阿里巴巴管理架構可能對公共投資者不利

Lucian Bebchuk is professor of law, economics and finance and director of the program on corporate governance at Harvard law School.

盧西恩·別布丘克(Lucian Bebchuk)是法學、經濟學和金融學教授，也是哈佛大學法學院(Harvard Law School)公司治理項目的主管。

Wall Street is eagerly watching what is expected to be one of the largest initial public offering in history: the offering of the Chinese Internet retailer Alibaba at the end of this week. Investors have been described by the media as “salivating” and “flooding underwriters with orders.” It is important for investors, however, to keep their eyes open to the serious governance risks accompanying an Alibaba investment.

華爾街正熱切關注着中國互聯網零售商阿里巴巴集團本週末的首次公開募股(IPO)，預計它將成爲有史以來規模最大的IPO之一。媒體報道稱，投資者“垂涎”於這次IPO，“承銷商已被訂單淹沒”。不過，投資者卻有必要注意到，投資阿里巴巴時面臨嚴重的公司治理風險。

Several factors combine to create such risks. For one, insiders have a permanent lock on control of the company but hold only a small minority of the equity capital. Then, there are many ways to divert value to affiliated entities, but there are weak mechanisms to prevent this. Consequently, public investors should worry that, over time, a significant amount of the value created by Alibaba would not be shared with them.

這些風險源於多重因素。首先，內部人士雖然只擁有少數股權，但卻對公司擁有永久的控制權。其次，阿里巴巴可以有許多辦法把價值轉移給相關實體，而阻止它這麼做的機制卻十分脆弱。因此，公衆投資者應該擔心的是，未來阿里巴巴創造的價值中，將有相當大一部分不會拿出來與他們分享。

In Alibaba, control is going to be locked forever in the hands of a group of insiders known as the Alibaba Partnership. These are all managers in the Alibaba Group or related companies. The Partnership will have the exclusive right to nominate candidates for a majority of the board seats. Furthermore, if the Partnership fails to obtain shareholder approval for its candidates, it will be entitled “in its sole discretion and without the need for any additional shareholder approval” to appoint directors unilaterally, thus ensuring that its chosen directors always have a majority of board seats. Many public companies around the world, especially in emerging economies, have a large shareholder with a lock on control. Such controlling shareholders, however, often own a substantial portion of the equity capital that provides them with beneficial incentives. In the case of Alibaba, investors need to worry about the relatively small stake held by the members of the controlling Alibaba Partnership.

在阿里巴巴，掌握公司控制權的永遠是一羣內部人士，也就是阿里巴巴的合夥人。這些合夥人都是阿里巴巴集團或相關企業的管理人員。他們將擁有提名多數董事的獨有權利。此外，如果合夥人沒能讓股東通過他們提名的候選人，他們將有權“全權決定且不需要獲得任何股東的支持”，就可以單方面任命董事，從而確保他們選擇的董事總是能夠佔據董事會的大部分席位。在世界範圍內，特別是新興經濟體，很多上市公司都有一個擁有控制權的大股東。但此類控股股東的資金在權益資本中佔據了大部分，他們有追求利益的動力。至於阿里巴巴，投資者有擔心的必要，因爲阿里巴巴合夥人所持有的股份相對較少。

After the I.P.O., Alibaba’s executive chairman, Jack Ma, is expected to hold 7.8 percent of the shares and all the directors and executive officers will hold together 13.1 percent. Over time, insiders may well cash out some of their current holding, but Alibaba’s governance structure would ensure that directors chosen by the Alibaba Partnership will forever control the board, regardless of the size of the stake held by the Partnership’s members.

上市之後，阿里巴巴執行主席馬雲將持有7.8%的股份，所有董事及高管持有的股份總額將達到13.1%。一段時間後，內部人士可能會將一部分股份套現，但阿里巴巴的管理架構將確保阿里巴巴合夥人選出的董事將永遠控制董事會，無論合夥人持有多少股份。

With an absolute lock on control and a limited fraction of the equity capital, the Alibaba insiders will have substantial incentives to divert value from Alibaba to other entities in which they own a substantial percentage of the equity. This can be done by placing future profitable opportunities in such entities, or making deals with such entities on terms that favor them at the expense of Alibaba.

有了這種絕對的永久控制，加上一小部分的權益資本，阿里巴巴的內部小圈子將有巨大的動力將該集團的價值轉移到他們擁有可觀股本的其他實體中。要做到這一點，可以採用的方式是把未來的賺錢機會放到此類實體中，或是與之做交易時達成對阿里巴巴不利的條款。

Alibaba’s prospectus discloses information about various past “related party transactions,” and these disclosures reflect the significance and risks to public investors of such transactions. For example, in 2010, Alibaba divested its control and ownership of Alipay, which does all of the financial processing for Alibaba, and Alipay is now fully controlled and substantially owned by Alibaba’s executive chairman.

