董事會應該如何牽制維權投資者

The hottest topic in many corporate boardrooms today is shareholder activism — or more specifically, the vulnerability of becoming the target of a shareholder activist and what to do about it. Instead of dreading this or, worse, have to defend against it, boards of directors should be proactive about getting out ahead of it. As insiders, we are in a better position to act on our fiduciary responsibility to represent the interests of shareholders than is an independent party, and we have more tools and power at our disposal to do so. Done right, this might result in some healthy, but managed changes.

如今，在許多公司的董事會議室裏，最熱門的話題是股東維權行動，更確切的說，是被維權股東盯上的可能性以及應對之策。董事會不應對此諱疾忌醫，甚至拖到不得不奮力反抗，而是應當在問題出現前就主動出擊。與獨立當事人相比，我們作爲董事會成員，處於更有利的地位，能更好地履行我們的受託責任，代表股東利益，而且我們掌握着許多工具和權力，來幫助我們做到這一點。若處理得當，這可能會帶來一些控制得當的有益變化。

The influence the activists are having in the market has never been greater. Simply put, what they are doing is attracting more interest and more capital, now estimated at north of $115 billion, 10 times the levels of the 1990’s. Distributing their messages has also become easier. They often communicate via social media and business news channels to emotionally pressure management and collaborate with other shareholders.

如今，維權投資者的市場影響力之大，可謂前所未見。簡言之，他們如今受到的關注更多，吸引的資金也更多，目前估計已經突破1150億美元，是20世紀90年代的10倍。維權投資者“傳經佈道”也變得更加容易。他們經常通過社交媒體和商業新聞頻道發表看法，藉此向公司管理層施壓，並與其他股東聯合起來。

So what is a board of directors to do? Boards are empowered to protect shareholders, but many shareholders have become sympathetic to activists because they believe the system has inherent conflicts of interest; that directors are more interested in collecting paychecks and preserving their status quo than in exercising their fiduciary duty to shareholders.

那董事會應該怎麼做？董事會被授權保護股東，但許多股東認爲，現行體制存在內在利益衝突，而董事們更熱衷於從公司領薪水、維持自身現狀，而非履行對股東的信託責任，股東們因此對維權投資者持贊同態度。

Conversely, the board’s time horizon for creating value is by definition much longer than that of any one activist, and many boards and management teams feel activists are too short-term and just don’t get the complexities of the landscape in which they operate. Operating realities include balancing the interests of customers, suppliers, employees, and regulators. Implementing well-managed changes, while navigating these factors, often takes longer than investors may realize.

相反，董事會的價值創造投資期比任何維權投資者的都要長得多，許多董事會和管理團隊感到，維權投資者過於注重短期收益，根本不瞭解企業經營領域的複雜性。經營企業需要平衡客戶、供應商、員工和監管機構的利益。在兼顧上述因素的同時，引進管理得當的改變，所需要的時間，往往比投資者想的要長。

But there are many things public company boards can do to better align with their core responsibility to the stockholders—and they can do it in a way that is proactive and more long-term in nature than if it is in response to an activist.

不過，在更好地履行對股東的核心責任方面，上市公司董事會確實大有可爲。而且，與應對維權投資者不同的是，董事會可以事前採取行動，並立足長遠。

Here are three ideas, which are meant to be directional rather than prescriptive.

以下是筆者在此方面的三個想法，旨在拋磚引玉，並不要求一一照做。

Let shareholders air it out.

讓股東暢所欲言

Most boards only receive input from reading reports by sell-side analysts, who are not their shareholders, and from the CEO and CFO, who directly talk to institutional shareholders. Imagine, as an executive, never meeting with your boss to get feedback, but instead receiving it filtered from someone on your staff. That’s essentially what happens for many boards.

大多數董事會對企業的瞭解，來自於閱讀由賣方分析師撰寫的報告，以及由企業首席執行官和首席財務官提供的信息。其中，賣方分析師並非企業股東，而企業首席執行官和首席財務官則直接與機構股東對話。試想，作爲一名管理者，怎能從不與自己老闆碰面以獲取其反饋，而是聽信自己員工的一面之詞？然而，在許多董事會，現狀都是如此。

The shareholders are ultimately the “boss” of the board in the sense that the board serves as their proxy for enhancing intrinsic value. Yet boards typically hear about shareholder concerns indirectly and often not attributed to any specific shareholder.

