全球經濟需要直升機撒錢 Helicopter drops might not be far away

The world economy is slowing, both structurally and cyclically. How might policy respond? With desperate improvisations, no doubt. Negative interest rates have already Moved from the unthinkable to reality. The next step is likely to include fiscal expansion. Indeed, this is what the OECD, long an enthusiast for fiscal austerity, recommends in its Interim Economic Outlook. But that is unlikely to be the end. With fiscal expansion might go direct monetary support, including the most radical policy of all: the “helicopter drops” of money recommended by the late Milton Friedman.

世界經濟正在放緩——既是結構性的，也是週期性的。政策或將會如何應對？毫無疑問，只能依靠不顧一切臨時拼湊出的各種措施。負利率早已從天方夜譚變爲現實。下一步很可能要實施財政擴張。實際上，這正是經合組織(OECD)——財政緊縮政策的長期擁護者——在其《年中經濟展望》(Interim Economic Outlook)中給出的建議。但這可能還不算完，在推出擴張性財政政策的同時，可能還會出臺直接的資金支持，包括所有政策之中最激進的政策——已故經濟學家米爾頓•弗裏德曼(Milton Friedman)建議的“直升機撒錢”(helicopter drops)。

More recently, this is the policy foreseen by Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater, a hedge fund. The world economy is not just slowing, he argues, but “monetary policy 1” — lower interest rates — and “monetary policy 2” — quantitative easing — are largely exhausted. Thus, he says, the world will need a “monetary policy 3” directly targeted at encouraging spending. That we might need such a policy is also the recommendation of Adair Turner, former chairman of the Financial Services Authority, in his bookBetween Debt and the Devil.

對衝基金橋水公司(Bridgewater)創始人雷•戴利奧(Ray Dalio)最近已預見到了這一政策。他辯稱，世界經濟已經不止是在放緩，但降息（一號貨幣政策）與量化寬鬆（二號貨幣政策）很大程度上都已彈盡糧絕。因此，他說，世界將需要以鼓勵消費爲直接目標的“三號貨幣政策”。英國金融服務管理局(FSA)前主席阿代爾•特納(Adair Turner)在自己的著作《債務與魔鬼》(Between Debt and the Devil)中也給出了相同的政策建議。

Why might the world be driven to such expedients? The short answer is that the global economy is slowing durably. The OECD now forecasts growth of global output in 2016 “to be no higher than in 2015, itself the slowest pace in the past five years”. Behind this is a simple reality: the global savings glut — the tendency for desired savings to rise more than desired investment — is growing and so the “chronic demand deficiency syndrome” is worsening.

爲什麼世界或將不得不採取這樣的權宜之計呢？簡單來說，答案是：全球經濟處於長期放緩之中。經合組織目前預計，2016年全球產出增速“不會高於2015年——2015年本身也是過去5年增速最慢的一年”。這背後的現實很簡單：全球儲蓄過剩（合意儲蓄比合意投資增長更多的趨勢）日益嚴重，因此，“長期需求不足綜合徵”正在惡化。

This stage of demand weakness must be seen in its historical context. The long-term real interest rate on safe securities has been declining for at least two decades. It has been near zero since the financial crisis of 2007-09. Before then, an unsustainable western credit boom offset the weakness of demand. Afterwards, fiscal deficits, zero interest rates and expansions of central bank balance sheets stabilised demand in the west, while a credit expansion funded massive investment in China. Loose western monetary policies and loose Chinese credit policies also drove the post-crisis commodity boom, though China’s exceptional growth was the most important single factor.

必須用歷史的眼光看待這一階段的需求疲軟。在過去至少20年間，安全資產的長期實際利率一直在下降——自2007-09年金融危機以來一直接近於零。而在金融危機爆發前，西方國家不可持續的信貸膨脹抵消了需求的疲軟。金融危機爆發後，財政赤字、零利率以及央行擴大資產負債表穩定了西方的需求，而在中國，信貸擴張爲大規模投資提供了資金。西方寬鬆的貨幣政策和中國寬鬆的信貸政策還帶動了後危機時期的大宗商品繁榮——儘管中國一枝獨秀的增長是最重要的單一因素。

The end of these credit booms is an important cause of today’s weak demand. But demand is also weak relative to a slowing growth of supply. At the world level, growth of labour supply and labour productivity have fallen sharply since the middle of the last decade. Lower growth of potential output itself weakens demand, because it lowers investment, always a crucial driver of spending in a capitalist economy.

這輪信貸繁榮的結束是導致當前需求疲軟的重要原因。但相對於放緩的供給增長，需求還是很疲軟。從世界平均水平看，自上個10年的中期開始，勞動力供給增速及勞動生產率提升速度已經大幅下滑。潛在產出增長放緩本身就會削弱需求，因爲它使投資減少，而投資在資本主義經濟中一直是支出的關鍵驅動力。

It is this background — slowing growth of supply, rising imbalances between desired savings and investment, the end of unsustainable credit booms and, not least, a legacy of huge debt overhangs and weakened financial systems — that explains the current predicament. It explains, too, why economies that cannot generate adequate demand at home are compelled towards beggar-my-neighbour, export-led growth via weakening exchange rates. Japan and the eurozone are in that club. So, too, are the emerging economies with collapsed exchange rates. China is resisting, but for how long? A weaker renminbi seems almost inevitable, whatever the authorities say.

