普京"資源民族主義"面臨考驗

During his time in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin has drawn on two potent sources of political strength: high oil prices, which fell into his lap during the boom; and patriotic fervour, which he stoked by engineering regional conflicts. Now the oil price is falling like a stone. Will the Russian president be able to rely on patriotic Mobilisation alone?

在主政克林姆林宮期間，弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)利用兩大因素有效地擴大自己的政治影響力：一個是高油價，在繁榮時期，這一好處得來全不費工夫；另一個是愛國主義熱情，他通過挑起地區衝突助長了這種熱情。如今油價正直線下跌，這位俄羅斯總統能夠單純依賴於民衆的愛國熱情嗎？

The past decade brought two periods of surging oil prices: one that ended in 2008 amid the flames of the financial crisis; and another that began barely three years later. But last week a barrel of oil fetched as little as $70, from $105 in June, and Russian producers must be feeling the squeeze.

過去10年油價經歷了兩輪飆升：一輪葬送在了2008年金融危機的大火之中；短短3年過後又開始了新一輪。但上週油價從6月的每桶105美元跌至70美元低位，俄羅斯生產商肯定感受到了壓力。

The latest slowdown marks a moment of danger for Mr Putin. In the decade and a half since he first became president, the government has strengthened its control over oil and gas and increased its role in the financial sector. The creeping tide of nationalisation eroded incentives for investment, and swept away the resources needed for private investment. This is hardly without precedent; in resource-rich countries people are usually enthusiastic about nationalisation. But they expect benefits.

當前油價跌勢使普京面臨一個危險時刻。自他14年前首次擔任俄羅斯總統以來，俄羅斯政府加大了對油氣的控制，並增強了政府在金融業的作用。逐漸興起的國有化浪潮削弱了投資激勵，捲走了私人投資所需的資源。這並非沒有先例：在資源豐富的國家，人們通常對國有化熱情十足。但他們期待的是好處。

In the early years of Mr Putin’s presidency, they were not disappointed. The oil bounty pushed up consumption, stimulating growth. Most of the money was distributed through market channels. But the second oil price boom did not translate into economic performance as smoothly. In 2012 and 2013, when prices were often above $100, the economy was close to stagnation.

在普京總統任期的最初幾年，他們沒有感到失望。石油財富推升了消費，刺激了經濟增長。其中多數資金通過市場渠道進行了分配。但第二輪油價飆漲卻未能改善經濟表現。2012年和2013年，當油價常常突破100美元時，俄羅斯經濟卻接近停滯。

A dearth of investment led to rising costs, consumption increases ran out of steam, and the oil riches instead had to be meted out through government largesse. By the beginning of this decade, public spending was more than a quarter higher than in the middle of the last one, much of it going on social assistance, higher pensions and public sector wages, as well as military spending.

投資不足導致成本上升，消費增長失去動力，石油財富只能通過政府支出進行分配。到本10年初，政府公共支出比上一個10年中期高出逾四分之一，其中很多流向社會救助、養老金提高、公共部門薪資以及軍事開支。

This approach is sometimes called “resource nationalism”, and we have seen it before: in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, for example, or in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. It inevitably involves confrontation with the west as the regime seals itself off.

這種方法有時被稱作“資源民族主義”，我們以前曾看到過：例如在薩達姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)統治下的伊拉克，或者烏戈•查韋斯(Hugo Chávez)領導下的委內瑞拉。隨着該政權將自己封閉起來，不可避免的要與西方形成對峙。

Politicians who follow this path typically proclaim themselves regional leaders, and engineer conflicts with neighbouring countries that help patriotic mobilisation. Confrontations abroad are a source of legitimacy at home. They offer an excuse for repression, and they draw people into a nationalist narrative. The declared goals of the conflict are irrelevant; what matters is the perpetuation of conflict itself. Seen this way, hopeless fights seem rational, despite the cost.

走上這條道路的政治家一般自我標榜爲地區領袖，他們會挑起與鄰國的衝突，這些衝突有利於利用愛國主義熱情。海外衝突是國內合法性的來源。它們爲鎮壓提供了藉口，並把人們帶入民族主義敘事(nationalist narrative)。公開的衝突目標並不重要：重要的是衝突的延續。從這種角度來看，儘管要付出高昂代價，但毫無希望的戰爭似乎是合理的。

The transition from soft authoritarianism to totalitarian rule depends on three preconditions: popular support, the acquiescence of elites, and an economy that is not deteriorating too quickly. For now, popular support is Mr Putin’s strongest suit. After a period of decline, his approval rating is said to have jumped to 85 per cent in June.

從軟性威權主義(soft authoritarianism)過渡到極權主義需要3個先決條件：民衆支持、精英階層的默許，同時經濟沒有出現過快惡化。目前，民衆支持是普京最大的優勢。在經過一段時期的下滑後，據說他的支持率在6月躍升至85%。

This may be misleading: in an authoritarian climate, such numbers are extremely dubious. Public discussion, such as it is, takes place in the shadows, and opinion polls offer only a distorted reflection. Although anti-western feelings are intensifying, Russians’ lifestyles are now more westernised than ever before. Two years ago, tens of thousands took to Moscow’s streets to demand modernisation.

這可能具有誤導性：在威權體制下，這些數字極其可疑。公共討論是在陰影之下進行的，民意調查也只是一種歪曲的反映。儘管反西方的情緒在加劇，但俄羅斯人的生活方式比以往任何時候都更加西化。兩年前，數萬人曾走上莫斯科街頭要求實現現代化。

The elites have lost some of their nerve in the face of Mr Putin’s apparent popularity. But it is the economy – the double blow of sanctions and a falling oil price – that poses the most serious threat to the president. Repressive institutions are not completed yet, and the country is not sufficiently closed. The Kremlin is hesitating, wondering whether to escalate the confrontation, or ease off while the new economic reality sinks in.

面對普京表面上的受歡迎程度，精英們失去了一些勇氣。但對普京構成最嚴重威脅的是俄羅斯的經濟，該國經濟受到西方制裁以及油價下跌的雙重打擊。高壓機制尚未完成，該國還沒有完全閉關鎖國。克里姆林宮正在猶豫不決，在人們意識到新的經濟現實之際，要將衝突升級還是要緩和衝突。

But the logic of resource nationalism knows no reversal. A regime that will not let go of its country’s natural riches cannot create prosperity. Instead, Mr Putin must channel the patriotic spirits of his people. And that means intensifying his conflict with the west.

但“資源民族主義”的邏輯是不可逆轉的。一個不願放棄掌控本國自然財富的政權是無法締造繁榮的。而普京必須疏導俄羅斯人民的愛國主義精神。這意味着需要加劇他與西方的衝突。