Alphabet多元化架構爲何受投資者歡迎
After software engineering and financial engineering comes linguistic engineering. Google this week raised its market capitalisation by $25bn by shuffling around some executive jobs and changing its name to Alphabet. Who knew that swapping your tiles in a game of corporate Scrabble was worth so much?
搞過了軟件工程和金融工程之後，谷歌(Google)又搞起了語言工程。本週谷歌對管理層進行了一些調整，同時將公司名稱改成Alphabet，結果市值增加了250億美元。誰能料到在企業版拼字遊戲(Scrabble)中換個名字就能賺這麼多呢？
Everyone reads what they want into the new letters. For Larry Page, Google’s restless co-founder, Alphabet means jettisoning the cares of running a corporation and becoming a full-time inventor and venture capitalist, while Sundar Pichai takes the leadership of Google. For employees, it brings the hope of more valuable share options. For Wall Street, it spells clarity.
所有人都從這一新名稱中看到了他們想要的。對於求新求變的聯合創始人拉里槧奇(Larry Page)來說，Alphabet意味着拋下管理企業的煩惱，成爲一個全職發明家和風險投資家，谷歌的領導權則交由桑德爾皮查伊(Sundar Pichai)。對於員工而言，Alphabet帶來了提高認股權價值的希望。對於華爾街，Alphabet更加清晰明瞭。
Only governance renegades would invent a structure with one board for Google and Alphabet, the founding triumvirate — Eric Schmidt, Sergey Brin and Mr Page — stacked above Mr Pichai, and Ruth Porat as chief financial officer of both. “Google is not a conventional company,” wrote Mr Brin and Mr Page in their 2004 founders’ letter, and by heavens they meant it.
只有在治理上離經叛道的管理者能發明出這種結構，谷歌和Alphabet共享一個董事會，皮查伊上面排着創業三巨頭埃裏克施密特(Eric Schmidt)、謝爾蓋布林(Sergey Brin)和佩奇，露絲波拉特(Ruth Porat)擔任兩家公司的首席財務官(CFO)。布林和佩奇曾在2004年的創始人來信中寫道：“谷歌不是一家傳統公司。”想不到他們是認真的。
Still, being conventional is not the best way to build an innovative business or to make profits. Warren Buffett runs a unique combination of industrial conglomerate and investment fund at Berkshire Hathaway, and it has worked well for him. He made his largest ever acquisition this week, buying Precision Castparts for $32bn.
不過，堅持傳統的確不是建立一個創新企業或實現盈利的最佳途徑。沃倫巴菲特(Warren Buffett)掌管着一個獨特的組合，他所執掌的伯克希爾哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway)結合了工業集團與投資基金業務，結果很不錯。本週他做出了有生以來最大規模的收購，以320億美元買下了精密鑄件公司(Precision Castparts)。
Berkshire and Alphabet are different kinds of businesses. Mr Buffett values cash flow and mature brands; Mr Page prefers to create things. One of the purposes of this week’s reshuffle is to prove to investors that not as much as they fear is being spent on experimental start-up projects, such as Project Loon’s high-altitude balloons providing internet access to remote areas.
伯克希爾哈撒韋公司與Alphabet是不同類型的企業。巴菲特重視現金流和成熟品牌，佩奇則喜歡創造新事物。谷歌本週重組的目的之一，是想向投資者證明，花在實驗性初創項目上的錢沒有他們所擔心的多，比如向偏遠地區提供互聯網接入服務的Project Loon高空氣球計劃。
Mr Page’s naming of Mr Buffett as a role model in providing “long-term, patient capital” to an array of businesses is not idle. He thinks that a multi-business group with a guiding intelligence at the centre can beat the single-sector company favoured by investors. The “conglomerate discount” applied by Wall Street can be defeated.
佩奇視巴菲特爲榜樣，稱巴菲特向大批企業提供“長期以及耐心的資本”。這並非泛泛而談，佩奇認爲有着核心指導智慧的多元化企業集團，可以打敗投資者所青睞的專注於單一行業的企業。華爾街所採用的“多元化企業折讓”(conglomerate discount)是可以被戰勝的。
In principle, that is an odd thing for Mr Page to believe. Google’s technology, after all, uses online auctions and markets — the wisdom of the crowd, not human curation. Why should conglomerates such as Alphabet, with their entrenched interests and fiefdoms, be better than capital markets at allocating capital efficiently? Does he trust in inside knowledge only when the insider is himself?
原則上，佩奇的這種想法相當奇怪。畢竟谷歌的技術所用到的在線拍賣和在線市場屬於羣體智慧，而不是人工篩選。爲什麼Alphabet這類擁有穩定的利益和市場主導地位的企業集團，在有效配置資本方面會勝過資本市場？難道只有當他自己是內部人時，他纔會相信內幕消息？
But he is right. Conglomerates can outperform when they exploit their advantages and remain disciplined rather than falling prey to empire-building. Their ability to build a cadre of skilled managers and to pick the right investment projects is strongest in research-intensive industries that invest in intellectual property, which is Alphabet’s territory.