股東是董事會的“老闆”，董事會是幫助股東增進企業內在價值的代理人。然而，董事會通常只能間接獲悉股東看法，而且往往很難聽到單個股東的看法。

A huge opportunity is missed without direct contact. This is exactly the opportunity the activists are availing themselves of by contacting blocks of shareholders to exchange views on underperforming companies and collaborating on remedies.

就這樣，與股東直接接觸的大好機會被白白浪費。而維權投資者正是抓住了這一機會，與大批股東進行接觸，交換對業績不佳的公司的看法，並共同尋求補救之法。

Boards should do the same. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this. For example, Coca-Cola Co. Director Maria Elena Lagomasino, Chair of the Compensation Committee, met directly with one large shareholder and also considered specific feedback derived from major institutional shareholders of Coke on the issue of executive compensation. This input led to the revised approach to equity compensation, communicated by her directly with shareholders through the company’s website.

董事會也應該這樣做。要做到這一點，可以通過多種方式。舉例來說，可口可樂公司（Coca-Cola Co.）董事、薪酬委員會主席瑪麗亞o埃萊娜o拉格馬西諾，曾就高管薪酬問題與一位大股東直接會面，並考慮可口可樂主要機構股東對該問題的具體反饋。可口可樂根據獲得的反饋信息，對股權薪酬進行了調整。拉格馬西諾通過公司網站，直接與股東就該調整進行了溝通。

This could even become part of a regular process. For example, a designated board member could invite large shareholders to periodic get togethers to air their thoughts and concerns. This feedback could either be summarized for the board by that board member or delivered directly by a representative from the group at a board gathering.

這甚至可能會成爲常規做法。例如，可以指定一名董事，邀請大股東們參加定期聚會，暢談自身想法和顧慮。股東們的反饋，可以由該董事向董事會簡要概述，也可以由一名股東代表直接在董事會上進行陳述。

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is even more ambitious. It hosts more than 30,000 shareholders in Omaha annually and allows them more than six hours to ask unfiltered questions. Recently, Chairman and CEO Warren Buffett offered some sage advice on the subject. “I believe in running the company for shareholders that are going to stay, rather than the ones that are going to leave.”

在這方面，伯克希爾哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）走得更遠。該公司每年邀請3萬多名股東齊聚奧馬哈，股東們有6個多小時可以隨意提問。關於這一點，伯克希爾哈撒韋董事長兼首席執行官沃倫o巴菲特最近給出了一條明智的建議。“我經營公司，是爲了那些準備長期持有的股東，而不是那些準備短線操作的股東。”

If a designated director or a designated third party representing the board were to reach out to shareholders from time to time, both sides would learn and benefit. It would allow key directors to educate shareholders, as well as build credibility and a relationship before problems arise. In addition, shareholders can add insight to the board, because they often speak with competitors, customers, and suppliers of the company and can bring an “outside in” perspective that can be hugely valuable.

如果指定一名董事或第三方來代表董事會，時常與股東接觸，董事會和股東都將從中受益。關鍵董事將有機會對股東進行教育，並在問題出現前樹立信譽、建立關係。此外，股東可以同董事會分享自己的獨到見解。股東往往與企業的競爭對手、客戶以及供應商有接觸，因而能提供“由外及內”的獨特視角，這可能對企業極具價值。

Limit terms, but don’t install terms limits.

限制任期年限，但不限制任期屆數。

This means setting up a mechanism for both attracting new directors with some of the skill sets of long-term shareholders, as well as a mechanism for rotation off the board to create room for new thinking, more diversity, and women.

這意味着建立相應機制，吸引具有部分技能組合的長期股東成爲新董事，同時確立董事解聘機制，以便催生新思維、促進多元化、增加女性董事數量。

For removing directors, the solution that activists primarily advocate is a hard term-limit. As an alternative, many companies instead opt for a retirement age. I am not a fan of either. Why create a system that force out good board members?

對於解聘董事，維權投資者往往主張實行嚴格的任期限制。作爲替代方案，許多公司通常是對董事設定退休年齡。我對這兩種方案都不太贊同。爲何要建立一個機制，迫使那些出色的董事讓位？

Then again, most boards have at least one or maybe a few directors who are not adding as much value as a new member might bring and therefore represent an “opportunity cost.” Once directors are on a board, it can be extremely difficult to naturally rotate them off. Firing a friend is tough under the best conditions, and even more so because there is no economic incentive.

