中國債市派對遇冷

Too big to ignore but too opaque to entirely trust. China is engaged in a charm offensive to lure foreign money into its bond market, which has grown in a short period of time from a minnow to the third largest in the world, after the US and Japan.

太大而不容忽視，但又因太不透明而無法完全信任。中國正在發起一場魅力攻勢，吸引境外資金進入其債券市場，後者已在很短時間內從無足輕重成長爲全球第三大債市，僅次於美國和日本。

The opening of the bond market to foreigners is part of a transformation in the international financial system, which is slowly linking up with a Chinese economy that was once walled off behind tight capital controls. It is a crucial step in Beijing’s plan to turn the renminbi into one of the anchor currencies of the global economy.

向境外投資者開放債市是國際金融體系變革的一部分，該體系正慢慢地與曾經躲在嚴格資本管制圍牆後面的中國經濟接軌。此舉是北京將人民幣打造成全球經濟錨定貨幣之一計劃中的關鍵一步。

But the risk for China’s economic planners is that no one shows up to their bond market party, amid fears over capital controls and default risk. International fund managers acknowledge that Chinese onshore debt is bound to become a big part of global fixed-income portfolios, but add qualifiers such as “eventually” and “medium- to long-term”. Few, it seems, want to go in first.

但中國經濟規劃者面臨的風險是，出於對資本管制和違約風險的擔憂，沒有投資者爲他們的債市派對捧場。國際基金經理承認，中國的在岸債務勢必將成爲全球固定收益投資組合中的一大塊，但他們加上了“最終”、“中期至長期”等限定詞。似乎沒人想衝在第一位。

“For an economy that is a tenth of the global economy with a similar share in global exports and investment, the singular lack of financial integration is striking and cannot last,” says Qu Hongbin, chief Greater China economist at HSBC in Hong Kong.

匯豐(HSBC)駐香港大中華區首席經濟學家屈宏斌表示：“對於一個規模佔全球經濟十分之一、出口和投資也佔全球相似份額的經濟體而言，金融一體化的缺位格外突出，不可持續。”

Until recently, foreign participation in the Chinese market was tightly controlled by quotas and licensing requirements. That changed in February 2016, when the People’s Bank of China threw wide open the doors to the interbank bond market, where most Chinese debentures trade. With one stroke, the central bank cleared the way for banks, insurers, securities firms, asset management companies, pension funds and non-profit endowments to enter the market without prior approval.

直至不久以前，外資進入中國債市還受到額度和許可證要求的嚴格控制。但這一情況在2016年2月發生了轉變，當時中國人民銀行(PBoC)放開了銀行間債券市場，大多數人民幣債券在這一市場交易。中國央行一舉爲銀行、保險公司、證券公司、資產管理公司、養老基金以及非盈利基金進入該市場掃清了道路，取消了事先批准這個要求。

Last month the government widened access further, announcing a programme to let investors in Hong Kong buy Chinese onshore bonds through their own brokerages. Modelled on the Stock Connect programmes linking Hong Kong’s exchange with those in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the Shanghai Bond Connect will allow foreigners to buy onshore Chinese bonds without the need for an onshore account.

上月，中國政府進一步放寬准入，宣佈了一項允許在香港的投資者通過自家經紀商購買在岸人民幣債券的計劃。仿照連接港股與上海和深圳股市的“滬港通”、“深港通”計劃，“債券通”將讓境外投資者無需擁有在岸賬戶即可購買在岸人民幣債券。

Despite expanded access, however, interest from foreign investors has so far been tepid. Foreign holdings of Chinese domestic bonds rose a modest 13 per cent last year, according to central bank figures. At Rmb853bn ($124bn) by the end of 2016, foreign holdings equal only 1.3 per cent of total market value.

