neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received; that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury, or provocation. For there is no question, but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.

還有經院學派中某種學者底意見，以爲無已成的傷害或挑釁的原因而作戰，不能算是堂堂正正之師，這種意見是要不得的。因爲敵人雖尚未給我們以打擊，但是我們有充分的理由恐懼臨近的禍患，這也算是戰爭底正當原因，這是沒有問題的。

For their wives; there are cruel examples of them. Livia is enfamed for the poisoning of her husband: Roxolana, Solyman's wife, was the destruction of that renowned prince. Sultan Mustapha; and otherwise troubled his house, and succession: Edward the Second of England his queen had the principal hand, in the deposing and murder of her husband.

至於后妃，她們之中是有殘酷的例子的。裏維亞因爲毒害丈夫而著惡名;羅克撒拉那，梭利滿底王后，就是殺害那位出名的王子蘇丹穆斯塔發的人，並且在別的方面也曾攪亂其家庭及嗣續;英王愛德華第二底王后在廢除並殺害她底丈夫之舉中是主要人物。

This kind of danger is then to be feared, chiefly, when the wives have plots for the raising of their own children; or else that they be adulteresses.

因此，最當防範這種危險的時候，就是當那爲后妃者爲了要扶立自己底所生而有陰謀的時候，否則就是當她們有外遇的時候。

For their children: the tragedies, likewise, of dangers from them, have been many.

至於子嗣，同樣地，由他們而來的危難其所致的不幸也是很多的。

And generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of their children, hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession of the Turks, from Solyman, until this day, is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for mat Selymus the Second was thought to be supposititious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for both Constantinus, and Constance, his sons, died violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little better; who died, indeed, of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken arms against him. The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second, of Macedonia, turned upon the father, who died of repentance. And many like examples there are: but few, or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust; except it were, where me sons were up in open arms against them; as was Selymus the First against Baiazet: and the three sons of Henry the Second, King of England.

一般地說來，父親對兒子生疑忌之心者總是不幸的。穆斯塔發之死(上面已經說到的)對梭利滿王室是一種致命傷，因爲土耳其王室自梭利滿以至今日的王位繼承都有不正之嫌疑，恐是外來的血統;因爲塞利馬斯第二被人認爲是私生子也。克瑞斯帕斯(一位非常溫順的青年王子)之見殺於康士坦丁努斯大帝，也同樣地是他那個王室底致命傷;因爲康士坦丁努斯底兩個兒子，康士坦丁努斯和康士坦斯，都死於非命;他底另外的一個兒子，康士坦洽斯，結局也不見佳;他雖然確是病死的，但是他也是在玖利安努斯起兵之後死的。馬其頓王腓力普第二底王子德米垂亞斯之死報在他父親身上，因爲他是悔恨而死的。類此的例子很多，但是爲父親的因這種猜疑之心而得到益處的例子卻是很少或沒有;唯有在做兒子的公然舉兵反叛的時候，那可算是例外，如塞利馬斯第一之徵巴亞塞提，和英王亨利第二之三子是也。

For their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them: as it was, in the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket, Archbishops of Canterbury; who with their croziers, did almost try it, with the king's sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty kings; William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come in, and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.

至於高級僧侶，在他們驕縱有勢的時候，也可以由他們發生危險的，如安塞爾馬斯和坎特白雷大主教湯瑪斯·拜開提底時代尤是也。這兩個人幾乎以他們底圭杖與帝王底刀劍相爭，而奇者，他們所與之抗衡者竟是堅強驕傲的君主，即威廉·魯夫斯，亨利第一與亨利第二是也。這種危險並非來自僧侶階級底本身，而是當他們倚仗國外的勢力的時候纔有的，或者在僧侶們進來及被選的時候，不受職於君主或任何個人而是由民衆選出的，在這種時候，纔有危險的。

For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less able to perform anything that he desires. I have noted it, in my history of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his nobility; whereupon, it came to pass that his times were full of difficulties, and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not cooperate with him in his business. So that in effect, he was fain to do all things, himself.

至於貴族，對他們稍爲疏遠也不爲過;可是壓抑他們，也許可以使爲帝王者君權更專，但是不甚安全，並且不容易把他心中所欲的事做到。在拙著《英王亨利第七本紀》中常見及此點，即亨利第七是壓抑貴族的，因此他底時代乃是充滿着艱難與禍亂的;因爲那些貴族，雖然仍舊忠於亨利，然而卻沒有在他底事業上與他合作。因此他就不得不自己來辦一切的事了。

For their second nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt: besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not too potent: and lastly, being the most immediate in authority, with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.

至於那第二流的貴族，他們是沒有什麼危險性的，因爲他們是一個散漫的團體。他們有時候也許放言高論，但是那是沒有什麼大害的;並且，他們是高級貴族底一種平衡力，使之不能增長得過於強大的;最後，他們因爲是最與一般人民接近的掌權者，所以他們也是最能緩和民亂的。

For their merchants; they are venaporta; and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish lime. Taxes, and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king's revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he loseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.

至於商人，他們可算是“門靜脈”;要是他們不繁榮，那末一個國家也許有好的四肢，但是其血管將是空的，其營養將甚爲貧乏。加之於他們的賦稅很少能於人君底收入有益的，因爲他在小處得來的在大處失去了，那就是各項稅率固然增加，而商業底總額則減削也。

For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of religion; or their customs, or means of life.

至於平民，除非他們有偉大，多能的領袖，或者你對於宗教問題，或他們底風俗，或他們底生計加以干涉的時候，他們是沒有什麼危險性的。

For their men of war, it is a dangerous state, where they live and remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the Janissaries, and Pretorian bands of Rome: but trainings of men, and arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.

至於軍人，當他們在一起過着團體生活，並且習於賞賜的時候，他們是一個危險階級。如此的例子我們可於土耳其之親衛兵與羅馬之護衛軍見之;但是訓練一部分人，並分級予以武裝，由好幾個將帥統領，並且不加賞賜，則是自衛的舉措而不含危險也。

Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times;and which have much veneration, but no rest All precepts concerming kings, are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es homo', and memento quod es deus, or vice da', the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.

爲人君者有如天上的星宿，能致福亦能致禍，受很多的尊敬但是沒有休息。一切關於帝王的箴言，實際是包含在這兩句銘語裏的;“記住你是個人”和“記住你是個神或者神底代表”。頭一句話約束他們底權力，後一句話控制他們底意志。