話又說回來，大多數董事會至少都有那麼一位甚或好幾位董事，創造的價值小於引入新董事可能帶來的價值，導致了“機會成本”。一旦某人進入公司董事會，要想將其解聘決非易事，正所謂請神容易送神難。即便天時地利，炒朋友的魷魚都很難，在沒有經濟激勵的情況下，更是難上加難。

It’s emotionally easier just to “wait it out.” This is even more complicated when a CEO inherits a board that was picked and groomed by her predecessor and doesn’t have the collective skills for her new strategy.

感情上，更容易的做法是“乾等着”。而且，當首席執行官面對的董事會，成員全都是由前任首席執行官挑選並推薦，其技能組合不能滿足企業新戰略的需求時，事態將更加複雜。

My view is that boards would be well served to adopt a process that specifically outlines the rotation process and that is understood and implemented for new directors. In other words, limited terms, but not unified term-limits. By making this change for all new directors, it side-steps the issue of those already on the board, making it easier to implement on a go forward basis.

我認爲，董事會應確立相應程序，明確規定新董事輪換機制，並確保該規定得到理解和執行。換言之，限制任期年限，但對任期屆數不做統一限制。僅對新任董事適用上述改變，能有效規避來自於現任董事的阻力，從而使新規更易推行。

I lean toward a system in which each new member of the board agrees to hand in their resignation every six to eight years, with the idea being that some directors will be asked to serve multiple terms it they are uniquely qualified to help the CEO and company build value, but many will be thanked for their service and move on after that time frame.

我傾向於這樣一個體系：每位新任董事都同意，每六至八年遞交一次辭呈。如果有些董事在幫助首席執行官和企業創造價值方面，能發揮無可替代的作用，會被請求連任。至於那些沒有突出作用的董事，將在企業對他們此前的服務表示感謝後，就此離開董事會。

The decision regarding whose resignations to keep, or whose to accept, could be made either by an appointed director, or by an absolutely confidential and binding majority vote of the other board members. This latter approach might be easier socially.

是否接受某位董事的辭呈，可由一位指定的董事，或其餘董事絕對保密且具有約束力的多數票來決定。後一種做法可能更易實行。

Think like an activist.

像維權投資者那樣思考。

Directors must insist on asking management to analyze strategic choices as an activist would: by looking at alternatives to the strategies the CEO is recommending. This is not typical. The more common pattern is for the CEO to consider options and present only the recommended one to the board.

董事們必須堅決要求企業管理層像維權投資者一樣分析戰略選擇：審視在首席執行官推薦的戰略之外，有何替代方案。這種做法十分罕見。通常的做法是，首席執行官在權衡各種戰略後，僅向董事會介紹自己認爲最好的戰略。

The road not taken is the one the activist will surface so the board must have analyzed these alternatives. This means understanding what it would mean to get out of underperforming operations, split up the company and evaluate varying alternatives for measuring and handling excess cash versus the ones being recommended. If these choices are not discussed, the board will be poorly prepared to articulate and defend its alternative course.

維權投資者主張的，必然是企業未採用的戰略。因此，董事會必須提前分析所有替代方案。這意味着弄清與首席執行官推薦的戰略相比，放棄業績不佳的公司、分拆企業、評估測量和處理過剩現金的各種替代方案意味着什麼。如果董事會沒有討論上述選擇，將在闡明和捍衛自身戰略方面準備不足。

Importantly, an analysis of the break-up or private transaction value of a company that shows a higher value than where the stock is trading does not oblige a company to make a sale. There have been many times in history where macro-economic or other conditions have made the current stock market and private transaction values poor indicators of intrinsic value. The board’s duty is to enhance the latter, exercising its duty of care, by fully understanding what strategic choices the company is making and why.

重要的是，分析顯示某企業的拆分或私人交易價值大於其股票市值，並不表示企業必須出售。歷史上，由於宏觀經濟環境或其他條件，導致當前股市和私人交易價值偏離企業內在價值的例子並不鮮見。董事會的職責，是提升企業內在價值，行使審慎職責，充分理解企業做出的戰略決策，以及做出決策的理由。

By proactively using their power to align with long-term shareholder value creation, boards can help companies avoid the disruption that a shorter-term activist agenda will bring.

通過主動利用手中權力，積極配合創造長期股東價值，董事會可以幫助企業避免維權投資者的短期議程將帶來的混亂。