中國如何讓資本外流變成好事大綱

After increasing relentlessly for two decades, China’s foreign exchange reserves started to decline about a year ago, and during the crisis month of August 2015 they plummeted alarmingly. Seen by many investors as a signal of waning confidence in the credibility of Chinese economic policy, a collapse in the reserves is now taken as one of the prime reasons to dump risk assets on a global basis. As the balance sheet of the PBOC shrinks, investors fear that “quantitative tightening” will be triggered in developed bond markets, and worry that a credit crunch will occur in China itself.

在連續不停地增加20年之後，中國的外匯儲備在大約一年前開始減少，在2015年8月的危機期間以令人震驚的幅度下降。在許多投資者眼裏，這是市場對中國經濟政策可信度的信心在降低的標誌，中國外匯儲備大幅減少現在被列爲在全球範圍拋售風險資產的主要原因之一。隨着中國央行(PBoC)資產負債表縮小，投資者害怕這將在在發達國家債券市場觸發“量化緊縮”，並擔心中國自身將發生信貸危機。

These concerns are not entirely without foundation but a confidence run on the renminbi is still unlikely. Much will depend on whether the Chinese authorities can shed their cloak of secrecy sufficiently to lay out a clear strategy for the reserves, the exchange rate, monetary policy and the necessary clean up in the domestic banking system. If the right strategy emerges, confidence can be restored, because China is very far from being an insolvent nation.

這些擔心並非毫無依據，但人民幣仍不大可能遭遇“信心擠兌”。事情將在很大程度上取決於中國官方能否充分擺脫神神祕祕的習慣，在儲備、匯率、貨幣政策和國內銀行體系的必要清理等問題上闡明清晰的戰略。如果正確的戰略浮出水面，那麼信心就可以恢復，因爲中國遠不是一個失去清償能力的國家。

How did China get here? The rise in foreign exchange reserves started way back in 2001, and proceeded at about 40 per cent a year in the mid 2000s. After that, the rate of increase has gradually slowed, and the reserves peaked at almost exactly $4 trillion in August 2014. Throughout this long period, China ran a large current account surplus, and a private sector capital surplus, but did not want the exchange rate to rise too rapidly. The authorities therefore smoothed the inevitable exchange rate appreciation by buying dollars and building reserves. The rise in the reserves was not so much a deliberate policy choice, more the automatic result of policy decisions elsewhere.

中國當前的局面是如何形成的？早在2001年，中國的外匯儲備便開始增加，在本世紀頭十年中期的增速達到約40%。之後外匯儲備增速逐漸放緩，在2014年8月達到近4萬億美元的最高點。在這段很長的時期內，中國運行着巨大的經常賬戶順差以及私人部門資本盈餘，但不希望匯率升高得過快。因此，中國當局通過買入美元和積累外匯儲備，使不可避免的匯率升值過程變得平緩。外匯儲備的增加與其說是刻意的政策選擇，不如說是其他地方政策決定自動引發的結果。

The real exchange rate rose by about 40 per cent after 2007, and by 2014 it had eliminated the persistent undervaluation that had for so long annoyed the US and the rest of the international economic community. This changed the dynamics of the balance of payments, reducing the current account surplus to 2 per cent of GDP from a peak of 11 per cent in 2007. The interest “carry” trades that had sucked private capital into China also started to unwind as the market recognised that the currency was no longer undervalued, and that Chinese interest rates would fall sharply if the economy experienced a hard landing.

2007年後，人民幣實際匯率升高了約40%，到2014年，之前一直惹惱美國和其他海外經濟體的持續低估已不存在。這改變了中國的國際收支態勢，經常賬戶順差從2007年相當於國內生產總值(GDP) 11%的峯值降至GDP的2%。之前把私人資本吸引到中國的利息“套利”交易也開始被解除，因爲市場意識到人民幣已不再低估，而如果經濟硬着陸，那麼中國利率將大幅下降。

In the past 12 months, private sector capital outflows have proceeded at a generally orderly pace, but have still forced China to reduce its reserves by $400 billion in order to prevent a precipitous drop in the exchange rate. It was not until the PBOC announced an adjustment to its exchange rate mechanism on 11 August, triggering fears of future devaluation, that the capital outflow hit crisis proportions. During August, the reserves dropped by $94 billion on the official figures, and many analysts think that disguised intervention in futures and options markets increased the genuine figure for currency support to over $170 billion last month.

在過去12個月裏，私人部門資本外流的總體步伐是有序的，但仍迫使中國消耗了4000億美元儲備，以防止匯率陡然下跌。只是在8月11日中國央行宣佈調整匯率機制、觸發市場擔心人民幣未來再度貶值之後，資本外流才達到危機規模。官方數據顯示，8月份中國外匯儲備減少了940億美元。許多分析人士認爲，對期貨和期權市場的變相干預意味着該月真實的匯率支持力度超過1700億美元。

Clearly, such a rapid rate of reserve depletion would, if continued, administer a large global shock to asset markets as China’s holdings of foreign bonds are reduced. Furthermore, when reserves decline, the official sales of dollars for renminbi reduce local currency liquidity in the domestic financial system. Although the impact of reserve changes on domestic liquidity can in theory be offset by “sterilisation” activities by the central bank (such as changing banks’ reserve requirements), in practice sterilisation does not seem to have been fully successful in either direction.