阿里巴巴的招股書中披露了過去多筆“關聯方交易”的信息，而這些披露反映了此類交易對公衆投資者的重要性和風險。例如，2010年，阿里巴巴剝離了對支付寶的控制權和所有權。支付寶承擔了阿里巴巴旗下平臺的所有付款流程，如今變爲由馬雲本人完全控制並大體持有。

Public investors should worry not only about whether the Alibaba’s divesting of Alipay benefited Mr. Ma at the expense of Alibaba, but also about the terms of the future transactions between Alibaba and Alipay. Because Alibaba relies on Alipay “to conduct substantially all of the payment processing” in its marketplace, these terms are important for Alibaba’s future success.

公共投資者應當擔憂的，不限於阿里巴巴剝離支付寶是否以自身爲代價讓馬雲受益，還有阿里巴巴與支付寶之間未來交易的條款。由於阿里巴巴依賴支付寶進行旗下市場中“近乎全部的付款流程”，這些條款維繫着阿里巴巴未來的成功。

Mr. Ma owns a larger fraction of Alipay’s equity capital than of Alibaba’s, so he would economically benefit from terms that would disfavor Alibaba. Indeed, given the circumstances, the I.P.O. prospectus acknowledges that Mr. Ma may act to resolve Alibaba-Alipay conflicts not in Alibaba’s favor.

馬雲在支付寶的持股比例超過了在阿里巴巴的持股比例，因此，他可以從那些不利於阿里巴巴的條款中獲取經濟收益。實際上，鑑於這些情況，阿里巴巴的招股書承認，在化解阿里巴巴與支付寶的衝突時，馬雲或許會不站在前者這一邊。

The prospectus seeks to allay investor concerns, however, by indicating that Mr. Ma intends to reduce his stake in in Alipay within three to five years, including by having shares in Alipay granted to Alibaba employees. But stating such an intention does not represent an irreversible legal commitment. Furthermore, transfers of Alipay ownership stakes from Mr. Ma to other members of the Alibaba Partnership would still leave the Partnership’s aggregate interest to be decidedly on the side of Alipay rather than Alibaba.

不過，招股書試圖打消投資者的憂慮，指出馬雲有意在三五年內減持在支付寶的股份，包括將其轉給一些阿里巴巴的內部人士。不過，表明這樣的意圖並不意味着這是不可反悔的法律承諾。此外，將支付寶的所有權股從馬雲手中轉到其他的阿里巴巴合夥人那裏，仍會讓合夥人的總體利益明確無誤地落到支付寶一邊，而非阿里巴巴。

Given the significant related party transactions that have already taken place, and the prospect of such transactions in the future, Alibaba tried to placate investors by putting in a “new related party transaction policy.” But this new policy hardly provides investors with solid protection. Unlike charter and bylaw provisions, corporate policies are generally not binding. Furthermore, Alibaba’s policy explicitly allows the board, where the nominees of Alibaba partnership will always have a majority, to approve any exceptions to the policy that the board chooses.

鑑於已經出現過重大的關聯方交易，而且未來仍可能發生，阿里巴巴試圖通過設置“關聯方交易新政策”來安撫投資者。可是，這種新政策幾乎不能爲投資者提供切實的保障。不同於公司的規章制度，企業政策基本上沒有約束力。況且，阿里巴巴的政策明確允許董事局按照自身意願批准政策例外，而董事局中阿里巴巴合夥人任命的人選將永遠佔據多數。

Of course, the Alibaba partners might elect not to take advantage of the opportunities for diversion provided to them by Alibaba’s structure. And, even if the partners do use such opportunities, the future business success of Alibaba might be large enough to make up for the costs of diversions and leave public investors with good returns on their investment.

當然，阿里巴巴合夥人或許會選擇不去利用阿里巴巴的公司結構提供給他們的轉移機會。此外，就算合夥人的確利用了這樣的機會，阿里巴巴未來的商業成功可能也足以彌補轉移的成本，留給公衆投資者不錯的投資回報率。

Before jumping in, however, investors rushing to participate in the Alibaba I.P.O. must recognize the substantial governance risks that they would be taking. Alibaba’s structure does not provide adequate protections to public investors.

儘管如此，急於參與阿里巴巴IPO的投資者們，在縱身一躍之前，必須意識到自己會承擔可觀的公司治理風險。阿里巴巴的結構並未給公衆投資者提供充分的保護。