借跨大西洋能源協議向普京釋放信號

Energy has always been central to creating a trade and investment bloc through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. If a TTIP agreement can reduce wide differences in energy prices between Europe and the U.S., Europeans will pay less for energy, while American energy producers will finally be able to profit from the recent energy boom by selling at competitive market prices. Trying to artificially hold down prices has heavy costs for domestic producers, encourages consumption, and dampens energy production over time.

在通過《跨大西洋貿易及投資夥伴協定》(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 簡稱TTIP)建立貿易和投資聯盟的磋商中，能源問題一直是關鍵所在。如果TTIP能夠縮小歐洲和美國之間巨大的能源價格差異，歐洲人在能源上的花費將會減少，而美國能源生產商最終也能夠通過具有競爭力的市場價格從最近的能源熱潮中獲利。試圖人爲壓低能源價格將令國內生產商付出沉重代價，同時會刺激能源消費，而在長期內抑制能源生產。

Yet recent events in Ukraine and Russia have made clear that creating a trans-Atlantic energy market is about More than economic efficiency. Energy cooperation has become an indispensable pillar of the Western security community, which has played a central role in maintaining peace in Europe for more than 60 years.

Reuters但最近烏克蘭和俄羅斯的衝突清楚表明，建立一個跨大西洋能源市場不僅僅具有經濟意義。能源合作已經成爲西方安全同盟一個不可或缺的支柱，而該同盟在維護歐洲60多年來的和平中發揮了關鍵作用。

Today the European Union produces only a small portion of its energy needs, importing about 80% of its oil and some 60% of its gas. More than a third of this oil and 30% of the gas is of Russian origin. Only four countries in the EU-Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Sweden-are able to do without any Russian gas. By reducing European energy dependency on Russia, both the U.S. and Europe will be better able to defend and promote their values-while capturing the immense gains from greater economic integration between the world's two largest economies.

當前，歐盟只有小部分能源是自產的，大約80%的石油和60%的天然氣需要進口。超過三分之一的進口石油和30%的進口天然氣來自俄羅斯。歐盟成員國中只有四個國家能夠完全不依靠俄羅斯的天然氣，它們是葡萄牙、西班牙、愛爾蘭和瑞典。通過減少歐洲對俄羅斯的能源依賴，美國和歐洲都能更好地保護及宣揚自己的價值觀，同時獲取世界兩大經濟體之間實現經濟進一步一體化所帶來的巨大好處。

During a visit to Washington this month, I could sense a new enthusiasm for focusing on ways to significantly increase American energy exports to Europe. Lifting U.S. export restrictions would be the first step, but we must also speed up infrastructure development, especially for liquefied natural gas.

在本月訪問華盛頓期間，我可以感覺到對專注於如何大幅增加美國對歐洲能源出口的一股新熱情。取消美國的出口限制將是第一步，但我們還必須加快基礎設施的發展，特別是液化天然氣的基礎設施。

The main constraint seems to be time. Six LNG terminals approved by the Obama administration still need approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission before construction can begin. It could be years before shipments of LNG can make their way across the Atlantic. And then there is the TTIP. While talks are on track, this ambitious project might take two or three years to complete.

主要制約因素似乎是時間。已獲奧巴馬政府批准的六個液化天然氣終端在開工建設之前，仍需獲得美國聯邦能源監管委員會(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)的批准。美國的液化天然氣運到大西洋另一邊的歐洲可能需要數年時間才能實現。此外，還有TTIP問題。儘管談判正在步入軌道，但這項宏大的項目可能需要兩三年的時間才能完成。

Given recent events in Ukraine, we don't have time to wait for the full trade agreement. Instead, Europe and the U.S. should begin work immediately on a separate charter setting out the main steps for creating a trans-Atlantic energy market. This energy charter could be agreed on and signed in months, having a quick impact on the increasingly critical security crisis.

鑑於最近的烏克蘭局勢，我們沒時間等待達成完整的貿易協定。歐洲和美國應該立即開始研究一項單獨的協議，制定創建跨大西洋能源市場的主要步驟。雙方可能在幾個月後就能達成共識並簽署能源協議，從而對日益嚴重的安全危機產生迅速的影響。

A trans-Atlantic energy charter should have four main chapters. First, it would immediately lift American export restrictions for oil and gas sold to Europeans. As President Obama recently put it, American natural gas will go 'into the open market,' so this is no gift to Europeans.

