如果有一天 大麻合法化了

While the debate about legalisation of cannabis is endlessly fascinating, it obscures the vital question of how to design a system of legal availability.

雖然關於大麻合法化的辯論總能激起人們的興趣，但它遮蓋了一個重要問題：如何設計出一套合法供應的體系？

Prohibition produces some very bad results. It deprives millions of people of the liberty to pursue what would be, for them, a harmless pleasure. It creates an illicit market that delivers tens of billions of dollars a year to criminals. It leads to large numbers of arrests (mostly for possession for personal use) and a smaller but substantial number of incarcerations (mostly for growing or dealing). The black market fuels corruption and violence worldwide.

禁令帶來一些很糟糕的後果。它剝奪了數以百萬計的人無害享樂的自由。它滋生了非法市場，每年幾百億美元落入犯罪分子手中。有許多人被捕（多數是因爲持有大麻自用），還有數目較少但仍相當可觀的人入獄（多數是因爲種植或交易大麻）。黑市在全球各地助燃着腐敗和暴力。

On the other hand, prohibition maintains high prices, discouraging heavy use and use by minors. The problem is how to shed the harms of prohibition while minimising the harms of legalisation. The desirable outcomes are cannabis available to adults who want to use it in moderation and abolition of the illicit trade but without significant increases in habitual heavy use or in more-than-occasional use by minors. Alas, current legalisation efforts in the US, replacing prohibition with commercial production and sale after the fashion of alcohol, have little prospect of getting us there.

另一方面，禁令的好處是，它維持了大麻的高價，從而減少了大量使用大麻和未成年人使用大麻的現象。問題是怎樣既能消除禁令的弊端，又能儘量減少合法化的危害。理想的結果是，讓想要適度吸食的成年人能夠獲得大麻，從而取締非法交易，同時又不導致習慣性濫服大麻或是未成年人頻繁吸食大麻的情況顯著增加。可惜的是，美國當前的合法化努力方向是用商業生產和銷售取代禁令，就像對待酒類那樣，這意味着實現上述目標的機會渺茫。

Some rise in problem use is inevitable if cannabis becomes cheaper and more available. But a move to commercialisation multiplies the risks. A licit industry would be financially dependent on the minority of consumers who become chemically dependent, just as the alcohol industry derives most of its revenue from periodic binge drinkers and chronic alcoholics. Alcohol and cannabis follow the 80-20 law: 20 per cent of the user population accounts for 80 per cent of sales, and most of those heavy users suffer from substance abuse. The commercial interests of the cannabis industry would therefore be in direct conflict with the public interest, and the industry would have both means and motive to use its muscle to resist measures to limit drug abuse.

如果大麻價格降低、供應增加，濫用的現象難免會上升。但商業化之後，風險會成倍增加。合法化的行業將在經濟上依賴一小部分上癮的顧客，正如酒業的營收大多來自經常豪飲者和長期酗酒者一樣。酒類和大麻均適用“80-20定律”：20%的顧客羣貢獻80%的銷售額，大部分“重度消費者”有物質濫用問題。因此，大麻行業的商業利益將與公共利益直接衝突。該行業將有動機和手段來阻撓限制濫用的措施。

Cannabis is naturally cheap; only prohibition makes it expensive. The Rand Corporation’s Drug Policy Research Center in the US has estimated the free-market price at no more than 10 per cent of the current illicit-market price. Since an hour stoned already costs less than an hour drunk, casual users would gain little from lower prices – even now the cost barely registers in their personal budgets. But for cash-strapped teens and heavy users, a cost of pennies per cannabis cigarette would be an invitation to dive in; and a for-profit industry would reinforce that invitation with relentless promotion.

大麻本來很便宜，只是禁令才讓它值錢。美國蘭德公司(Rand Corporation)毒品政策研究中心(Drug Policy Research Center)估計，自由市場的價格不會超過目前非法市場價格的10%。既然沉迷於一小時大麻影響的成本已經比買一小時的醉便宜，偶爾享用的消費者很難從降價中獲得什麼好處——即使是現在，抽大麻在他們的預算裏也佔不了多大份量。但對於大量吸食的消費者和囊中羞澀的青少年而言，幾分錢一根的大麻煙將非常誘人。而謀求利潤的行業將用不斷的促銷加強這種誘惑。

High taxes and tight marketing restrictions might, in principle, curb the damage. But why should we expect such measures to surmount industry opposition? Here, again, the case of alcohol provides fair warning.

