歐洲衰落應引起全球關注 The decline of Europe is a global concern

In his 1898 poem “Waiting for the Barbarians”, the Greek poet CP Cavafy describes a polity that invents or exaggerates mysterious foreign threats to prop up its decaying power structures. The listless ruling elites, hollow public cereMonies and pervasive forebodings of doom depicted in Cavafy’s masterwork should serve in 2016 as a wake-up call for Europe.

在1898年發表的《等待野蠻人》(Waiting for the Barbarians)一詩中，希臘詩人卡瓦菲斯(CP Cavafy)描繪了一種政體，這種政體通過虛構或誇大神祕的外部威脅來支撐其日益腐朽的權力結構。卡瓦菲斯名作中刻畫的那些無精打采的統治精英、空洞的公共儀式以及無處不在的末日先兆，應當對2016年的歐洲起到警示作用。

Whether it concerns terrorism, immigration, homegrown political extremism, the eurozone’s unity, unemployment, lacklustre economic growth or even Europe’s military defences, national governments and the EU apparatus in Brussels look increasingly as if they are not up to the numerous challenges bearing down simultaneously from every direction. This should worry not just Europeans but their friends and partners in the Americas and Asia.

不論是關於恐怖主義、移民、本土政治極端主義、歐元區的團結一致、失業問題、乏力的經濟增長，抑或是歐洲的軍事防禦，各國政府、駐布魯塞爾的歐盟(EU)機構看起來似乎都越來越無力應對同時來自各個方向的衆多挑戰。這不僅應引起歐洲人的擔憂，他們在美洲及亞洲的朋友與合作伙伴同樣應感到擔憂。

The malaise goes much wider and deeper than the EU, which is not to blame for everything that happens or does not happen in Europe. It is partly a matter of Europe’s relative global decline, which makes it difficult to manage events even in its own neighbourhood. It is partly a matter of cultural, economic, political and technological change in western societies as a whole. This disrupts familiar patterns of life, undermines the trust of citizens in their rulers and weakens the ability of governments to act decisively.

這一疾患的廣度和深度遠遠超出了歐盟（不應將歐洲所有已發生或未發生之事都歸咎於它）的範圍。這部分事關歐洲在全球相對衰落——使得歐洲甚至難以管理好自己地盤內的事務；部分事關西方社會作爲一個整體在文化、經濟、政治及技術領域的變化。這種變化瓦解了人們熟悉的生活方式，降低了公民對統治者的信任，削弱了政府果斷採取行動的能力。

Nonetheless, the EU is the focus of concern. Its inadequate responses to one crisis after another create the unfortunate impression that, despite being a club of affluent democracies, with 28 member states and more than 500m inhabitants, the EU is doomed always to be less than the sum of its parts.

儘管如此，歐盟仍是問題的焦點。歐盟對一個又一個危機的乏力應對給人留下了這樣一種不良印象，即雖然身爲富裕民主國傢俱樂部，擁有28個成員國以及超過5億居民，但歐盟作爲一個整體註定總是小於各部分之和。

Rousing appeals from political leaders for a more efficient and closely integrated EU — and there have been lots of them in 2015 — turn out too often to be mere lip service to an ideal.

歐洲各國政治領導人對於更高效、一體化程度更深的歐盟的大聲疾呼（2015年有很多這樣的呼籲），結果往往只是理想化的空談。

The EU’s pitiful efforts at defence collaboration illustrate the problem. It was none other than Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, who said in October: “If I look at the common European defence policy, a bunch of chickens would be a more unified combat unit in contrast.”

歐盟在防務合作方面的糟糕進展說明了這一問題。不是別人，正是歐盟委員會(European Commission)主席讓-克洛德容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)去年10月時說：“如果讓我評價歐洲的共同防務政策，一羣小雞倒更像一個統一的作戰單元。”

This is not to say that the EU is on the brink of falling apart. As they demonstrated during the eurozone crisis, and as they are demonstrating again in the refugee and migrant emergency, Europe’s leaders have a tried and tested method for coping with urgent problems. They find solutions that are temporary, barely satisfactory and designed chiefly to serve the purpose of somehow keeping the EU show on the road.

這並不是說歐盟正處於分崩離析的邊緣。歐洲領導人擁有應對緊急問題的屢試不爽的辦法，他們在歐元區危機期間已經證明了這一點，在難民和移民危機中還在繼續證明這一點。他們總是能找到臨時的、差強人意的解決方案，這些方案在設計時主要就是爲了實現這樣一個目的，即不管怎樣讓歐盟把戲接着唱下去。

In this spirit they have arranged three hugely expensive financial rescues of Greece, but they have refused to grasp the nettle of a comprehensive write-off of Greek debt. They have created a semi-banking union which has common supervision and a common mechanism for winding up failed banks, but which lacks common deposit insurance. In both cases it is national political pressures, primarily in Germany, that are the obstacle.