跨大西洋能源協議應當包括四個主要部分。首先，它會立即取消美國對於向歐洲出售油氣的出口限制。正如美國總統奧巴馬最近所說的，美國天然氣將“進入公開市場”，因此這並不是免費給歐洲人的禮物。

Second, the U.S. would commit to an ambitious program of energy infrastructure directed at creating the terminals and transport facilities to exploit the new energy market. The U.S. Energy Department could scrap individual reviews for LNG export facilities in favor of a single, en-masse approval, and recommend to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that it expedite all energy-charter projects.

第二，美國將會致力於一個宏大的能源基礎設施項目，旨在打造相應的接收站和運輸設施以開拓歐洲這一新的能源市場。美國能源部(U.S. Energy Department)可能取消逐一審批液化天然氣出口設施，代之以統一的全體審批，並建議美國聯邦能源監管委員會(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 簡稱FERC)加快所有與能源協議相關的項目。

Third, Europeans would make a similar commitment to infrastructure development. Europe already benefits from a high number of gas terminals, but cross-border gas pipelines and electricity interconnections are still lacking.

第三，歐洲可能同樣致力於基礎設施開發。歐洲已經受益於數量衆多的天然氣接收站，但仍缺乏跨境天然氣管道以及電網。

There is no point in going ahead with a trans-Atlantic energy charter without simultaneously completing the EU internal market in energy. For example, the Iberian Peninsula has the potential to become a major alternative supply route of gas from across the Atlantic to the rest of Europe.

如果不同時完善歐盟內部的能源市場，推進跨大西洋能源協議就會毫無意義。例如，伊比利亞半島有可能成爲橫跨大西洋向歐洲其他地區供應天然氣的主要替代供應線路。

Finally, the EU would have to make a genuine effort to bring its environmental and state-aid standards closer to American practice. We understand that Americans would be frustrated if there were a blanket ban on shale-gas extraction in Europe (and few countries have a ban now), especially if it is combined with government support for local energy producers. Both sides need to compromise, and Europeans are ready to deliver.

最後，歐盟還必須切實採取措施，讓其環境和國家補助標準接近美國的做法。我們深知，如果歐洲出臺針對頁岩氣開採的整體禁令（現在有少數國家有此禁令），美國人將會感到失望，尤其是如果政府對當地能源生產商還有扶持的話。雙方都需要妥協，而歐洲已經做好了準備。

Rarely has there been such a perfect alignment of economic, security and foreign policy goals. Energy planning is not unlike investing in financial securities, where diversification is used to manage risk under a variety of unpredictable outcomes. A trans-Atlantic energy market would be deep enough to withstand almost all conceivable supply-and-demand shocks. It would boost confidence and investment in energy and the overall economies.

經濟、安全和外交政策目標很少像這樣完全契合。能源規劃與投資金融證券並無不同，面對衆多不可預知的結果，人們會採用多元化的辦法來管理風險。跨大西洋的能源市場將會足夠深厚，能夠經受住幾乎所有想得到的供求動盪。它將會提振人們對於能源的信心、加大能源投資，同時還將提振整體經濟。

But energy infrastructure is enormously expensive, and investors will not take a more integrated market seriously unless we send a clear message that a new era of American and European energy planning has begun. Such a message would also reach another set of watchers: Countries that like to use their energy supplies in ways that run counter to American and European interests will see their influence wane. A trans-Atlantic energy charter is our best option and our best tool in the face of an increasingly uncertain future.

但能源基礎設施的成本極高，而且投資者不會重視一個更加一體化的市場，除非我們發出明確信號，表明美國和歐洲能源規劃的新時代已經開啓。這樣的信號還會影響到另外一羣觀察者：想以違背歐美利益的方式運用其能源供應的國家會發現它們的影響力減弱。面對越來越充滿不確定性的未來，跨大西洋能源協議是我們最好的選擇，也是我們最好的工具。

Mr. Macaes is Portugal's secretary of state for European affairs.

（本文作者是葡萄牙歐洲事務部長）