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韓國對朝貿易輸給中國 朝鮮依賴中國

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韓國對朝貿易輸給中國 朝鮮依賴中國

A poor country triples its trade volume in six years. Exports to its main partner soar fivefold. This is a rare feat for a nation not blessed with oil; rarer still for a country under UN Security Council sanctions, tightened three times during the same trade spurt.

一個窮國的貿易額在6年時間裏增長了兩倍,對其主要貿易伙伴國的出口額飆升了5倍。這對一個石油匱乏的國家來說是個罕見的成就,再考慮到它還受到聯合國(UN)安理會的制裁,能取得這樣的成績就更是難得了。在該國貿易額噴發式增長期間,聯合國對其施加了3輪新制裁。

We are talking of North Korea, believe it or not. Unbelievers appear to include Kim Jong Un. When the young leader brutally purged his uncle-mentor, Jang Song Thaek, in December the charge sheet included “selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices”.

信不信由你,我們是在說朝鮮。不相信的人裏似乎也包括金正恩(Kim Jong Un)。當這位年輕領導人於去年12月無情地剷除他的姑父兼導師張成澤(Jang Song Thaek)時,判決書中所列的罪行包括“廉價出售國家寶貴資源。”

China does receive some (not all) North Korean minerals cheap, since no one else will buy. But to be fair, on Jang’s watch – he oversaw trade with China – an economy still poorer on Most indicators than when Moscow pulled the plug in 1991 began to grasp one big nettle: how to raise exports. Pyongyang issues no numbers; when they do that, we will know for sure reform is under way. But its partners’ recent trade statistics tell a striking story.

中國確實以廉價獲得朝鮮的部分(不是全部)礦產,因爲不會有其他人來買。但公平地說,在張成澤的掌管下(他負責管朝中貿易),朝鮮——從多數指標上看,朝鮮比1991年蘇聯解體時更加貧窮——開始果斷地處理一個棘手問題:如何擴大出口?朝鮮政府沒有公佈貿易數據,但假如它會公佈,我們會明確地知道朝鮮正在進行改革。不過,朝鮮各貿易伙伴國近期的貿易數據卻反映出一個驚人的現象。

North Korea has never traded much, and has always run a deficit. When the USSR collapsed, China was left as its main partner-cum-sponsor. For many years their trade was more like aid. In the late 1990s the value of imports from China averaged about $500m a year – though often they were not paid for. Pyongyang exported next to nothing in return. The debts mounted, as did Chinese impatience. The deficit rose throughout the subsequent decade, reaching $1.3bn in 2008 – twice the level of Pyongyang’s exports.

朝鮮從未開展過太多貿易活動,而且貿易總是處於逆差狀態。蘇聯解體後,中國成了朝鮮最主要的貿易伙伴兼資助者。許多年來,中朝之間的貿易更像是援助。20世紀90年代末,朝鮮從中國進口的貨物平均每年爲5億美元左右,儘管朝方往往沒有支付貨款。朝鮮沒有對華出口多少東西。隨着朝鮮的欠債越來越多,中國人也越來越不耐煩。朝鮮對華貿易逆差在接下來的10年裏不斷增長,在2008年達到13億美元,比朝方出口額高出近一倍。

In 2012 South Korean news agency Yonhap noted a startling change. In just four years, starting in 2007, the value of trade had almost tripled to $5.6bn. At the same time, it became less one-sided; North Korea’s exports more than quadrupled to $2.5bn. That is still peanuts by regional and global standards, and the deficit narrowed rather than disappearing entirely. But it began to look like serious, reciprocal trade. The progress continues, if no longer at quite such a clip. Latest Chinese customs statistics show that North Korean exports to China in 2013 rose 17 per cent to nearly $3bn, against imports of $3.6bn.

2012年,韓國新聞通訊社韓聯社(Yonhap)報道了一個驚人的變化。從2007年起的4年時間裏,朝鮮對華貿易額幾乎增長了兩倍,達到56億美元。同時,朝鮮對華貿易活動也不再是單向的:朝方出口額增長了3倍多,達到25億美元。拿地區和全球的標準來衡量,這些數字微不足道,而且朝鮮的貿易逆差只是在縮小,並沒有完全消除。但朝中貿易似乎開始朝真正意義上的、互有往來的貿易方向發展了。這股勢頭得以延續,即使增長速度不再那麼迅猛。中國海關最近的數據顯示,2013年朝鮮對華出口額接近30億美元,同比增長17%,進口額爲36億美元。

China apart, North Korea has, or had, only one crucial partner: South Korea: Pyongyang’s trade with the rest of the world in 2012 totalled less than $800m, according to Seoul’s Bank of Korea. In 2007 after a decade of “sunshine”, the engagement pursued by two liberal presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, inter-Korean trade reached $1.8bn, snapping at China’s heels. South Korea briefly became the North’s biggest export market as the joint venture Kaesong Industrial Complex, in the North but near to Seoul, grew.

