以日本爲鑑 中企海外收購須防竹籃打水

A thrifty Asian powerhouse saves and invests its way to economic stardom, inspiring admiration and paranoia in the rich world. The powerhouse begins to lose momentum, driving its corporations to switch their investment appetites towards assets abroad. But, lacking worldly experience, the corporations bungle. Billions in hard-earned national savings disappear down a black hole.

一個節儉的亞洲大國依靠儲蓄和投資，一步步成長爲世界經濟明星，讓發達世界既羨慕，又心生疑懼。當這個大國開始失去增長動力時，國內大公司便將投資興趣轉向海外資產。但缺乏經驗令這些公司舉步維艱。辛苦掙得的鉅額國民儲蓄就這樣消失於黑洞之中。

Such was the experience of Japan from the late 1980s, when it snapped up trophy assets from New York’s Rockefeller Center to the Hotel Bel-Air in Los Angeles, for which a Japanese acquirer paid the equivalent of $2.3m in 2016 dollars — per room. Now, a quarter of a century later, China may be following the same script, to judge from today’s merger wars at least.

這就是日本在上世紀80年代末的經歷。那時，日本企業在美國大肆收購“炫耀性資產”——從紐約的洛克菲勒中心(Rockefeller Center)到洛杉磯貝爾艾爾酒店(Hotel Bel-Air)。爲了收購貝爾艾爾酒店，日本買家爲每間客房支付的價格相當於2016年的230萬美元。四分之一世紀後的今天，至少從目前的併購戰中可以判斷，中國或許已經踏上了日本當年走過的道路。

Exhibit A, until recently, was the commodity sector. State-owned companies bought up mines and oil reserves at the peak of the market, and have now lost their shirts. The theory of the purchases was that China, a commodity importer, should protect itself from rising global prices. But these same prices reflected the country’s unsustainable expansion. Far from hedging prudently, it was taking a leveraged bet on its own growth.

證據一：直至最近，中國的海外收購大多集中在大宗商品領域。國有企業在市場價格高峯時期收購礦山和石油資源，但如今已經蒙受巨大損失。海外收購的理由是，作爲大宗商品進口國，中國應該保護自己免受全球價格上漲的影響。但這些價格同樣也反映了中國海外擴張的不可持續。中國非但沒有謹慎地進行避險操作，反而對本國的增長進行了槓桿式的押注。

Now comes exhibit B: Anbang Insurance Group. Founded 12 years ago as a provincial car and property underwriter, Anbang has recently barged into wealth management, selling precariously high-yielding life insurance contracts and more than doubling its assets in a little over a year.

證據二：安邦保險集團(Anbang Insurance Group)。作爲一家成立於12年前的地方汽車與財產保險商，安邦近來已經進軍財富管理領域，銷售收益率偏高的壽險合約，並使公司資產在一年多的時間裏翻了一番。

Laden with its clients’ savings, it has embarked on a wild shopping spree, spending nearly $2bn on New York’s Waldorf Astoria, promising $6.5bn for hotels owned by private equity group Blackstone and offering $14bn in a high-profile contest to acquire Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, owner of the W, Westin and Sheraton brands.

憑藉客戶的儲蓄，安邦走上了瘋狂的海外收購之路——斥資近20億美元買下了紐約華爾道夫酒店(Waldorf Astoria)，承諾以65億美元收購私人股本集團黑石(Blackstone)旗下酒店，並以140億美元高調競購喜達屋酒店及度假村國際集團(Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide)，後者擁有W酒店、威斯汀(Westin)、喜來登(Sheraton)等品牌。

Nor are Anbang’s ambitions merely American. The company is said to

（編者按：根據最新的消息，安邦已經在喜達屋競購戰中輸給了萬豪國際(Marriott International)。）

have its sights on trophy assets in 30 countries.

安邦的雄心並不侷限於美國。據稱，該公司看上的炫耀性資產遍及30個國家。

Anbang rationalises its empire building by invoking Warren Buffett, the American investor who parlayed an insurance business into a conglomerate with a market capitalisation of $351bn. But the comparison is as outlandish as Anbang’s expansion rate. Mr Buffett’s success is rooted in the discipline of “value” investing, seeking companies that are cheap relative to book value or cash flow. He focuses on his home turf and stalks his prospects patiently. He does not brag that “we must win the first battle and every battle thereafter”, as Wu Xiaohui, Anbang’s Napoleonic founder, has proclaimed.