然而，雖然市場準入放寬了，但境外投資者迄今興趣不大。中國央行的數據顯示，境外投資者持有的人民幣債券去年溫和上漲了13%，截至2016年底爲8530億元人民幣（合1240億美元），僅相當於市場總值的1.3%。

“China’s interest rates are modestly higher than in the west, and the long-term prospects for the economy and the currency are still good,” says David Dollar, former US Treasury economic and financial emissary to China and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “However, there are all kinds of risks, and interest rates strike me as low relative to the risks.”

“中國的利率略高於西方，中國經濟以及人民幣匯率的長期前景仍然不錯，”美國財政部前駐華經濟和金融特使、現爲華盛頓布魯金斯學會(Brookings Institution)高級研究員的杜大偉(David Dollar)說，“然而，存在着各種各樣的風險，同時在我看來，利率相對於風險不算高。”

Fund manager caution

基金經理的謹慎

Among the types of foreign investors, central banks and sovereign wealth funds have responded most positively. After the International Monetary Fund’s decision in late 2015 to add the Chinese currency to its special drawing rights, the renminbi officially assumed the status of reserve currency in October last year. Because all IMF members hold SDRs among their reserves, this change meant renminbi assets automatically entered the reserve portfolios of the fund’s 189 member countries.

在不同類型的境外投資者中，央行和主權財富基金的迴應最爲積極。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF) 2015年末決定把人民幣納入其特別提款權貨幣籃子之後，人民幣去年10月正式擁有了儲備貨幣的地位。因爲所有IMF成員國在本國外匯儲備中都持有特別提款權貨幣，這一變化意味着人民幣資產自動進入了該組織189個成員國的外匯儲備資產組合。

Beyond these automatic purchases, many other sovereign investors take their cue from the IMF. “As the renminbi becomes a bigger part of the SDR basket, central bank reserve managers, large sovereign pension plans and the like will probably have to adjust their holdings to reflect the higher allocations within global sovereign portfolios,” says Manu George, senior investment director for Asian fixed income at Schroders Investment Management.

除了這些自動購入，其他許多主權投資機構也從IMF得到啓發。施羅德投資管理公司(Schroders Investment Management)亞洲固定收益部門高級投資主管馬努?喬治(Manu George)表示：“隨着人民幣在特別提款權貨幣籃子中份額擴大，央行儲備經理、大型主權養老金計劃等很可能將不得不調整所持資產，以反映全球主權投資組合中人民幣債券較高的配置。”

Global central banks owned $84.5bn worth of renminbi assets as foreign exchange reserves at the end of last year, equal to 1.1 per cent of global reserves, IMF data show.

IMF的數據顯示，截至去年底，全球央行擁有價值845億美元的人民幣資產作爲外匯儲備，相當於全球外匯儲備總額的1.1%。

Taken together, the IMF and PBoC data suggest that central banks account for about two-thirds of total foreign holdings of Chinese bonds. Adding SWFs — whose renminbi holdings are mostly excluded from the IMF data — the government share of total Chinese bond holdings appears higher still. The flipside of these figures, however, is considerable caution on the part of private fund managers.

綜合來看，IMF和中國央行的數據似乎表明，各國央行佔外國持有中國債券總額約三分之二。加上主權財富基金——其人民幣資產持有量基本被IMF數據排除在外——各國政府在中國債券持有總量中的份額顯得更高。然而這些數據說明的另一面是，私人部門基金經理仍相當謹慎。

One factor is the risk of defaults. The first default in the Chinese bond market occurred only in 2015 by Shanghai Chaori Solar, after years in which bailouts were the norm. Though bonds remain safer than other credit in China, defaults have become more common.

違約風險是一個因素。中國債券市場的第一起違約在2015年才發生，違約方爲上海超日太陽能科技(Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology)；此前多年裏救助是常態。雖然債券仍比中國的其他信貸安全，但違約已變得更加常見。

Legal bankruptcies are also increasingly common, following years in which a bankruptcy law passed in 2006 was little used. Even so, large restructurings of important companies are typically orchestrated by government officials through extra-legal negotiations, which introduce political considerations into the process.