除了中國,朝鮮——這裏或許應該說曾經——只剩下一個重要的貿易伙伴:韓國。據韓國央行(Bank of Korea)統計,2012年朝鮮與中韓以外地區的貿易額不到8億美元。2007年,在兩位自由派韓國總統金大中(Kim Dae-jung)和盧武鉉(Roh Moo-hyun)推行對朝“陽光政策”(Sunshine,指1998-2008年期間韓國實行與韓鮮增進接觸的政策——譯者注)10年後,朝韓貿易額達到18億美元,直追朝中貿易額。隨着雙方合作建設的開城工業園區(Kaesong Industrial Complex)不斷髮展,韓國一度成爲朝鮮最大的出口市場。開城工業園地處朝鮮,但離首爾很近。

Larger plans were afoot. In 2007, at the second North-South summit, accords were signed for co-operation on shipbuilding, mining, transport and more. A plethora of new joint committees started work quickly to implement all this. For once the Koreas talked business, not politics.

更宏偉的計劃浮出水面。2007年,在第二次韓朝峯會上,雙方就造船、採礦、交通等方面的合作簽署了系列協議。一大批新組建的聯合委員會很快就投入工作,以落實相關協議。朝韓雙方談商業而不談政治,僅此一次。

Nothing came of it. At the end of that year, South Koreans elected as president Lee Myung-bak, who insisted the North must first give up nuclear weapons. The agreements were aborted and a downward spiral began. In May 2010, after the sinking of a South Korean warship, Mr Lee banned all inter-Korean trade and all investment except at Kaesong.

但那輪合作無果而終。2007年年底,韓國民衆選舉李明博(Lee Myung-bak)爲總統,他堅持朝鮮必須首先放棄核武器。雙方的協議被中止,情況急轉直下。2010年5月,在韓國一艘軍艦沉沒後,李明博禁止了與朝鮮的一切貿易,以及除開城以外的所有投資。

That zone alone still generated record North-South trade of $2bn in 2012. Meanwhile trade between China and North Korea leapt ahead. Last April, Mr Kim sabotaged Kaesong, pulling out the North’s workers. It reopened in September but the closure meant inter-Korean trade fell 42 per cent in 2013 to $1.1bn: an eight-year low, and barely one-sixth the value of trade with China.

不過,單憑開城工業園,朝韓貿易額在2012年依然創紀錄地達到20億美元。與此同時,朝中貿易也實現了跳躍式增長。去年4月,金正恩宣佈撤出開城工業園的全部朝鮮工人,給園區造成了損失。雖然開城工業園於9月重新開張,但園區關閉已導致2013年雙邊貿易額下降42%至11億美元,爲8年來最低,僅爲朝中貿易額的六分之一。

North Korea is a risky place to do business, for Chinese as for others. Yet well-publicised horror stories may mislead. The numbers show that many Chinese companies have found a way to navigate the obstacles and make money. They would not be there otherwise.

無論是對中國人還是其他國家的人而言,在朝鮮做生意都要冒着很大風險。不過,那些廣爲流傳的駭人故事或許具有誤導性。統計數字表明,許多中國企業找到了克服障礙和賺錢的法子——若非如此,他們就不會去朝鮮。

Beijing’s gain is Seoul’s loss. Stillborn state-run projects aside, in the sunshine era a few bold companies from the South vied with China to do business in North Korea. Outside Kaesong they all lost their shirts. Yet it was not Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father and predecessor, but Mr Lee who did for them. The sectors affected (mining above all) mourn the chances lost, but politicians are in denial. In January President Park Geun-hye told South Koreans to prepare for reunification, which she bizarrely called a “jackpot”. But the Koreas can barely even agree to hold family reunions – the first in four years began this week – much less recoup ground lost under Mr Lee, whose trade ban remains in force.

中國得利,韓國就受損。除流產的國有項目之外,在陽光政策時期,曾有少數大膽的韓國企業在朝經商、與中國企業競爭。除開城之外,它們在朝鮮其他地方的生意全都血本無歸。然而,導致這種結果的並非金正日(Kim Jong Il)——朝鮮現任領導人的父親和前任,而是李明博。受到禁令影響的行業(採礦業首當其衝)嘆惜失去了多少機會,但政客們拒不承認。今年1月,韓國總統朴槿惠(Park Geun-hye)告訴韓國民衆爲半島統一做好準備,她用了個怪異的說法,稱統一能帶來“巨大利益”(jackpot)。但就連離散家屬團聚問題,朝韓雙方都僅能勉強達成共識(近日舉行的朝韓離散家屬團聚活動是4年來的首次),收復李明博時代所失去“陣地”這個問題就更別提了,他下達的貿易禁令如今也仍然有效。

Pyongyang always tries to play off its interlocutors against one another. Conceivably, the mercurial Mr Kim might suddenly try to ditch China and re-embrace South Korea. But Beijing will not let him and the cautious Ms Park would not have him. Uncle Jang’s men may have fallen from favour but the trade ties he built will last. Seoul blew its chance. North Korea’s future now lies with China.

平壤方面總是試圖挑撥會談各方的關係。可以想象,一向多變的金正恩或許會突然試圖拋棄中國、向韓國重新示好。但北京方面不會任由他這樣做,一向謹慎的朴槿惠也不會接受他的示好。張成澤的人馬或許已經失勢,但他構建的貿易紐帶將會延續下去。首爾方面浪費了一個好機會。朝鮮的未來如今繫於中國身上。