土耳其式"半吊子"民主沒有出路

By definition, municipal elections are about choosing local leaders. Yet Turkey’s local elections this weekend will be about much More. It is set to be a contest between two visions of democracy and its outcome will have serious implications for the future of democratic freedoms in this crucial western ally.

地方選舉顧名思義應該是關於地方領導人的選舉。不過本週末土耳其舉行的地方選舉，代表的意義會豐富得多。這次選舉勢必成爲一場兩種民主願景的競賽，選舉結果也將對這個西方關鍵盟友的民主自由前途產生深遠影響。

For Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK party, an initial decade of relative calm ended with the protests focused on Gezi park on Istanbul’s Taksim Square last year, which led to a nationwide mobilisation against the prime minister’s polarising and paternalistic style. More recently the government has faced fresh pressure following a wave of corruption allegations, leaked mostly almost on a daily basis through social media.

對雷傑普•塔伊普•埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)領導的執政黨“正義與發展黨”(AK party)而言，去年在伊斯坦布爾塔克西姆廣場(Taksim Square)加濟公園(Gezi Park)爆發的抗議，爲第一個相對平靜的十年劃上了句號。爆發於加濟公園的抗議後來演變成一場全國性抗議，針對的是土耳其總理埃爾多安極化、家長式的執政風格。最近，在社交媒體上幾乎每天都有指控土耳其官員腐敗的新材料爆出，讓土耳其政府面臨新的壓力。

The prime minister’s response to these challenges – besides banning Twitter and YouTube – has been to sidestep criticisms by emphasising his government’s legitimacy to rule the country. While campaigning for his local candidates, Mr Erdogan has stressed the importance of the national will, reiterating his belief that the primary source of legitimacy for governments is elections. This is also the reason he has opted to turn the local polls into a referendum on him and his AK party.

面對這些挑戰，土耳其總理的應對方式一直是，強調本屆土耳其政府的執政合法性，迴避批評者提出的問題，此外，他還封殺了Twitter和YouTube。在爲本黨地方候選人助選時，埃爾多安一直強調國家意志的重要性，再三重申他認爲政府合法性的主要來源是選舉。他之所以選擇將這次地方選舉變成對他本人以及正義與發展黨的公投，原因也在於此。

But the real importance of the local elections will rather be in determining the next phase of Mr Erdogan’s political stratagem, and therefore of Turkey’s near-term political path. Depending on the outcome of the local elections, the prime minister might decide to become a candidate in presidential elections scheduled for August. His party would need to get close to the 50 per cent it received in the 2011 parliamentary elections for him to consider this option seriously. Failing this, he would want to lead his party in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015.

不過，地方選舉真正重要的意義其實在於，它會決定埃爾多安如何設計下一階段的政治策略，從而決定土耳其短期內的政治軌跡。地方選舉結果會決定埃爾多安是否會決定以候選人身份參加定於8月舉行的總統選舉。而他領導的正義與發展黨需接近50%的得票率，埃爾多安才能嚴肅考慮這一選項，50%是2011年的選舉中該黨的得票率。否則，他可能會希望領導正義與發展黨蔘加定於2015年舉行的議會選舉。

Changing the AK party’s bylaws that stipulate a three-term leadership limit would enable him to continue his political career. A third scenario that cannot be ruled out is the AK party registering a substantive drop in support to, say, 35 per cent. That would force Mr Erdogan to spend his political capital in the near term to ensure the cohesion of his party in the face of an increased risk of internal dissent.

他可以通過修改正義與發展黨章程中有關領導人最多隻能連任3次的規定，來繼續自己的政治生涯。當然也不能排除第三種情況，即正義與發展黨支持率大幅下滑，比如下滑至35%。這會迫使埃爾多安短期內利用自己的政治資本確保本黨團結，以應對日益凸顯的黨內分歧風險。

For Mr Erdogan, the second pillar of his legitimacy is the evidence of his government’s performance. That is why his campaigning for his party’s local candidates is laden with references to roads built, social programmes launched and surges in welfare that have been realised under his rule. But what he fails to take into account is “process legitimacy” – which is incidentally the source of Turkey’s recent instability.