破產案件也日益常見；中國的企業破產法在2006年通過後，曾經在多年裏很少動用。即便如此，重要企業的大規模重組一般還是由政府官員通過法外談判來安排的，整個過程會納入政治考慮。

“For large enterprises with debt in the hundreds of billions, they are traditionally handled through administrative means. Local governments or even the State Council will take control and settle things out of court,” says Wang Xinxin, a professor at Renmin University Law School in Beijing.

北京中國人民大學法學院教授王欣新表示：“對於揹負數千億美元債務的大企業，傳統上是通過行政手段處理的。地方政府乃至國務院都是在法庭外接手和解決事情。”

In the case of Huishan Dairy, whose shares dropped 85 per cent last month, provincial authorities in northeastern Liaoning province ordered creditors not to sue. The case showed how officials will intervene with debt problems even at a privately owned company, if its potential collapse threatens the local economy or the solvency of local banks. The ban on legal action meant that even creditors with collateral were at risk of being unable to enforce their claims.

以輝山乳業(Huishan Dairy)爲例，該公司股價上月下跌85%，地處中國東北的遼寧省政府下令債權人不得起訴。該案例表明即使是民營企業，只要其潛在崩潰威脅到當地經濟或當地銀行的償付能力，官員們就會干預債務問題。禁止起訴意味着，即使是擁有抵押品的債權人，也面臨着無法執行其債權的風險。

Another issue is credit ratings. The three large global rating agencies — Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s — all have Chinese joint ventures. But rating methodologies differ substantially.

另一個問題是信用評級。惠譽(Fitch)、穆迪(Moody’s)和標準普爾(Standard & Poor’s)三大全球評級機構都有中國合資企業，但評級方法有很大不同。

“There seems to be a disparity in analysing companies. If it’s one notch — OK, fine. But you can’t have the equivalent of an A rating onshore and then have Fitch and S&P rate it as a B,” says Jamie Tadelis, co-head of sales at SC Lowy, a Hong Kong investment bank.

香港投資銀行SC Lowy銷售部聯合負責人傑米?塔德里斯(Jamie Tadelis)表示：“在分析公司方面似乎存在差異。如果相差一級，那還好，沒問題。但你不能有在岸評級相當於A，而惠譽和標普評級爲B的局面。”

Chinese rating agencies counter that their ratings are often higher in part because most bond issuers are state-owned enterprises. Local agencies place more weight than their foreign counterparts on the likelihood of government support for a company, even if such support is not codified in law.

中國評級機構反駁說，他們的評級之所以往往較高，部分是因爲多數債券發行人是國有企業。這些本土機構比外國同行更看重政府支持一家企業的機率，即使這種支持在法律上沒有明文規定。

“We will pay attention to credit fundamentals, but at the same time, we also pay attention to the degree of credit support from various levels of government. Sometimes this support takes the form of an implicit guarantee,” says Yan Yan, chairman of China Chengxin Credit Rating, a joint venture with Moody’s.

穆迪合資企業——中誠信國際(CCXI)董事長閆衍表示：“我們既注意信貸基本面，也注意各級政府對信貸的支持程度。有時這種支持代表了一種隱形擔保。”

Some investors are also worried that the corporate bond market is indistinguishable from the broader debt overhang facing the Chinese economy. Non-financial debt in China hit 277 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 2016, up from about 150 per cent at the end of 2008, when Beijing unleashed a fiscal and monetary stimulus to cushion the impact of the global financial crisis. Corporate debt has been the biggest driver of the overall increase.

一些投資者也擔心公司債券市場與中國經濟面臨的整體債務積壓難以區分。2016年底，中國的非金融債務相當於國內生產總值(GDP)的277%，而2008年底約爲150%，當時北京釋放了財政和貨幣刺激，以緩解全球金融危機的影響。企業債務是這些年來整體債務增加的最大因素。

However, despite the risk of excessive debt for China’s broader economy, the bond market is a relatively safe entry point for foreign debt investors. Banks — along with non-bank “shadow” lenders such as trusts, securities companies and fund management companies — are where China’s riskiest debt lurks, analysts say.