徵收重稅和嚴格限制營銷在理論上可能會控制住危害。但憑什麼認爲這些措施能戰勝行業的反對？在這方面，酒類的案例再次提供了合理的警告。

A large increase in problem use might be a price worth paying to rid ourselves of the many ills attendant on prohibition. But it is not a price we have to pay. Smarter policies could lead to better outcomes.

爲擺脫禁令帶來的諸多弊病，濫用大麻現象的大幅增加或許是值得付出的代價，但這並不是非得付出的代價。更明智的政策有望產生更好的效果。

Legal production and sale could be restricted to consumer co-operatives; to not-for-profit enterprises with trustees charged with preventing abuse; or to a state monopoly run as a branch of the health service rather than the revenue agency. Non-commercial vendors would be less likely to offer cannabis-infused sweets in packaging that mimics children’s sweets or infuse cannabis into fruit-flavoured drinks, as now offered by the “medical marijuana” industry in the US.

合法產銷的範圍可以限定於：消費者合作社，有受託人負責防止濫用的非盈利企業，或者一個國有壟斷機構，作爲醫療服務（而非稅務部門）的某個分支來運行。非商業的供應商不太可能會像目前美國的“醫用大麻”行業那樣，售賣富含大麻成分、包裝模仿兒童糖果的甜食，或是將大麻成分加入果味飲料。

One measure to limit abuse – consistent with either commercial or non-commercial distribution – would be user-set personal periodic limits on consumption: an instance of the “libertarian paternalist” strategy of “nudges” toward sensible behaviour.

有一項限制濫用的措施既適合商業經銷，又適合非商業經銷：讓消費者自己設定在一個週期內的消費量。這是“自由意志家長主義”將人們向理智行爲“輕推”的體現。

Almost no one plans to become a heavy daily user. Abuse is the accretion of countless undramatic decisions, each taken under the lure of current amusement, pleasure or relief, and neglecting the future. If each user, on starting to purchase cannabis, were required to choose a personal monthly quota, to be enforced by retailers, users’ long-term interests might have a fighting chance of competing with short-term impulses. Persuading people to set such limits would require persuading them that they are at risk of falling prey to cannabis abuse. Users could increase their limit but only with, say, two weeks’ notice; in the meantime, retailers would be required to dishonour purchase requests above the limit.

幾乎沒有人希望每天吸食很多大麻。濫用是無數個小決定的累積，每個小決定則來自及時行樂（不管是消遣、追求快感還是放鬆）、忘記未來的誘惑。如果每位消費者在開始購買大麻時被要求選擇每月的消費量，並由零售商執行，那麼消費者的長期利益或許有機會與短期衝動較量一番。既然要說服人們爲自己設限，就需要說服他們認識到陷入大麻濫用的風險。消費者可以提高自己的限額，但必須事先通知（如提前兩週）。與此同時，零售商將必須拒絕超限的購買請求。

User-set limits would impinge on no one’s liberty; a consumer who did not want such protection could simply set a high limit to start with. Of course, some would do so, and some would progress to dependency by repeatedly raising their personal quotas. But others, made mindful of the fact that their consumption was exceeding their original intentions, might leave the limits in place, using them as props to moderation.

讓消費者自己設定限額，不會妨礙任何人的自由：不希望得到保護的消費者只需一開始將限額設高即可。當然，有人確實會這樣做，也有人會一再提高個人限額，慢慢上癮。但其他人在意識到自己的消費量正在超過最初指標之後，可能不去修改限額，而是把它當作促進節制的機制。

Perhaps continued prohibition is the worst option. But turning the business over to a money-hungry industry might well be the second worst. Why not choose better?

繼續禁止大麻或許是最糟糕的選擇。但將生意完全交給唯利是圖的行業，恐怕是第二糟糕的選擇。爲何不選擇更好的方案？