貨幣聯盟是否公平? 蘇格蘭要英鎊等於沒獨立

Is the opposition of the three main political parties at Westminster to a post-independence currency union with Scotland a bluff? North of the border, many believe it is. I have no window into men’s souls: these Scots may be right.

英國國會三大主要政黨聲稱，假如蘇格蘭獨立，將反對與其締結貨幣同盟。他們是在虛張聲勢嗎？在蘇格蘭，許多人認爲是這樣。我沒有看穿他人心思的本事：這些蘇格蘭人或許是對的。

But I hope it is no bluff. A currency union does not have to be ruled out on any terms. But a union that could make sense for the rest of the UK would be highly unequal. Why would a newly independent nation Accept it?

但我希望這不是虛張聲勢。無論如何，都不一定非得排除貨幣聯盟這種選擇。但是，一個對英國其餘地區來說可能算是合理選擇的聯盟，對蘇格蘭來說將是極不平等的。爲何一個新獨立的國家要接受這樣的聯盟？

Experience with the euro has clarified many issues relating to currency unions. Some are only partially relevant to a currency union between Scotland and the rest of the UK. While the oil-dependent Scottish economy would be different from that of the rest of the UK, it is fair to argue that, after more than three centuries, integration of the economies and, in particular, the labour markets, is sufficient to make currency union workable. This, after all, is an old and successful venture.

歐元的經驗闡明瞭許多與貨幣聯盟有關的問題。有些問題只跟蘇格蘭與英國其餘地區之間的貨幣聯盟存在部分關係。儘管依賴石油的蘇格蘭經濟會不同於英國其餘地區，但我們有理由認爲，經過了三個多世紀，兩種經濟之間的融合，特別是勞動力市場的融合，足以保證貨幣聯盟是可行的。畢竟，這是項古老而成功的嘗試。

That is part of the reason why it is hard to understand the zeal for independence. Is it, as Oxford’s Paul Collier has argued, really no more elevated than a resource grab?

我們之所以難以理解蘇格蘭人爲何對獨立有那麼大勁頭，部分原因就在於此。是否如牛津大學(Oxford)的保羅•柯利爾(Paul Collier)所辯稱的，蘇格蘭要求獨立，表面上有冠冕堂皇的理由，實質上不過是爲了搶奪資源？

Accept that the currency union could work from a narrowly economic point of view. Is that the end of the story? Definitely not. The point about a currency union – evident from the experience of the eurozone – is that it is not just about the economies. Sharing a fiat (or government-made) money entails a high degree of institutional and political integration. This is why currency unions between notionally independent states are so fraught.

假定僅從經濟角度來看，這個貨幣聯盟是可行的。這樣就可以了嗎？當然不。從歐元區的經驗可以明顯看出，貨幣聯盟的意義在於，它關乎的不僅僅是經濟。共享法定（即政府定的）貨幣，必然會導致高度的制度和政治一體化。正因如此，名義上獨立的國家之間的貨幣聯盟才這麼令人頭疼。

Risking that might have made sense for countries proposing to move towards a deeper union, as was the case for the euro (however ill-advised). But how can it make sense for a country that has decided to dissolve a union? It is weird to tell the English you are desperate to be rid of them and, in the same breath, say you trust them so much that you wish to share a core activity of the state you are leaving.

如果相關國家提議進一步深化聯盟關係——歐元區就是這種情況（不管這種提議有多麼不明智）——那麼冒這種風險或許還說得通。但一個已決定要拆散聯盟的國家，還有何道理冒這樣的風險？一邊對英格蘭人說你迫切想要擺脫他們，一邊又說你是如此信任他們、以至於希望共享這個你將要脫離的國家的一項核心活動，這太奇怪了。

How then should the rest of the UK respond the day after a “yes” vote, should that sad event occur? By saying that Scotland can be in the sterling area, provided the institutions of that union are established under the law of the rest of the UK and are accountable to its government. Among other things, these institutions would carry out financial regulation. The fiscal policy of Scotland would be controlled by binding agreements. Scotland would also have specified fiscal obligations in the event of a bailout. These arrangements between Scotland and the rest of the UK would be established by treaty.

