財經預測 中國經濟轉型不會逆轉

Vertiginous levels of debt, industrial overcapacity, slowing growth and deflation: it has seldom been easier to spin a bearish yarn out of China’s economic data. In any fully developed economy this combination would augur an asset price bust or, at best, a spell of extreme volatility.

令人目眩的債務水平、工業產能過剩、增長放緩以及通縮：從中國經濟數據中梳理出悲觀故事，現在似乎比以往任何時候更容易。在任何成熟的發達經濟體，這一組合將預示着資產價格崩潰，即便往好了說也得出現一段時間的極度波動。

Either may come to pass: for the first time in decades, capital is leaving the country, and the stock exchange is performing a passable impression of a market in the grip of late-stage mania.

這兩種情況都有可能發生：幾十年來第一次，資本正離開中國，而中國股市出現晚期狂熱的典型症狀。

But China is also a place where normal rules of thumb do not apply. Uniquely for an economy in its position — the largest as well as one of the fastest growing on the planet — its leadership has consciously planned for a transition towards a different growth model.

但中國也是一個不適用正常經驗法則的地方。中國是世界上規模最大的經濟體，也是增長最爲迅速的經濟體之一。對這樣一個經濟體來說，其領導層自覺地規劃增長模式轉型，這一點是獨一無二的。

Weaning an economy this large from a lopsideddependence on investment was never going to be easy. China’s rulers have economic levers at hand, but knowing which ones to pull is hard.

讓如此龐大的經濟體擺脫對投資的極度依賴從來都不是一件容易的事情。中國領導人手頭有經濟槓桿，但難的是知道可以動用哪一個。

At every tremor in the growth rate, there is pressure on the authorities to goose up demand. In the past, China’s first recourse has been to unleash credit, such as by leaning on local authorities to splurge on infrastructure or property. But decades of this has strewn debt across the land, much through 10,000 local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), which have total liabilitiesexceeding 40 per cent of gross domestic product.

增長率的每一次波動，都會讓中國政府受到提振需求的壓力。在過去，中國首先想到的手段是釋放信貸，比如要求地方政府大舉投資於基礎設施或房地產。但幾十年這麼做下來讓中國債務激增，其中許多是通過1萬家地方政府融資工具(LGFV)借入的，它們的債務總額與國內生產總值(GDP)之比超過40%。

The state recently eased up on demands that LGFVs repay their bank debt, and has just scrapped the loan-to-deposit cap imposed on banks. Such measures may free up lending conditions, but will prove more palliative than stimulating. Demand for credit is weak, and will not rebound any time soon: industry is suffering from overcapacity, and the LGFVs carry funding costs well above their return on assets. Non-performing loans are breaching new highs. Finance managers prefer to recover first before bingeing again.

中國政府最近放寬了讓LGFV償還銀行債務的要求，並剛剛取消了對銀行的存貸比要求。此類舉措可能釋放信貸空間，但事實將證明它們的作用在更大程度上是緩解疼痛、而不是刺激。信貸需求疲弱，而且不會迅速反彈：工業深受產能過剩之苦，LGFV的融資成本遠高於資產回報率。不良貸款不斷創出歷史最高紀錄。財務經理們在再次大舉放貸前希望先收回貸款。

Moreover, the challenge is not so much to fire up growth as to spark it where it has not previously been strong. Those sectors that drove China’s dizzying ascent — property, infrastructure, manufacturing — cannot sustainably carry the economy forward. The People’s Bank of China, never a champion of laissez faire, has made clear that it wants banks to divert credit to agriculture and small business — not normally huge drivers of heavy investment.

此外，真正的挑戰與其說是增長，不如說是在以往不夠強勁的領域引燃增長。過去推動中國經濟急速增長的行業——房地產、基礎設施和製造業——不可能持續推動經濟前行。從來不是自由放任的倡導者的中國人民銀行(PBoC)明確表示，希望銀行將信貸投向農業和小企業，而後者通常不會大舉投資。

Against these China-specific challenges are some with a global flavour, notably incipient deflation. Falling prices have helped China hit its 7 per cent growth target despite historically weak demand in cash terms. It is nominal more than real aggregates that matter most to indebted companies, however; those in China now have revenues growing at just 0.7 per cent, no faster than in the trough of the 2008 financial crisis. This, again, is no auspicious backdrop for a rebound in investment.

在這些中國特有挑戰的背景下，還有一些帶有全球特色的挑戰，尤其是剛剛出現的通縮態勢。價格不斷下降已幫助中國達到7%的增長目標，儘管按現金計算，需求處於歷史低點。然而，對負債累累的公司來說，最重要的是名義總量而不是實際總量。中國企業的收入增長率僅爲0.7%，不比2008年金融危機的低谷期間快多少。就投資反彈而言，這同樣不是什麼好兆頭。

All these factors suggest that China’s gradual shift from investment dependence is not set to reverse. The measures the authorities have taken to counter a slowdown are precautionary, but presage no change in strategy. New drivers of growth — smaller businesses, consumer spending and services — may struggle to rebound as fast as the old drivers retrench, but with unemployment at a 15-year low, there is a willingness to tolerate the distress this causes to places most reliant on the old model.

以上這一切似乎表明，中國不會逆轉逐步擺脫投資主導模式的轉型努力。中國政府爲抵禦經濟放緩而採取的措施是預防性的，但並不預示着戰略的改變。新的增長動力——中小企業、消費支出和服務——可能難以彌補舊的增長動力縮減所造成的缺口。但隨着失業率處於15年來的低點，中國政府將願意容忍該戰略給許多最依賴舊增長模式的地方帶來的壓力。

China’s flight on to a new growth path may prove turbulent, but there is as yet no reason to fear a hard landing. In fact, with more than 40 countries counting the Middle Kingdom as their top export partner, and Chinese imports decelerating, the bumpiest landing may await those beyond its borders.

中國向新增長模式的轉型之路可能不會一帆風順，但迄今還沒有任何理由擔心中國硬着陸。實際上，鑑於逾40個國家將中國視爲最大的出口合作伙伴，而中國的進口在減速，面臨最顛簸着陸的可能是那些中國以外的國家。