東芝假賬醜聞的教訓 The universal dangers shown by Toshiba’s failings
The causes and consequences of the long-running inflation of profits by Toshiba reflect some uniquely Japanese cultural norms. So, inevitably, did the 2011 scandal at Olympus, where successive leaders covered up accounting manipulation.
東芝(Toshiba)長期虛報利潤的原因和後果，反映出日本一些獨特的文化習俗。奧林巴斯(Olympus)2011年爆出的醜聞也必然如此。奧林巴斯曾有連續數位掌門人掩蓋會計操縱的問題。
But the genetic traces of those debacles are visible in plenty of other countries and companies. Self-satisfied boards of non-Japanese companies should examine the flaws that are common to all corporate cultures — almost certainly including their own.
但是，這類潰敗背後的基因痕跡在很多其他國家和企業都能看到。非日本企業洋洋自得的董事會應該對所有企業文化中常見的缺點進行檢查——幾乎肯定包括了它們自己的企業文化。
After all, there are only so many ways of cooking the books, however varied the details of each case. In the introduction to his indispensable anthology of creative accounting, Michael Jones, a professor of financial reporting, identifies just four main strategies — increasing income, decreasing expenses, increasing assets and decreasing liabilities. Toshiba was doing the first, according to an independent report — but so, for example, was WorldCom, one of the most notorious US cases of accounting fraud, back in the early 2000s.
畢竟，作假賬的方式太多了，不過每種情況的細節有所不同。財務申報方面的教授邁克爾瓊斯(Michael Jones)在介紹僞造賬目方面不可或缺的選集時，指明瞭4種主要策略——增加收入、減少支出、增加資產以及減少負債。據一份獨立報告稱，東芝使用的是第一種手法——不過，舉個例子，世通(WorldCom)也是這麼做的，它是21世紀初最臭名昭著的美國假賬案之一。
Control failings are one common theme. The audit committee at Toshiba includes executive directors — a red flag to UK governance purists. But directors, auditors and risk managers can succumb to capture or groupthink anywhere. It took the financial crisis to enshrine the idea that UK banks’ chief risk officers should be more independent, for instance.
控制失敗是一種常見主題。東芝的審計委員會中包含執行董事——這對英國的公司治理純粹主義者來說是一個危險信號。但是，在任何地方，董事、審計員和風險管理者都可能會屈服於羣體思維，或者被監督對象所俘虜。只有經歷了金融危機才能銘記住這類觀點——比如，英國銀行的首席風險官應該更加獨立。
As for lack of objective supervision, the UK principle that chief executives should be overseen by an independent chairman is widely ignored in the US. When boards do split the roles, it is often to give the former chief executive a stepping stone to retirement, an echo of the way former Toshiba and Olympus executives clung on to influence over their companies after they left. Even in the UK, companies are only one emergency decision or succession crisis away from appointing an executive chairman.
至於缺乏客觀監督方面，英國對首席執行官應接受獨立董事長監督的原則，在美國被廣泛忽略。當董事會的確讓不同的人擔任這兩個角色，這通常是給前任首席執行官一塊通往退休的墊腳石——這與東芝和奧林巴斯前首席執行官在離任後不願放棄對公司影響力的情況相呼應。即便在英國，如果企業需要做緊急決定或是遭遇繼任危機，也會任命一位執行董事長。
Unwillingness to challenge authority, a trait attributed to employees at Toshiba and Olympus — and often given an “only in Japan” spin — is a recurring problem everywhere, from Royal Bank of Scotland under Fred Goodwin to Fifa under Sepp Blatter.
不願挑戰權威——這被認爲是東芝和奧林巴斯的員工身上的特性，而且常被貼上“只出現在日本”的標籤——是世界各地反覆出現的問題，無論弗雷德古德溫爵士(Sir Fred Goodwin)執掌時的蘇格蘭皇家銀行(RBS)還是塞普布拉特(Sepp Blatter)領導的國際足聯(Fifa)都不例外。
The assumption that non-Japanese companies benefit from the protection of more advanced governance codes is broadly true. But such armour can be paper-thin if not reinforced in practice. Enron was technically in line with US boardroom practice. Toshiba was itself held up as a model of governance. It started appointing outside directors to its board long before the Olympus fiasco prompted wider corporate reform in Japan.
非日本企業受益於更先進的治理法範的保護——這種設想基本是正確的。但是，這種保護性的盔甲可能會形同虛設，如果沒能在實踐中加固的話。在法律層面，安然(Enron)與美國董事會的做法一致。東芝本身被樹立爲公司治理的典範。該公司任命外部董事進入董事會的做法，遠早於奧林巴斯慘劇在日本引發全面企業改革。
The most important lesson from Toshiba is about the malign impact of top-down pressure to meet unrealistic targets. Toshiba’s ex-chief executive denies having given direct instructions to staff to inflate profits. But the investigating panel said he told executives to “use every possible measure to achieve profitability” and added that Toshiba’s corporate culture did “not allow employees to go against the will of their superiors”.
從東芝得到的最重要教訓是，爲達到不切實際的目標而由上而下施加壓力，會帶來不利影響。東芝前首席執行官否認直接向員工作出虛報利潤的指示。但是，調查委員會稱，他曾向高管表示“利用一切可能的手段來實現盈利”，該委員會還補充稱，東芝的企業文化“不允許員工違背上級意願”。
Staff at target-chasing western banks before the credit crunch or at WorldCom ahead of its collapse in 2002 may recognise that picture. Bernie Ebbers, the telecoms group’s chief executive, “created, and the [then] board permitted, a corporate environment in which the pressure to meet the numbers was high, the departments that served as controls were weak, and the word of senior management was final and not to be challenged”, a WorldCom board investigation found in 2003.
信貸緊縮前在追逐目標的西方銀行業工作的員工、或者世通2002年破產前的員工，也許會覺得這畫面似曾相識。2003年對世通董事會所做的一份調查發現，時任該電信集團首席執行官的伯尼埃伯斯 (Bernie Ebbers)“創造了（董事會隨後允許了）一種企業環境——完成業績數字的壓力很大、承擔控制職能的部門很弱、高管層的指示毋庸置疑，不會受到挑戰”。
If the Toshiba report were just a snapshot of how some Japanese companies are fossilised relics of what corporate governance used to look like elsewhere, the rest of the world could rest easy. But the rest of the world should not be so smug. A new survey suggests that internationally, 37 per cent of management accountants, who help companies seek out investments and control risks, have felt under pressure from managers or peers to compromise corporate ethics. The percentage has risen over the past three years in most places polled, including the UK and the US.
如果這份關於東芝的報告僅僅揭示出，有些日本企業正是其他地方以往公司治理面貌的“化石遺址”，那麼世界其他地方便可高枕無憂。但是，世界其他地方不應該如此安然自得。一份新調查顯示，全球37%的管理會計師（負責幫助企業尋找投資並控制風險）已經感覺到來自經理或同儕的、讓其放棄企業倫理的壓力。在絕大多數接受調查的地區——包括英國和美國——這一比例在過去三年均有所上升。
When aggressive targets, irresistible management pressure and weak controls coincide, misconduct can spread quickly. Rival companies see the inflated numbers and strain to match them. To suggest such weaknesses are confined to one corporate or national culture is a first step into dangerous complacency.
當激進的目標、不可抗拒的管理壓力以及控制薄弱同時出現時，不端行爲便會迅速蔓延。對手企業看到虛報的數字，就會想方設法報出差不多的數字。認爲這種嗜好爲某一家企業或某種民族文化所獨有，就是步入危險自負的第一步。