顯而易見的是，如果這樣的消耗速度繼續下去，隨着中國所持外國債券減少，將對全球資產市場造成重大沖擊。另外，當外匯儲備減少時，官方拋售美元、買入人民幣之舉，會降低國內金融體系的本幣流動性。儘管在理論上，外匯儲備變化對國內流動性的衝擊可以被央行的“沖銷”行動（比如調整銀行存準率）抵消，但在實踐中，這種沖銷在兩個方向上似乎都不是特別成功。

Recent IMF research shows that large scale capital inflows have frequently triggered domestic credit explosions, and it is reasonable to suppose that capital outflows could cause an unintended tightening in domestic financial conditions in China. Indeed, the graph on the left suggests that this is already happening.

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)不久前的研究顯示，大規模資本流入經常引發國內信貸爆炸性增長，因此可以合理推斷，資本外流有可能在無意中導致中國的國內金融狀況收緊。的確，左邊的曲線圖似乎表明，這種情況已經在發生。

Whether the Chinese credit squeeze continues depends on two factors: the future course of private capital outflows, and the attitude of the authorities to the exchange rate. The higher the capital outflows, and the more determined is the PBOC to prevent a large devaluation, the greater the depletion in the reserves will be.

中國的信貸緊縮是否會延續下去，取決於兩個因素：私人資本外流的未來走向，以及官方對匯率的態度。資本外流速度越快，中國央行越是堅定地阻止人民幣大幅貶值，那麼外匯儲備的消耗幅度就越大。

Some analysts are optimistic that the pace of capital outflows will slow down automatically in the near future. Nomura estimates that much of the “hot money” that entered China after 2010 has now exited the country. For example, they suggest that the outstanding stock of foreign loans previously taken out by Chinese banks to finance domestic lending has already been cut in half, from a peak of $887 billion a year ago. If so, the capital outflow could soon start to abate.

有些分析人士樂觀地認爲，資本外流速度將在不遠的將來自動放緩下來。野村證券(Nomura)估計，2010年之後進入中國的熱錢有很大一部分已撤出了中國。比如，他們提出，中國各銀行從國外借入用於國內放貸的貸款餘額，已降到了一年前8870億美元峯值的一半。如果是這樣，資本外流可能很快就開始放緩。

The problem, though, is that this all depends on confidence. Even though there are still tough regulatory controls on capital outflows, there has been considerable leakage in the form of illicit flows that appear as “errors and omissions” in the official statistics. According to the IMF, capital outflows are likely to be much larger than inflows when capital controls are eliminated.

不過，問題在於，這一切都取決於信心。即便目前資本外流仍受到嚴格的監管控制，但非正規資本流動存在相當大的漏洞，這部分流動在官方統計數據中被列爲“錯誤和遺漏”。IMF數據顯示，當資本管制被取消後，資本流出很可能遠遠高於資本流入。

Furthermore, if Chinese citizens lose confidence in the financial system, the capital outflow could become much larger, as firms and households seek ways to avoid currency controls. In many emerging markets, such activities have led to a “sudden stop” in capital availability to the economy during crises.

此外，如果中國公民對國內金融體系失去信心，資本外流可能要比目前大得多，公司和家庭都會想方設法繞過匯率管制。在許多新興市場，這類活動曾在危機期間導致對國內經濟的資本供應“突然中斷”。

Fortunately, there is no sign yet that this is happening in China, and really no need for it to happen in the future. On almost any basis, China’s unencumbered liquid reserves are much greater than liquid liabilities. In fact, there is a strong case for arguing that the present situation should be used as an opportunity to reduce excess reserves (see Joe Gagnon).

幸運的是，中國尚沒有發生這種情況的跡象，而未來也沒必要發生。在幾乎任何基礎上衡量，中國可支配的流動儲備都遠遠高於流動性負債。事實上有很好的理由認爲，當前局面應該被用作降低過高儲備的機遇。

Excess reserves cost money, because the income earned on foreign assets is generally less than the interest paid on the domestic liabilities held by the central bank as part of its sterilisation operations. Furthermore, at times when the exchange rate is strong, it is difficult to bring the reserves home to refinance the troubled domestic financial system because this would lead to an undesirable overvaluation of the renminbi. The paradox is that the reserves can only be used when the exchange rate is weak.

儲備過高要付出金錢代價，因爲從外國資產中獲得的收益通常低於央行作爲沖銷操作的一部分持有的國內負債的利息。另外，當匯率處於強勢時，中國很難利用外匯儲備爲陷入麻煩的國內金融體系提供再融資，因爲這將導致不可取的人民幣估值過高。矛盾之處在於，只有當匯率較弱時，中國才能讓外匯儲備派上用場。

To restore domestic and international confidence, China needs several policy changes at once: much easier domestic monetary policy; more open international capital markets; a freely floating, but not collapsing, exchange rate; and a recapitalised domestic financial system. If such a package were announced in a transparent and coherent manner, then an orderly drain on the reserves could come to be viewed as part of the solution, not part of the problem. But China’s economic policy regime is not there yet.

爲了恢復國內、國際信心，中國需要同時進行多項政策調整：比目前寬鬆得多的國內貨幣政策；更開放的國際化資本市場；自由浮動、但不會崩潰的匯率；對國內金融體系進行資本重組。若能以透明和有條理的方式公佈這樣的一攬子政策，那麼外匯儲備的有序消耗最終有望被視爲解決方案的一部分，而非問題的一部分。但就目前而言，中國的經濟政策體制還沒有到位。