不過，儘管中國整體經濟存在債務過高的風險，但債券市場仍是境外債務投資者相對安全的切入點。分析師們表示，銀行，以及信託、證券公司和基金管理公司等非銀行“影子”貸款機構，纔是中國風險最高的債務存在的地方。

In the bond market, junk bonds barely exist. An approval process filters out the worst would-be issuers. Most actual issuers are large state-owned companies and banks with strong credit profiles. By contrast, the shadow-banking system is the main refuge for weak borrowers unable to access credit from cheaper sources.

在中國的債券市場上，幾乎不存在垃圾級債券。一道審批流程篩選掉了最糟糕的潛在發行人。多數實際發行人都是大型國企和銀行，具備強大的信用檔案。相比之下，影子銀行體系是那些無法從更低廉來源獲得信貸的劣質借款人的主要避難所。

Moreover, bonds are not the driver of China’s credit boom. Despite rapid volume growth, bonds still account for only 11 per cent of total outstanding corporate and household debt, according to the central bank. By contrast, bank loans comprise 72 per cent, while shadow bank credit makes up 16 per cent.

此外，債券並不是中國信貸繁榮的驅動力。根據中國央行數據，儘管發行量增長迅速，但債券在企業及家庭未償債務總額中仍僅佔11%。相比之下，銀行貸款佔72%，影子銀行信貸佔16%。

Trapped money fears

資金陷阱擔憂

Even in government bonds, which carry minimal default risk, investors have other concerns, including whether their money could be trapped in China. Late last year, in a bid to curb capital outflows and cut pressure on the renminbi, Beijing cracked down on outbound acquisitions by Chinese companies, after a record-breaking year. Chinese individuals have had difficulty buying foreign exchange for personal use.

甚至在違約風險最低的政府債券領域，投資者也有其他擔憂，包括他們的資金是否可能被困在中國。去年末，爲限制資本外流、降低人民幣壓力，中國政府對中國企業的海外併購加強了審查，此前一年中國企業的海外併購規模打破紀錄。中國居民的個人購匯也曾遇到困難。

Regulators insist they are merely tightening enforcement and that the moves do not amount to new capital controls. But for investors, this distinction is semantic. In practice, currency conversion and cross-border remittance are more difficult than a year ago.

監管者堅稱，他們只是在加強執行，這些舉措不構成新的資本管制。但對於投資者而言，這只是語義上的區別。在實踐中，外匯兌換和跨境匯款的難度大於一年前。

So far, foreign investors in Chinese stocks and bonds have not faced restrictions. And for the moment, downward pressure on the renminbi has eased and foreign exchange reserves have stabilised, reducing the likelihood of further restrictions. But every dollar of foreign investment that flows into China’s bond market today increases the regulators’ incentive to keep that money from exiting tomorrow if outflow pressure resumes, as many analysts expect it will.

迄今，購買中國股票和債券的外國投資者沒有遭遇限制。同時就目前而言，人民幣下行壓力已減輕，外匯儲備也已企穩，這降低了中國政府實施更多限制的可能性。但流入中國債券市場的每一美元外資，都會加大監管機構像很多分析人士預測的那樣，在未來資本外流壓力再度出現時阻止資金流出的動機。

“The government’s desire to build up its bond markets, in tandem with the goal of making the renminbi a prominent international currency, suggests that foreign investors can count on relatively unconstrained financial flows,” says Eswar Prasad, professor at Cornell University and former China head of the IMF. “However, investors may not be fully persuaded by the government’s reassurances.”

