人們爲何願意虧錢當債主 Why bullish markets did nothing for bearish boards
As the period of ultra-loose monetary policy in the developed world inches to a close, a paradox calls for explanation. Throughout this extraordinary monetary experiment managers of listed companies appeared to see risks everywhere and have been reluctant to invest in fixed assets despite enjoying the lowest borrowing costs in history. By contrast financial institutions have been fearless in propelling markets ever higher.
隨着發達國家的超寬鬆貨幣政策期接近終結，一個矛盾需要得到解釋。縱觀這次不尋常的貨幣實驗，上市公司的管理者眼裏似乎到處都是風險，儘管隨手可得史上最低的借款成本，他們卻不願投資於固定資產。相比之下，金融機構卻像不要命似的不斷推高市場。
This dichotomy between subdued risk taking in the real economy and aggressive risk taking in financial markets has prompted Angel Gurría, general of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Dev-elopment, to remark that one or other of these views will be proved wrong.
實體經濟死氣沉沉不願冒險，而金融市場激進冒險，這種反差促使經合組織(OECD)祕書長安赫爾古里亞(Angel Gurría)評論稱，這兩種觀點必然有一種將被證明是錯誤的。
With the US Federal Reserve now preparing to raise interest rates we may soon know whose judgment is dangerously flawed.
鑑於美聯儲(Fed)正準備提高利率，我們或許很快就能得知哪種判斷存在危險的缺陷。
The behaviour of financial institutions, whether judicious or insane, is at least comprehensible. Central banks’ post-crisis bond buying programmes were precisely designed to prod investors to take on more risk. This has given further impetus to a secular decline in real interest rates that predated the financial crisis, reflecting such forces as the Asian savings glut, deficient in the west and adverse demographic trends. The outcome has been the much-discussed search for yield.
不管是明智還是瘋狂，金融機構的行爲至少是可以理解的。危機後央行的債券購買計劃正是爲了激勵投資者承擔更多風險。這進一步推動了在金融危機前已經出現的實際利率長期下滑，反映了亞洲儲蓄過剩、西方投資不足以及人口結構趨勢不利等多種力量。結果是人們已有很多討論的對收益的追逐。
Downward pressure on yields has been reinforced by a shortage of so-called safe assets. Hence a stampede into sovereign bonds with negligible or negative yields — in effect, a search for non-yield. Even after the recent upturn in yields, investors are still paying some European governments to take their money.
所謂的安全資產的缺乏，加大了收益率的下行壓力。於是，投資者蜂擁進入收益率微不足道甚至爲負值的主權債券——實際上是在追逐無收益。即使在最近收益率有所回升之後，投資者依然要付錢讓某些歐洲國家的政府借走自己的錢。
In a speech in June Andrew Haldane, chief economist of the Bank of England, pointed out that there had been no precedent for such negative rates since the time of the Babylonians. Among the various potential explanations, Mr Haldane puts particular emphasis on the phenomenon of “dread risk”, a term used by psychologists to describe an exaggerated sense of fear and insecurity in the wake of catastrophic events.
英國央行(BoE)首席經濟學家安德魯霍爾丹(Andrew Haldane)在6月的一次講話中指出，自巴比倫時代以來，人類歷史上從未有過這樣的負收益率先例。在多種可能的解釋中，霍爾丹特別強調了“恐懼風險”(dread risk)現象，這是心理學家用來描述災難性事件後放大的恐懼和不安全感的術語。
It certainly provides a plausible explanation of private sector savings behaviour after 2008. Back then, households and companies were running a combined financial deficit (income less spending) of 2.4 per cent of gross domestic product in the US and 1.5 per cent in the UK, while the eurozone was running a surplus of 2.4 per cent. So the private sector was neither saving nor dissaving to any great degree.