本着這種精神，他們已經爲希臘安排了三輪成本高昂的金融紓困，但卻一直拒絕快刀斬亂麻，全面免除希臘的債務。他們組建了一個準銀行業聯盟，這個聯盟擁有單一監管機制以及對受困銀行進行清算的單一清算機制，但卻尚未建立共同存款保險機制。在上述兩個例子中，主要障礙都是各國（主要是德國）國內的政治壓力。

Just as the eurozone crisis split the currency union between northern and southern Europeans, so the refugee emergency is dividing the EU between its older western European member states and its newer central and eastern ones. The Schengen system of border-free travel, a cornerstone of EU integration, is already fragmenting along west-east lines. If the barriers that separated the two halves of Europe before 1989 are not to re-emerge, it will be essential that western Europeans resist the temptation of imagining that they would be better off in a union, as in the cold war era, of 15 or fewer nations.

正如當初歐元區危機造成歐元區南北分裂一樣，難民危機同樣使歐盟分裂成老牌的西歐成員國和後加入的中東歐成員國兩部分。免簽證過境的申根體系(Schengen system)——歐盟一體化的基石——已經在沿着東西歐分界線破裂開來。如果要使1989年以前把歐洲分裂成兩半的障礙不再重現，至關重要的一點是，西歐人必須抵制這樣一種誘惑，即幻想像冷戰時期那樣保持一個只有15個或者更少成員國的歐盟，他們將過得更好。

To avert Schengen’s complete disintegration, the EU is pinning its hopes, and 3bn of its money, on Turkey to stem the tide of incoming war refugees and migrants from the Middle East, north Africa and beyond. The EU is also proposing to set up a powerful border and coastguard agency.

爲了防止申根體系的完全解體，歐盟正寄希望於土耳其能夠遏制來自中東、北非以及其他地區的戰爭難民和移民潮，並將向土耳其提供30億歐元來幫助實現這一目標。歐盟還提議建立一支強大的邊境與海岸警衛機構。

The most serious question for the EU in 2016 will be what consequences will follow if neither of these measures is effective, and if a European city suffers a terrorist rampage like the Paris attacks of November 13.

2016年，歐盟面臨的最嚴重問題在於，如果這些措施都沒有效果，如果一座歐洲城市遭受如同巴黎去年11月13日發生的恐怖襲擊，將會出現什麼樣的後果。

A related risk is that, despite the success of mainstream democratic parties in beating back the far-right National Front in France’s December 13 regional elections, rightwing populists will encroach more closely on the citadels of European power. Arguably, however, a more insidious threat to democracy comes from the willingness of respectable centre-right European politicians to borrow rhetoric and policies from their extremist rivals. This practice corrodes public discussion by promising simple solutions to complicated problems.

相關風險在於，儘管主流民主政黨在法國去年12月13日舉行的地方選舉中成功擊敗了極右翼的國民陣線(National Front)，但右翼民粹主義者將進一步侵蝕歐洲的權力中心。然而，可以說，民主面臨的更爲隱祕的威脅，來自正派的中右翼歐洲政治家願意從他們奉行極端主義的競爭對手那裏借用話語和政策。通過對複雜問題承諾簡單的解決方案，這種做法讓公共討論變質。

More than at any point since its creation in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EU appears vulnerable over the coming 12 to 24 months to a succession of dreadful blows and upsets.

未來一兩年，歐盟似乎比自1957年隨着《羅馬條約》(Treaty of Rome)簽署宣告成立以來的任何時候都更容易受到一系列可怕打擊與混亂的衝擊。

All are potentially fatal to the EU’s unity — not least Britain’s referendum, due by the end of 2017, on whether to stay in the bloc — but not necessarily to the EU’s survival as such.

所有這些（尤其是英國定於2017年底之前舉行公投決定是否脫離歐盟）對歐盟的團結一致可能是致命的，但對歐盟的存續卻未必致命。

Like Cavafy’s imaginary state, or like the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted for 1,000 years before Napoleon put it out of its misery in 1806, the EU may not disintegrate but slip into a glacial decline, its political and bureaucratic elites continuing faithfully to observe the rites of a confederacy bereft of power and relevance. It is not an outcome that any European with a grain of common sense should wish for. But it is no longer inconceivable.

如同卡瓦菲斯虛構的國度或是在1806年被拿破崙(Napoleon)終結之前延續了1000年的神聖羅馬帝國(Holy Roman Empire)一樣，歐盟或許不會解體，但會陷入緩慢的衰落，其政治和官僚精英繼續忠實地爲一個喪失了威力與重要性的聯盟舉行儀式。這是任何稍微擁有常識的歐洲人都不應期待的結果。但這個結果已不再是天方夜譚。