黃金市場或將迎來風暴 兩極分化
Gold prices have rallied More than 30 per cent since the lift-off in US interest rates in December. A sharp reversal in pricing, sentiment and positioning driven by myriad factors has left gold bears and bulls as polarised as ever.
自去年12月美國加息以來，黃金價格已勁升逾30%。多種因素導致的定價、情緒以及投資頭寸的巨大逆轉，令黃金多空雙方一如既往地兩極分化。
The bearish camp, with analysts such as those at Goldman Sachs, tends to have a constructive view on the US dollar and the ability to raise interest rates and normalise global monetary policy, and generally a benign view on the global economy and inflationary risks.
看空黃金的陣營（例如高盛(Goldman Sachs)分析師等）往往對美元以及央行加息與使全球貨幣政策正常化的能力持積極觀點，並且通常對全球經濟和通脹風險持樂觀態度。
In the bullish camp, to which I subscribe, the view tends to be more pessimistic on the global economy and the unintended consequences of monetary policy without limits. It sees the recent price action as the beginning of a multi-year bull run in gold.
看漲黃金的陣營（我屬於這個陣營）通常對全球經濟以及毫無限制的貨幣政策的意外後果較爲悲觀。他們把最近的價格走勢視爲黃金多年牛市的開始。
My view — that there is a perfect storm for gold — is based on three closely interrelated dynamics.
我認爲，黃金正面臨一個完美風暴，這基於3個密切相關的因素。
The first is the limits of monetary policy. In response to the Lehman crisis and to combat the threat of deflation, central banks have deployed a wide range of unconventional monetary policies. Quantitative easing and negative interest rates have been game changers — distorting the valuation of government bonds, breaking the theoretical ceiling in prices, squeezing shorts and underweight positions, and feeding what, in my view, is one of the largest financial bubbles in history.
首先是貨幣政策的侷限。爲應對雷曼(Lehman)危機和抵禦通縮威脅，央行動用了一系列非傳統的貨幣政策。量化寬鬆和負利率已改變了形勢，它們扭曲了政府債券的估值，打破了價格的理論天花板，擠壓了空頭和減持頭寸，並助長了在我看來歷史上規模最大的金融泡沫之一。
At the epicentre of the problem are the central banks. Investors and savers around the world, faced with extraordinarily low and even negative yields in cash and fixed income, have been incentivised — if not forced — to lengthen the duration in their portfolios, increasing the risk of capital losses, liquidity and volatility beyond what they might intend or be able to tolerate.
這些問題的核心是央行。面對現金和固定收益證券的超低甚至負收益率，全球的投資者和儲戶被鼓勵（如果不是被迫的話）延長投資組合的期限，從而令資金損失、流動性和波動性的風險超過人們可能願意或有能力容忍的水平。
Second, examine the edges of credit markets. The bubble in government bonds and duration has driven risk-taking across equity and credit markets, and lending to weaker and weaker credits, often ignoring or underplaying the risk of capital losses, liquidity and volatility. It’s a bull market that feeds on itself and benefits the weakest players most, such as emerging markets or high yield.
其次，考察一下信貸市場的邊緣吧。政府債券的泡沫和期限加大了股票和信貸市場的風險承擔，並促使貸款被髮放給信用越來越差的人，資金損失、流動性和波動性的風險往往被忽視或低估。這個牛市正自噬其身，而最受益的是那些最弱的參與者，例如新興市場或高收益債券。
In a world with limited investment opportunities, excessive risk-taking can lead to speculation and, of course, bubbles. The damage is done but can get worse, especially if countries such as China respond to future crises with more aggressive credit expansions, as it did this year.
在一個投資機會有限的世界裏，過度的風險承擔可能導致投機，當然還有泡沫。損害已經造成，但還可能變得更糟，特別是如果中國等國用更激進的信貸擴張應對未來危機，就像今年中國所做的那樣。
The current path of monetary and credit expansion is unsustainable and will eventually burst, leaving investors struggling for the return of their capital, instead of return on their capital — an extremely bullish scenario for gold and other real assets.
當前的貨幣和信貸擴張道路是不可持續的，終將破滅，導致投資者難以收回本金，而不只是投資收益，這對於黃金和其他實物資產而言是一個極其利好的情形。
Third, the limits of fiat currencies are being tested. Unlike in the global financial crisis of 2008, this time there won’t be any monetary bullets left. Interest rates are already at record lows, asset purchases suffer from the law of diminishing returns, and competitive currency devaluations only increase underlying problems and global imbalances. A dangerous slippery slope that paper cures miss is that they “eventually converge to their intrinsic value: paper”, as Voltaire warned.
第三，法定貨幣的侷限性正受到檢驗。與2008年的全球金融危機不同，這一次將不會有任何貨幣政策彈藥。利率已處於創紀錄低點，資產購買遭遇收益遞減，而競爭性貨幣貶值只是加劇了根本問題和全球失衡。就像伏爾泰(Voltaire)警告的那樣，紙幣療法忽視的危險滑坡是紙幣將“最終歸於它們的內在價值：紙”。
Over the past few years we have witnessed the first stage of Gresham’s law, whereby “bad money displaces good money”, and we are at the early stages of the second and final phase, whereby “good money displaces bad money”.
過去幾年，我們見證了格雷欣法則(Gresham’s law)的第一階段，即“劣幣驅逐良幣”，我們現在處於第二、也是最後階段的初期，那就是“良幣驅逐劣幣”。
Gold and the dollar are best placed to play the role of good money, which could result in a substantial appreciation against the bad-money currencies. But the inability or unwillingness of the US to normalise its monetary policy leaves the door wide open for gold to retake its reserve currency status and put an end to the monetary supercycle that started in 1971 with the end of Bretton Woods. It is a period in which the outstanding volume of paper money has grown disproportionately to the amount of gold that once backed it.
黃金和美元正處於發揮良幣作用的最佳時機，這可能使它們相對於劣幣大幅升值。但美國無法或者不願將其貨幣政策正常化，這爲黃金重奪儲備貨幣地位並終結本輪貨幣超級週期打開大門。這個超級週期始於1971年佈雷頓森林體系(Bretton Woods)瓦解時。這段時期發行的紙幣數量遠遠超過了曾經支撐紙幣的黃金的數量。
Time will tell if central banks and governments will be able to engineer a smooth solution to the challenges ahead, or if the remedy will be worse than the disease.
時間將證明央行和政府能否爲未來的危機找到一個平穩的解決方案，或者這種療法是否比疾病本身還糟。
Monetary policy without limits will lead to a very wild and bumpy ride and a larger crisis than the one we have been trying to resolve: a perfect storm for gold.
沒有限制的貨幣政策將帶來一段非常荒蠻且崎嶇的路程，而且會導致一場規模更大的危機：黃金的完美風暴。其規模將超過我們一直試圖化解的這場危機。