這無疑爲2008年後私營部門的儲蓄行爲提供了一個可信的解釋。2008年，美國家庭和企業的總財務赤字（收入扣除支出）佔國內生產總值(GDP)的2.4%，在英國爲1.5%，而歐元區私營部門運行着佔GDP 2.4%的財務盈餘。也就是說，私營部門既沒有大舉儲蓄，也沒有大舉花掉儲蓄。
By 2010 the private sector had switched to a large financial surplus of 7.2 per cent of GDP in the US, 8.2 per cent in the UK and 5.8 per cent in the eurozone. Serious thrift had set in.
到2010年，美國私營部門轉爲大幅財務盈餘，達到GDP的7.2%，英國和歐元區分別爲8.2%和5.8%。人們當真養成了節儉習慣。
Yet there are limits to the explanatory power of dread risk. Why should a once-in-5,000-year event have struck now, rather than in the 1930s Depression, which saw far greater losses of output and employment?
然而恐懼風險的解釋力有限。爲什麼5000年一遇的事件會發生在當下，而不是上世紀30年代的大蕭條時期？那時的產出和就業損失比現在嚴重得多。
Note, too, that the dichotomy between risk perceptions in the real economy and in the financial markets is partly an illusion. Industrialists are fuelling risk-taking in markets through buy-backs
還要注意的是，在一定程度上，實體經濟和金融市場在風險認知上的反差是一種假象。企業家自身的回購和收購助推着金融市場上的冒險傾向。
In their recent Business and Finance Outlook, OECD economists identified flawed incentive structures as part of the reason for divergent perceptions of risk. They are surely right. The growth of buy-backs stems from equity-related incentives and performance-related pay. The most popular performance metrics, earnings per share and total shareholder return, are manipulable by management. No surprise, then, that survey evidence in the US has shown that profitable investment opportunities are routinely turned down in order to meet short-term earnings targets.
在最近一期《商業和金融展望》(Business and Finance Outlook)中，經合組織的經濟學家們認爲，風險認知不同的部分原因在於激勵機制有缺陷。他們無疑是正確的。回購增長源於股權激勵和績效薪酬機制。最流行的業績指標（每股盈利和股東總回報）可以受到企業管理層的操縱。難怪美國的調查結果表明，企業爲了達到短期盈利目標，經常放棄有利可圖的投資機會。
A different take comes from economists at the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements. For them, the people who suffer most from dread risk — though they do not use the term — are central bankers. The folk in Basel believe that low interest rates beget yet lower rates because they cause bubbles, followed by central bank bailouts. Their worry is that we risk trapping ourselves in a cycle of financial imbalances and busts. Unlike Mr Haldane, they would like to see an early return to monetary “normalisation”.
位於巴塞爾(Basel)的國際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的經濟學家們提出了另一個見解。在他們看來，受恐懼風險（儘管他們沒有使用這個詞）影響最嚴重的是央行官員。巴塞爾的這些經濟學家認爲，低利率會進一步催生低利率，因爲它們會引起泡沫，而泡沫破裂後央行會出手紓困。他們的擔憂是，我們有可能陷入金融失衡和崩盤的循環。和英國央行的霍爾丹不同，他們希望貨幣政策儘早迴歸“正常化”。
This, though, would be painful. Even a modest move in the direction of historic interest rate norms could pose a threat to solvency, not least for banks whose balance sheets are stuffed with sovereign debt. The search for non-yield has made safe assets unsafe, while rock-bottom policy interest rates have restricted central bankers’ crisis management toolbox. Escaping from this once-in-5,000-year aberration may thus require Houdini-like skills.
不過，這將是痛苦的。即使是朝着長期利率常態的方向邁出有分寸的一步，也可能對償付能力構成威脅，尤其是對那些資產負債表上積壓大量主權債務的銀行。對無收益的追逐讓安全資產不安全，而低得不能再低的政策利率又限制了央行官員管理危機的手段。因此，要從這場5000年一遇的反常事態脫身，需要魔術大師霍迪尼(Houdini)那樣的高超技巧。