對埃爾多安而言，合法性的第二個支柱是其政府的政績。正因如此，他在爲本黨地方候選人造勢時，不斷強調在他執政期間，政府修建了多少公路、推出了多少社會保障項目、福利水平攀升多麼快。但他未考慮“程序合法性”，而這恰好是土耳其近期動盪的根源。

Unlike Mr Erdogan’s standards of democratic legitimacy, which are structural, process legitimacy is behavioural. It concerns the way the rule of law is applied, transparency in decision making is implemented, media freedoms are protected and wider participation in policy making is ensured. Process legitimacy is also intrinsically linked to the ability of the political system to permit and respond to dissent. For liberal democracies, process legitimacy is as important as the other pillars of democratic legitimacy. That is fundamentally what distinguishes liberal democracies from illiberal ones.

埃爾多安評判民主合法性的標準是物質上的，而程序合法性是基於行爲過程本身。程序合法性關注的是法治如何實施，決策過程的透明如何確保，媒體自由如何保護，以及政策制定過程中民衆參與度如何保證。程序合法性也與政治體系容忍和應對異見的能力存在內在聯繫。對自由民主政體而言，程序合法性與民主合法性的其他支柱同等重要。它是自由民主政體與非自由民主政體的本質區別所在。

Mr Erdogan’s refusal to adopt a more conciliatory stance during the Gezi protests last year and, more recently on the allegations of corruption, is linked to his genuinely held belief that a ballot box victory combined with a sound economic performance is not only necessary but also sufficient to preserve his rule. But he is wrong.

在去年的加濟公園抗議和最近抗議官員腐敗事件上，埃爾多安之所以拒絕採取更傾向和解的姿態，與他真心相信的一個信念有關——選舉的勝利加上漂亮的經濟表現，對於維持他的執政地位而言不僅是必要條件，而且是充分條件。但他錯了。

Turkey’s democracy has matured beyond the point of accepting this shallow version of a democratic contract. Mr Erdogan may still be the most popular politician in the land but his government is losing legitimacy each day that it refuses to implement fully the rule of law and to bring more transparency to policy making. That is why political instability in Turkey can no longer be appeased just by winning elections. Even if Mr Erdogan’s AK party wins the next elections, and wins big, this popular discontent will not go away.

土耳其民主的成熟度已經超越這樣一種淺薄民主的契約程度。埃爾多安或許仍是土耳其最受歡迎的政客，但他只要仍拒絕完全實施法治、並實現政策制定透明化，他的政府就在一天天喪失合法性。正因如此，僅憑贏得選舉已無法平息土耳其的政治動盪了。即便埃爾多安領導的正義與發展黨贏得下一次選舉，並且高票勝出，民衆普遍的不滿情緒仍不會消失。

The only way forward for the Turkish government is to recognise and address this critical shortcoming in its interpretation of democratic legitimacy. The EU can play a constructive role in nudging the government towards a more ambitious and comprehensive agenda of democratic reforms by starting talks on fundamental freedoms as part of the accession negotiations.

土耳其政府前進的唯一道路，就是承認其對民主合法性的解讀存在關鍵缺陷，並着手解決這種缺陷。歐盟(EU)可以就一些基本自由權開始與土耳其談判，並將其作爲土耳其加入歐盟談判的一部分，從而在推動土耳其政府邁向更具抱負、更全面的民主改革方面發揮建設性作用。

The crisis in Ukraine epitomises the dangers inherent in social and political polarisation. Turkey faces a similar challenge that can be overcome only by a wider interpretation of democratic legitimacy that goes beyond the deification of the ballot box. Only once this has happened can Turkey make the transition from the purgatory of unfulfilled democracies to the promised land of genuinely liberal democracies.

烏克蘭危機體現了社會和政治極化蘊含的內在風險。土耳其面臨類似的挑戰，只有不再信奉選票爲王，對民主合法性作出更全面的解讀，才能解決這一挑戰。只有到那個時候，土耳其才能走出“半吊子”民主制的煉獄，成爲貨真價實的自由民主制的應許之地。