富裕的民主國家萎縮 新的全球權力均勢

It was only the day before yesterday that the rich deMocracies imagined a post-cold war global order fashioned in their own image. Now they are running away from the world. There were to be three pillars to the new order. As a benign hegemon, the US would underwrite the international peace and advance the spread of liberal democracy.

彷彿就在前天，富裕的民主國家還按照自己的觀念構想了冷戰後的世界秩序。如今它們正從世界退縮。按照它們的構想，新秩序將會有3個支柱。作爲一個溫和的霸主，美國將爲國際和平背書並推動自由民主的傳播。

Europe would export its model of postmodern integration to its near neighbourhood and beyond — remember those predictions that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would soon be like the EU? A declining Russia would join China and the rising powers of the east and south in recognising their national advantage in becoming stakeholders in a western-designed system.

歐洲將向鄰國及其他國家輸出後現代的一體化模式——還記得關於東盟很快將和歐盟一樣的預測嗎？日益衰落的俄羅斯將和中國以及東半球和南半球的新興國家一起認識到，成爲西方設計的體系中的利益相關者符合自己的國家利益。

That was then. The US is still by a margin the pre-eminent power but, whether Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump wins the presidency in November, the domestic political impulse is to pull back from the world.

這就是當時的情況。如今，美國還算是頭號強國，但今年11月無論是希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)還是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)贏得總統大選，美國國內的政治衝動都是從世界退縮。

Europe is too busy filling the cracks in its own project to pay heed to what is happening elsewhere. Engulfed by crises — the eurozone, migration and most recently Brexit — it is a continent that has lost the capacity to think strategically. Meanwhile, China and Russia have no inclination to accept rules written by the US.

歐洲正忙着填補自身一體化項目的裂痕，無暇關注其他地方的情況。由於接連陷入危機——歐元區危機、移民潮以及最近的英國退歐——歐洲大陸失去了戰略思考能力。與此同時，中國和俄羅斯無意接受美國製定的規則。

What happened? The war in Iraq, intended to demonstrate the reach of American power, instead delineated its limitations. The global financial crash of 2007-08 cruelly exposed the weaknesses of liberal capitalism.

結果發生了什麼？伊拉克戰爭本應彰顯美國巨大的影響力，結果卻展示出其力有不逮。2007年至2008年的全球金融危機無情地暴露了自由資本主義的缺陷。

Europe’s integrationist dreams were shattered by the consequent eurozone shock. China grew faster than anyone had expected, accelerating the redistribution of power in the global system.

隨後的歐元區危機讓歐洲的一體化夢想破碎。中國的增長超過所有人的預期，加快了全球體系中的權力重新分配。

The common thread now is nationalism. In the US this takes the form of “America-first” — some say, belligerent — isolationism. For President Vladimir Putin, armed revanchism is about all he has left: Russia is weak in all the dimensions of power except the military.

現在的共同主題是民族主義。在美國，這是（一些人挑釁地說）以“美國優先”的孤立主義的形式存在的。對俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)來說，武裝復仇主義與俄羅斯的現狀有關：從軍事以外的其他所有維度來說，俄羅斯都是實力疲弱。

Europe, with its populism and pocket-sized authoritarians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, is unlearning the lessons of its history. China wants to expunge the memory of 100 years of humiliation. You could say they are all Westphalians now.

歐洲沒有吸取歷史的教訓，如今民粹主義興起，並出現了匈牙利總理維克托•歐爾班(Viktor Orban)等“縮微型”威權人物。中國希望消除100年的屈辱記憶。你可以說它們現在都是威斯特伐利亞的（威斯特伐利亞和約是指於1648年10月24日分別在神聖羅馬帝國明斯特市和奧斯納布呂克市（威斯特伐利亞區）簽定的一系列和約，標誌着三十年戰爭的結束。威斯特伐利亞和約在歐洲大陸建立了一個相對均勢狀態的格局，但這種格局並不穩定，事實上，隨後的各國興衰更替以一種令人目眩的速度進行着。——編者注）。

I was reminded of the gulf of misunderstanding and mistrust at a gathering this week in Beijing. The annual Xiangshan security forum is the place where China’s military and political elites speak to the world. It is a fascinating event for a westerner — a place where the voices of Europeans and Americans have to compete for time at the podium with those of such nations as East Timor, Cambodia, Mongolia and, of course, China’s ally of convenience, Russia.