可以解釋當前困境的正是這一背景——供給增長放緩、合意儲蓄與合意投資日益失衡、無法持續的信貸膨脹走到了終點、以及（尤其是）龐大的遺留債務負擔和虛弱的金融體系。這一背景還解釋了爲什麼那些國內需求不足的經濟體，不得不通過壓低匯率尋求“以鄰爲壑”的出口拉動型增長。日本和歐元區如此。一些匯率暴跌的新興經濟體亦是如此。中國還在挺着，但能堅持多久呢？無論當局怎麼說，人民幣貶值幾乎不可避免。

No simple solutions for the global economic imbalances of today exist, only palliatives. The current favourite flavour in monetary policy is negative interest rates. Mr Dalio argues that: “While negative interest rates will make cash a bit less attractive (but not much), it won’t drive . . . savers to buy the sort of assets that will finance spending.” I agree. I cannot imagine that businesses will rush to invest as a result. The same is true of conventional quantitative easing. The biggest effect of these policies is likely to be via exchange rates. In effect, other countries will be seeking export-led growth vis-à-vis over-borrowed US consumers. That is bound to blow up.

要消除目前的全球經濟失衡沒有簡單的解決辦法，只有權宜之計。目前最受青睞的貨幣政策是負利率。戴利奧辯稱：“負利率將讓持有現金變得（稍微）不那麼吸引人，但它不會促使……儲戶去購買那種能夠爲支出提供資金的資產。”我同意這點。我無法想象企業會因此趕忙去投資。傳統的量化寬鬆政策也是如此。這些政策的最大影響可能會通過匯率體現出來。實際上，與過度借貸的美國消費者相比，其他國家將尋求由出口拉動的增長。這種模式肯定會覆滅。

One alternative then is fiscal policy. The OECD argues, persuasively, that co-ordinated expansion of public investment, combined with appropriate structural reforms, could expand output and even lower the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product. This is particularly plausible nowadays, because the major governments are able to borrow at zero or even negative real interest rates, long term. The austerity obsession, even when borrowing costs are so low, is lunatic.

接下來，另一種解決辦法是財政政策。經合組織令人信服的辯稱，協調地擴大公共投資，再加上適當的結構性改革，可能會提高產出、甚至降低公共債務與國內生產總值(GDP)之比。這種觀點眼下看來尤其有道理，因爲世界主要國家的政府能夠長期以零實際利率甚至負實際利率借入資金。在借款成本處於如此低位之際還癡迷於財政緊縮政策，是極其愚蠢的。

If the fiscal authorities are unwilling to behave so sensibly — and the signs, alas, are that they are not — central banks are the only players. They could be given the power to send money, ideally in electronic form, to every adult citizen. Would this add to demand? Absolutely. Under existing monetary arrangements, it would also generate a permanent rise in the reserves of commercial banks at the central bank. The easy way to contain any long-term monetary effects would be to raise reserve requirements. These could then become a desirable feature of our unstable banking systems.

如果財政當局不願明智地採取行動（唉，有跡象顯示他們確實不願意），那麼央行就要唱獨角戲了。可以賦予央行向每一位成年公民發錢（最好是以電子形式）的權力。這會擴大需求嗎？肯定會。在現有的貨幣安排下，這還會導致商業銀行存放在央行的存款準備金永久性增加。避免產生任何長期貨幣影響的簡便辦法，是提高銀行存款準備金率。這隨後可能會成爲我們不穩定的銀行業體系的一個理想特徵。

The main point is this. The economic forces that have brought the world economy to zero real interest rates and, increasingly, negative central bank rates are, if anything, now strengthening. This is what the world economy is showing. This is what monetary policy is indicating. Increasingly, this is what asset prices are demonstrating.

主要觀點如下。將全球經濟帶入零實際利率、乃至讓越來越多央行實行負利率的經濟因素，眼下不僅未見減弱，反而正在增強。這就是全球經濟反映出的狀況，也是貨幣政策反映出的狀況。資產價格也越來越明顯地反映出這種狀況。

Policymakers must prepare for a new “new normal” in which policy becomes more uncomfortable, more unconventional, or both. Can the world escape from the chronic demand weakness? Absolutely, yes. Will it? That demands greater boldness. When one has exhausted the just about possible, what remains, however improbable, must be the answer.

政策制定者必須準備好迎接新一輪“新常態”，在這種新常態下，政策將變得更令人不安、更非傳統，或者兩者兼有。世界能否擺脫長期需求乏力？當然，答案是肯定的。會擺脫嗎？這需要更多勇氣。當所有可能的方案都已窮盡時，剩下的肯定就是答案，不管它有多麼不可思議。