安邦引用沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)的例子，來解釋自己打造商業帝國的行動。巴菲特成功地將一家保險公司發展成了市值3510億美元的企業集團。但這種比較如同安邦的擴張速度一樣怪異。巴菲特的成功根植於“價值”投資的原則，尋求那些相對於賬面價值或現金流較便宜的公司進行投資。他只專注自己擅長的領域，耐心地一步步實現自己的願景。安邦創始人吳小暉有着堪比拿破崙的氣勢，他曾經宣告“我們不但首戰必勝，而且每戰必勝”，巴菲特沒這樣吹噓過。

Anbang is only the most extreme example of a recent shift. This year Chinese companies have bid more than $100bn for foreign assets, a sum approaching the $106bn recorded in the whole of 2015.

安邦只是中國最近對外投資熱潮中一個最極端的例子。今年以來，中國企業參與競購的海外資產規模已超過1000億美元，接近整個2015年實現的1060億美元的收購額。

Inevitably, copious bidding is foolish bidding: the median Chinese bid last year valued the target company at 33 times earnings, implying a yield of 3 per cent. Given that investors could secure a higher yield with less risk by buying investment-grade corporate bonds, the Chinese were offering what fee-happy dealmakers call strategic acquisition premiums or, mockingly, “saps”.

不可避免的是，大量的競購只能是愚蠢的競購：去年，按照中國企業收購出價的中值來計算，它們對目標公司的估值爲33倍的市盈率，這意味着收益率爲3%。鑑於投資者可以通過購買投資級公司債券，以較低的風險獲得更高的收益，中國企業提供了見錢眼開的交易撮合者所稱的“戰略性收購溢價”(strategic acquisition premiums)，簡稱saps，意爲“傻瓜”。

Of course, some Chinese deals have proved successful. Lenovo’s 2005 acquisition of IBM’s PC business, derided at the time as a snake swallowing an elephant, turned out better than predicted. And there is a logic in Chinese companies marching up the value chain by buying western technologies and learning how to manage western brands.

當然，有些中國企業的併購已經證明獲得了成功。2005年，聯想(Lenovo)收購了IBM的PC業務，這在當時被揶揄爲一場“蛇吞象”的交易，但現在看來，結果比預計的要好。中國企業相信，通過購入西方技術並學習如何管理西方品牌，可以讓他們走向價值鏈的高端，這有其道理。

But much of the Chinese cash now chasing global assets is driven by political imperatives. In late 2014, in what looks like an unfortunate decision given the direction of today’s markets, China’s leadership decided to cool the appreciation of the exchange rate, to benefit domestic exporters, by encouraging its corporations to take money out of the country. Since these companies were still prohibited by capital controls from buying dollar bonds, they instructed a global army of intermediaries to snap up income-yielding property.

但如今，中國大部分追逐全球資產的資金都是受政治需要的驅動。2014年末，中國領導層決定通過鼓勵國內企業投資境外，爲升值的人民幣降降溫，讓國內出口企業受益——從如今的市場走向來看，這似乎是一個令人遺憾的決定。當時由於資本管制，這些企業無法購買美元債券，於是他們指示一支全球中間商大軍，搶購可產生收入的地產。

The risks in this strategy are evident. China’s executives are accustomed to economic growth of 9 or 10 per cent; they are inexperienced in countries where 2-3 per cent is good. The country’s high-flying businesses are mostly built on political connections — invaluable in China but of precious little relevance when buying US hotels. And, if they are venturing abroad for political reasons, Chinese buyers may not even care that they lack commercial ones.

這種策略帶有很明顯的風險。中國企業高管習慣了9%或10%的經濟增速；他們缺乏在2%-3%的增速就算不錯的國家經營的經驗。中國這些雄心勃勃的企業大多憑藉政治關係發展壯大，政治關係雖然在中國用處極大，但在收購美國酒店時並無作用。而且，如果他們的海外投資活動是出於政治原因，那麼，中國買家或許甚至不會關心是否有商業價值。

Within a few years of the Rockefeller and Bel Air purchases, the Japanese acquirers offloaded them for less than 60 cents on the dollar. In all, Japan is thought to have lost $400bn on US property during this period. Perhaps, knowing this history, the Chinese will prove more prudent. Then again, perhaps not.

買下洛克菲勒中心和貝爾艾爾酒店沒幾年，日本買家就被迫將它們虧本出售。總的算來，在這段時期，日本據信在美國地產市場損失了4000億美元。如果瞭解這段歷史，中國企業也許會更爲謹慎。當然，也許不會。