“政府希望發展債券市場，這符合讓人民幣成爲領先國際貨幣的目標，這似乎表明外國投資者可以期待相對不受限制的資金流動，”美國康奈爾大學(Cornell University)經濟學家、曾經擔任IMF中國部負責人的埃斯瓦爾?普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)表示，“然而，投資者可能不會完全相信政府的保證。”

Despite their concerns, foreign investors may soon have little choice but to at least dip their toes. In January, Bloomberg became the first major index provider to include Chinese onshore bonds in a benchmark index. Days later, Citibank’s index unit announced it would add Chinese treasuries to its series of government bond indices. A month earlier, Citi became the first US bank to obtain a coveted trading licence for China’s interbank bond market.

儘管感到擔憂，但外國投資者可能很快就會別無選擇，只能至少去嘗試一下。今年1月，彭博(Bloomberg)成爲首個將中國在岸債券納入基準指數的大型指數供應商。幾天後，花旗銀行(Citibank)的指數部門宣佈，將把中國國債納入其一系列政府債券指數。一個月前，花旗成爲首個獲得令人豔羨的中國銀行間債券市場交易牌照的美資銀行。

Adding Chinese onshore bonds to key benchmark indices would force asset managers’ hands. Inclusion in emerging-market bond indices could create automatic inflows worth $25bn-$40bn. If they are added to global bond indices, an additional $200bn-$300bn could flow in, according to Luke Drago Spajic, Singapore-based head of emerging Asia portfolio management at Pimco.

將中國在岸債券納入關鍵基準指數，將迫使資產管理者配置中國債券。納入新興市場債券指數可能會自動創造250億至400億美元的資金流入。太平洋投資管理公司(Pimco)駐新加坡的新興亞洲組合主管盧克?斯帕伊奇(Luke Spajic)表示，如果被納入全球債券指數，可能會再帶來2000億至3000億美元的流入。

“Once they’re in your index — especially emerging market indices — then if you don’t own them, you could end up with massive tracking error. You can’t own nothing,” says Mr Spajic.

斯帕伊奇表示：“一旦它們被納入你的指數，特別是新興市場指數，那麼如果你不擁有他們，你可能會遭遇嚴重的跟蹤誤差。你不可能什麼都不要。”

Beyond passive money, active managers will be attracted by high yields. Chinese 10-year government bonds currently yield about 3.4 per cent, compared with 2.35 per cent for the US, 0.25 per cent for Germany and 0.1 per cent for Japan. That creates an incentive to add more Chinese bonds.

除了被動資金，積極投資型經理將被高收益吸引。中國10年期國債目前的收益率約爲3.4%，而美國、德國和日本分別爲2.35%、0.25%和0.1%。這給基金經理們帶來了增持中國債券的動機。

“The question isn’t just whether investors are going to raise their holdings to benchmark levels. They may have to start buying more than index levels in order to outperform. That’s where it gets interesting,” says Mr Spajic.

斯帕伊奇表示：“問題不僅僅是投資者是否把持有規模增至基準水平。要想跑贏大盤，他們開始購買的數量可能必須超過指數水平。這將變得有意思。”

China’s currency is perhaps the single biggest factor worrying foreign fund managers. The renminbi suffered its worst fall on record in 2016. It has stabilised this year, but most economists believe that it will still fall further over the next 12 months.

人民幣或許是讓外國基金經理感到擔憂的最大單一因素。2016年，人民幣匯率遭遇最嚴重跌幅。今年人民幣匯率已企穩，但多數經濟學家認爲，未來12個月人民幣匯率將繼續下跌。

“Even with yields very attractive in onshore China, wiping out a lot of that through hedging activity drives overall return prospects lower,” says Schroders’ Mr George.

施羅德投資管理公司的喬治表示：“即便中國在岸債券的收益率極具吸引力，但對衝活動會抹去很大一部分額外收益，拉低總回報率前景。”

Additional reporting by Tom Mitchell, Ma Nan and Xining Liu

米強(Tom Mitchell)、Ma Nan和劉心寧補充報道