這讓我想起了最近北京一個聚會上的深刻誤解和不信任。香山年度安全論壇是中國軍事和政治精英向全球發表講話的場所。對西方人來說，這是一個極具吸引力的論壇，在該論壇上，歐洲人和美國人必須與東帝汶、柬埔寨、蒙古，當然還有中國的權宜盟友俄羅斯等國的人士爭奪上臺發言時間。

The chosen theme for 2016 was the search for a “new model of international relations”. The subliminal message was that the west should recognise that the old order has passed and it is time to engage with China in co-designing its replacement.

2016年論壇的主題是尋找“新型國際關係”。言外之意是，西方應該認識到，舊秩序已經成爲歷史，現在是與中國接觸共同設計新秩序的時候了。

Western talk of adapting the existing system to accommodate Beijing failed to recognise that what is required is something entirely new. Above all, the US, as the status quo outsider in east Asia, should adjust to the new realities. The alliance system of the second half of the 20th century does not fit the geopolitical realities of China’s rise.

西方表示將會調整現有體系以容納中國，這反映出他們未能認識到，中國需要某種全新的秩序。最重要的是，作爲現狀下東亞的外來者，美國應該調整以適應新現實。20世紀後半葉建立的同盟體系不切合中國崛起的地緣政治現實。

Apart from some sharp words about Beijing’s resolve to protect its claims and interests in the South China sea, the language of the hosts was mollifying. China seeks positive sum co-operation and is determined to avoid the “Thucydides trap” of a clash between an established and rising power. But the new order cannot look like the old.

除了發表決心捍衛南中國海上的主張和利益的激烈言辭以外，中國的言辭還算溫和。中國尋求正和合作，並決心避免落入老牌大國與新興大國衝突的“修昔底德陷阱”(Thucydides Trap)。但新秩序不可能像舊秩序。

Like what then? You catch talk in the background about a new concert of great powers, modelled on the work of Metternich at the 19th-century Congress of Vienna. Or perhaps a series of regional power balances with the US and China at the apex? A less sanguine view is that order will simply be replaced by half-organised disorder.

那麼像什麼？你在這種背景下聽到有人提議，以19世紀維也納會議上梅特涅(Metternich)的構想爲模板，諸大國建立新的協調關係。或者是構建一系列的區域性權力均勢，美國和中國處於頂點？一種不太樂觀的觀點是，秩序將被組織渙散的混亂取代。

There yet is another school of thought — call it realism, pragmatism or, more realistically, fatalism — that says there is simply nothing to be done. Later, if not sooner, this multipolar world will find a new equilibrium. Let nations sort out their own problems and conflicts, proponents of this view argue. A new balance will eventually emerge.

還有一種無所作爲的思想——我們稱之爲現實主義、務實主義或者更切合實際地說，是宿命主義。或快或慢，這個多極世界會找到新的均衡。這種觀點的擁護者辯稱，讓各國解決各自的問題和衝突。最終將出現新的平衡。

The snag is that eventually may be too late. The Middle East is burning and Russia wants to upturn the post-cold war settlement in Europe, but the really dangerous great power flashpoints are in east Asia. Add North Korea’s nuclear programme to regional rivalry in the East and South China seas and it is not hard to see US-China competition turning to confrontation and worse.

這種觀點的問題在於，最終可能太晚。中東戰火紛飛，俄羅斯希望顛覆冷戰後的歐洲格局，但大國中真正危險的引爆點是在東亞。綜合考慮朝鮮核計劃以及東中國海和南中國海上的地區性對抗局勢，不難發現美中競爭正在轉向對峙乃至更糟糕的局面。

The world is at a hinge point. The post-cold war settlement, organised around unchallenged US power, western-designed global institutions and multilateral rules and norms, has been eroded. The rule of power is chafing against the rule of law, nationalism against internationalism.

世界處於關鍵時刻。冷戰後圍繞無可匹敵的美國實力組織起來、由西方設計的全球機制和多邊規則的格局已經受到削弱。實力至上主義與法治原則衝突，民族主義與國際主義衝突。

Some think that the simple fact of economic interdependence will save the day — conflict would throw up only losers. But the dynamic can operate in the other direction.

一些人認爲，經濟彼此依存的簡單事實將會讓世界轉危爲安——衝突只會產生輸家，沒有人能成爲贏家。但形勢可能朝着相反的方向發展。

It is no accident that the International Monetary Fund’s latest annual report cites political risk as the biggest threat to the world economy. The liberal economic system depends above all on global security order.

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)在最新的年度報告中將政治風險列爲世界經濟的最大威脅，這並非偶然。自由的經濟體系首先依賴於全球安全秩序。