但佩奇是正確的。如果企業集團能夠利用優勢並遵守行爲準則，不因打造商業帝國而陷入困境，是可以勝過單一公司的。在專注於知識產權的研究密集型產業——這正是Alphabet的領域——企業集團最擅長建立起經驗豐富的管理骨幹隊伍，以及挑選合適的投資項目。
Neil Bhattacharya, a professor at Southern Methodist University in Texas, found in a study that multi-business companies ran operations more efficiently than single-sector ones. They had particular advantages in areas such as software and life sciences because managers could judge more accurately than stock markets which projects were likely to succeed.
美國德克薩斯州南衛理公會大學(Southern Methodist University)教授尼爾巴塔查里亞(Neil Bhattacharya)在一項研究中發現，多元化企業比單一企業在經營上效率更高，前者在軟件和生命科學等領域具有獨特優勢，因爲企業管理者比股市更能準確判斷哪些項目可能獲得成功。
This is counterintuitive, given US investors’ liking for simplicity, and view of conglomerates as inefficient. Public conglomerates in the US are valued at discounts of 10 to 15 per cent to single-sector companies, according to Boston Consulting Group — though the discount is lower in Europe, and Asian conglomerates often trade at a premium.
鑑於美國投資者喜歡簡單的東西，並認爲企業集團效率低下，巴塔查里亞教授的發現似乎與人們的直覺相反。根據波士頓諮詢集團(Boston Consulting Group)的數據，在美國，上市企業集團的估值相對於單一企業會折讓10%—15%，不過歐洲的這種估值差距要小一些，而亞洲的企業集團往往會溢價交易。
The suspicion originates in the 1970s and 1980s, the era of companies such as ITT and RJR Nabisco. Michael Jensen, a Harvard professor, later criticised the “billions in unproductive capital expenditures and organisational inefficiencies” at conglomerates, praising the trend toward “smaller, more focused, more efficient” enterprises.
懷疑始於上世紀七、八十年代，那是美國國際電話電報公司(ITT)和RJR納比斯科(RJR Nabisco)等公司的時代。哈佛大學(Harvard University)教授邁克爾礠森(Michael Jensen)後來批評企業集團存在“數十億非生產性的資本支出和組織效率低下現象”，讚揚了企業朝着“更小、更集中、更高效”的方向演變的趨勢。
Big corporations remain prey to temptation. Boston Consulting Group found that the conglomerate discount is partly due to conservatism. They tend to invest heavily in their original businesses, which may be stagnant or in decline, while undervaluing newer divisions with more potential. Microsoft, for example, suffered from trying to reinforce its Windows franchise.
大企業依然難抵擋誘惑。波士頓諮詢集團發現，造成多元化企業折讓的部分原因是保守。企業集團傾向於低看擁有更大潛力的新業務，而大舉投資它們最初的業務，然而這些業務可能是停滯乃至下滑的。比如，微軟(Microsoft)因試圖強化其Windows操作系統授權業務而受挫。
Yet even investors who are suspicious of quoted conglomerates delegate capital allocation and management oversight in private markets to informed insiders. Venture capital and private equity funds are both forms of conglomerate — they invest capital in a broad portfolio of businesses on behalf of outsiders who believe that such funds possess superior expertise.
然而，即使是對上市的企業集團抱懷疑態度的投資者，也會將私人市場上的資金配置和管理監督的事宜委派給知情的內部人士。風險資本和私人股本基金都是企業集團的形式——它們代表外部人士投資廣泛的業務領域，外部人士則相信這類基金擁有出色的專業知識。
Why, though, should investors seeking exposure to new companies buy shares in Alphabet, which then channels Google’s surplus cash into its own venture and growth funds, Project Loon, self-driving cars and life sciences? They could instead invest money directly in a venture capital fund. Why take the longer and less-direct road?
儘管如此，尋求投資新企業的人爲何要購買Alphabet的股票，這家集團會把谷歌的現金盈餘投入到其風險項目、成長基金、高空氣球計劃、無人駕駛汽車和生命科學等？他們可以直接投資一個風險資本基金。爲何要選擇一條更遠的彎路呢？
It depends on trust. Investors could also have bought shares in Precision Castparts last week for less than Berkshire Hathaway paid this week, but they do not complain because they trust Mr Buffett. Alphabet’s shareholders must believe in Mr Page and Mr Brin’s ability to use their intelligence and avoid the traditional pitfalls.
關鍵在於信任。在本週伯克希爾哈撒韋公司出手收購之前，投資者本來也可以在上週用更低的價格買入精密鑄件公司股票，但他們並沒有抱怨，因爲他們信任巴菲特。Alphabet的股東必然也相信佩奇和布里有能力運用他們的智慧並避開傳統的陷阱。
To judge by the shares this week, they prefer a conglomerate called Alphabet to a company that had not made plain what it was. Strange as it seems, it is a rational choice.
從本週的股價來看，比起一家沒有說清楚自己是什麼的公司，股東們更青睞一個叫Alphabet的企業集團。儘管似乎有點奇怪，但這是一個理性選擇。
