中國應確保金融監管機構獨立性

If China hopes to calm the turmoil that has shaken financial markets at home and around the world, and to steer its economy to a soft landing, it must reform its regulatory policymaking regime.

如果中國想要平息震撼了國內和全球金融市場的市場動盪，引導經濟走向軟着陸，就必須改革其監管政策制定體制。

The government itself is a significant source of instability and uncertainty. China needs more professional policymaking to restore confidence, which is possible only if Beijing stops intervening in markets arbitrarily and allows regulators independent oversight.

中國政府本身就是不穩定和不確定性的重要來源。中國需要更專業的政策制定方式來恢復人們的信心，而這隻有在中國政府停止隨意干預市場並允許監管機構獨立監督之後才成爲可能。

By now almost everyone is familiar with two agencies: the seemingly careless China Securities Regulatory Commission and the uncommunicative People’s bank of China . During China’s dramatic stock market crash in June and July last year, the CSRC was busy changing rules on the fly: limiting stock index futures trading, banning short selling, cutting margin ratios, locking up the holdings of large shareholders and then investigating for potential legal actions short-sellers and those selling off big blocks. These hasty rule changes, imposed for the immediate convenience, created much uncertainty for investors.

到目前爲止，差不多所有人都熟悉中國的兩大機構：看上去隨意草率的中國證監會(CSRC)和沉默寡言的中國央行(PBoC)。在去年6月和7月中國股市急劇崩盤期間，中國證監會在忙着隨時隨刻更改規則：限制股指期貨交易、禁止做空、降低保證金比例、禁止大股東減持，還對做空者和大宗股票賣出者開展調查，以採取可能的法律行動。這些出於一時方便而對規則倉促做出的改變，給投資者帶來了許多不確定性。

On January 4, the first working day after the New Year break, the CSRC introduced the two-step circuit breakers — to pause trading when stock indices were down 5 per cent and to close for the day if the fall reached 7 per cent. Unfortunately, the circuit breakers were needed right away as the market plunged within a few hours of opening. They were triggered again on January 7, this time with trading closed just 15 minutes after opening. That very evening, just four days after introducing the mechanism, the CSRC killed it.

1月4日是元旦假期後的第一個工作日，當天中國證監會引入了兩級熔斷機制，即當股指下跌5%時暫時停盤，而當跌幅達到7%時則當天閉市。不幸的是，由於股市在開盤幾小時內就出現暴跌，兩級熔斷機制馬上就發揮了作用。而在1月7日它們再次被觸發，這一次開盤僅15分鐘就閉市了。就在當天晚上，也就是該機制引入僅僅4天后，中國證監會暫停了這一機制。

Since the PBoC seldom communicates with the market, its actions are often misunderstood. For example, in August last year it reformed the mechanism for setting the renminbi exchange rate. Whereas the PBoC would previously give a morning fix with no link to the market rate, it now based the morning fix on the previous day’s closing rate on the onshore renminbi market.

而由於中國央行很少與市場溝通，該行的舉措經常會被人誤解。比如，去年8月中國央行改革了人民幣匯率形成機制。過去，中國央行會在每天早晨設定一個與市場匯率沒有關係的人民幣匯率中間價。如今，該行卻會根據前一天在岸人民幣市場收盤匯率，設定每天早晨的人民幣匯率中間價。

It was a good reform, intended to signal that Beijing was still pushing market-orientated reforms despite arbitrary interventions in the stock market. However, the outside world interpreted that step as China intending to devalue the renminbi because of worse-than-expected troubles in the economy, resulting in heavy selling of the renminbi and risky assets across global markets.

這是個不錯的改革舉措，意在釋放一種信號，即儘管中國政府在隨意干涉中國股市，它卻仍在推動市場化改革。然而，外界對這一舉措的解讀，卻是中國由於經濟困境糟於預期而有意讓人民幣貶值。這一解讀導致全球市場出現了對人民幣和高風險資產的大舉拋售。

In December, the PBoC introduced a renminbi index based on a basket of currencies but left the market to guess at its intentions. After the New Year, the guessing game intensified as the PBoC seemed to allow the renminbi to depreciate for days, leading to further confusion and intensified selling pressure across markets.

去年12月，中國央行引入了基於一籃子貨幣的人民幣匯率指數，卻讓市場自己猜測其意圖。新年之後，中國央行似乎放任人民幣連續多日貶值，令這種猜測遊戲愈演愈烈，導致人們的困惑進一步加深，增大了整個市場的拋售壓力。

So does the Chinese government lack competent people, as many have concluded? The answer is no. For those of us who have dealt extensively with these organisations, it is no secret that the PBoC and CSRC are among the most competent agencies in Beijing. From top to bottom, they are staffed by well educated (often western educated) highly experienced professionals.

那麼，是不是中國政府像許多人斷定的那樣，缺少能幹的人士？答案是否定的。對於我們當中與這些機構打過密切交道的人來說，中國央行和中國證監會屬於北京最能幹的機構並不是祕密。從上到下，他們的工作人員都是受過良好教育（往往是西方教育）、擁有豐富經驗的專業人士。

The problem lies instead in these policymaking bodies’ lack of independence. In the US, the Federal Reserve has full authority to decide on monetary and banking policies, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has autonomy on securities market matters.

實際上，問題在於這些政策制定機構缺乏獨立性。在美國，美聯儲(Fed)擁有決定貨幣政策和銀行業政策的全部權力，美國證交會(SEC)對證券市場的事務也有自治權。

By contrast the PBoC and CSRC cannot announce major, or sometimes even minor, policy decisions without the approval of the State Council, the state’s highest administrative body.

相比之下，沒有政府最高行政機構國務院的批准，中國央行和證監會無權公佈重大政策決定——有時甚至連較小的政策決定都無權公佈。

Within the State Council, it is the premier and four vice-premiers who ultimately decide on all proposals submitted by the PBoC, CSRC and other agencies. While they are all exceptionally gifted and well educated, they should not be expected to be experts on every policy matter.

而在國務院內部，對中國央行、中國證監會和其他機構提交的所有提案作出最終決定的，是總理和四位副總理。雖然他們全都擁有極高才華，也受過良好教育，但人們不能指望他們是所有政策事務上的專家。

In the past, this mattered less. China lacked even a commercial banking sector, to say nothing of sophisticated capital and currency markets. For agriculture and traditional industries, the absence of independent economic policy agencies was probably manageable.

在過去，這一點沒那麼重要。當時的中國甚至沒有商業銀行部門，更不必說複雜的資本和貨幣市場了。而對農業和傳統工業來說，缺乏獨立的經濟政策機構也許還行得通。

In the past two decades, however, the economy has become much more complex: many banks, big and small; markets in stocks, bonds, futures, options and other derivatives, and mutual funds, hedge funds, trusts and insurance industries, all developing rapidly. It is no longer realistic to expect one or two individuals to know it all and to be able to judge every policy matter.

然而，在過去二十年裏，中國經濟的複雜程度已大大增加：大大小小的衆多銀行，股市、債市、期貨市場、期權市場及其他衍生品市場，以及共同基金、對衝基金、信託和保險行業，全都處於迅猛發展之中。指望一兩個人無所不知、並能對所有政策事務做出判斷不再現實。

To restore confidence and minimise turmoil, China needs to reform and ensure independence for the PBoC, CSRC and other policy bodies. Let experienced professionals take charge of the financial markets.

要想恢復人們的信心並將動盪降至最低，中國必須開展改革，確保中國央行、證監會和其他政策機構的獨立性。讓有經驗的專業人士掌管金融市場吧。