那麼，在支持獨立的陣營在公投中勝出（假設真的發生這種令人遺憾的情況）後，英國其餘地區該如何應對？答案是告訴蘇格蘭說它可以留在英鎊區內，條件是該貨幣聯盟的機構必須依照英國其餘地區的法律成立、並向英國政府負責。這些機構的職責之一是實施金融監管。蘇格蘭的財政政策將受到有約束力的協議的控制。在發生紓困的情況下，蘇格蘭還將承擔明確規定的財政義務。蘇格蘭和英國其餘地區之間的這些安排將通過條約來設立。

The logic of the one-sided fiscal rules is that within a currency union, the cost of fiscal profligacy by a smaller member may be shifted on to the larger one. But the much larger member cannot shift the cost of its profligacy on to the smaller one. Thus Scotland would have an incentive towards profligacy that the rest of the UK would not. A one-sided risk demands one-sided control.

這種“一邊倒”的財政規則的道理是，在貨幣聯盟之內，較小成員財政揮霍的成本，或許會轉嫁給較大成員；而規模大得多的那個成員，卻無法將其財政揮霍的成本轉嫁給較小成員。因此，蘇格蘭有動機趨向揮霍，英國其餘地區則沒有。“一邊倒”的風險要求“一邊倒”的控制。

A similar logic applies to financial regulation. Scotland might gain from a financial boom headquartered in Edinburgh whose costs ultimately fell on the rest of the UK. For this reason, regulation would need to be centralised. But Scotland would have to take on some fiscal obligations in the event of a disaster. They could not fall solely on the rest of the UK.

類似的道理也適用於金融監管。蘇格蘭或許會從總部位於愛丁堡的金融機構掀起的金融熱潮中獲益，但其成本最終會落在英國其餘地區頭上。因此，監管必須集中化。但在發生災難的情況下，蘇格蘭必須承擔一些財政義務。財政義務不能只落到英國其餘地區肩上。

The need for clear lines of accountability and authority is fundamental. One country, one government, one central bank – that is the right principle. This, we have learnt, is particularly important in emergencies. Then the closest possible co-operation between the government, the central bank and the regulators is essential. In the next crisis, the government may even require the central bank to finance the government outright. It has to be clear that, in this situation, the bank would be answerable to one government – the UK government.

清晰的責任和權力劃分絕對必要。一個國家，一個政府，一家央行——這纔是正確的原則。從經驗來看，這一點在危急情況下尤其重要。政府、央行和監管機構之間實現儘可能緊密的合作有着至關重要的意義。下一場危機中，政府甚至可能要求央行直接資助政府。必須明確一點：在這種情況下，央行將只對一個政府負責，那就是英國政府。

Some argue that insisting on these conditions is impossible. A letter to the Financial Times even stated that “The UK after a Scottish secession will not be the UK but a different state.” It will not. It will be the UK without Scotland. As happened when the Irish Republic left in the 1920s, the Westminster parliament, the bulk of the laws of that parliament and a government accountable to that parliament will all continue to exist. Scotland will merely have terminated its temporary participation. Evidently the Act of Union would be repealed. But this does not mean the existence of the Bank of England or the laws that govern it will be in doubt. Scotland may leave the UK. It cannot take core institutions with it.

有人辯稱，堅持這些條件是不可能的。英國《金融時報》的一封讀者來信甚至說，“沒有了蘇格蘭的英國將不再是英國，而是另外一個國家”。不會是這樣的。英國還會是英國，只是沒有了蘇格蘭。正如上世紀20年代愛爾蘭共和國脫離英國時的情形一樣，英國國會、國會的大部分法律、以及對國會負責的政府，都將繼續存在。只不過是蘇格蘭將不再屬於英國——它屬於英國的歷史原本也不長。《聯合法案》(Act of Union)顯然會被廢除。但這不意味着英國央行(BoE)、或約束其行爲的各項法律的存續會產生疑問。蘇格蘭或許會脫離英國，但它無法把最重要的機構一同帶走。

A currency union on the lines I have outlined would be perfectly satisfactory. But it would be one in which Scotland and the Scots would have still less weight than now. They would retain access to a lender of last resort within the sterling area, but at a heavy price.

我上面概述的貨幣聯盟，將是一個非常令人滿意的貨幣聯盟。但在這樣的聯盟中，蘇格蘭和蘇格蘭人的話語權比現在還低。他們將保有求助英鎊區最後貸款人的權力，但需爲此付出高昂的代價。

If that is what the Scots really prefer, that would be fine by me. But if they want sovereign equality, they should reject the idea. Alternatives to the currency union exist. Some might work well. An independent Scotland should choose one of them.

如果這就是蘇格蘭人真正想要的，我沒什麼意見。但如果他們想要主權平等，他們就應當拒絕這個主意。貨幣聯盟之外的選擇並非不存在。其他一些選擇沒準相當可行。獨立的蘇格蘭應該從這裏面選一個。