美國爲何對中國造島束手無策

China’s efforts to dredge new land on remote coral atolls in the South China Sea have left the US struggling to come up with a response.

中國在南中國海偏遠的環珊瑚礁上填海造島，這讓美國很難做出迴應。

For Washington, Chinese land-building has helped make allies of former adversaries now fearful of military domination by an assertive China. The latest example was the trip to Vietnam last week by Ashton Carter, US defence secretary, who pledged US patrol craft to the Vietnamese navy.

對華盛頓來說，中國填海造島有助於讓之前是對手的國家成爲美國的盟友，這些國家擔心一個自信的中國將會佔據軍事上的主導地位。最新的例子是美國國防部長阿什頓•卡特(Ashton Carter)上週訪問越南，承諾將幫助越南海軍購買美國的巡邏艇。

But there is a limit to how far countries in the region are willing to present a united front to China, which has reclaimed 2,000 acres of land in the past 18 months, far outstripping all other claimants combined, according to Mr Carter. The Obama administration is also unsure about how strongly it should push back against what US officials see as a long-term Chinese plan to control the region’s waters.

但亞太國家並不熱衷於聯合對付中國——據卡特說，中國在過去18個月裏的填海造島面積達到2000英畝，遠遠超過了其他所有國家填海造島面積的總和。奧巴馬政府也不確定應該在多大程度上阻撓美國官員所認爲的中國控制該地區海域的長期計劃。

China claims 90 per cent of the waters of the South China Sea, a position contested by neighbours including Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. But the Obama administration is increasingly finding itself in the uncomfortable position of taking the lead in efforts to confront Beijing, while stumbling in diplomatic efforts to establish consensus in Southeast Asia on what to do.

中國宣稱對南中國海90%的海域擁有主權，包括越南、馬來西亞和菲律賓在內的鄰國對此提出異議。但奧巴馬政府日益發現，自己正處於挑頭對抗中國的尷尬處境，同時讓東南亞採取一致行動的外交努力未能取得進展。

“The frustration for the US is that the Southeast Asian countries, with the possible exception of the Philippines, do not want to make a choice between China, their main trading partner, and the US, main provider of security in the region,” says Euan Graham of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney.

悉尼智庫羅維國際政策學院(Lowy Institute for International Policy)的尤安•格雷厄姆(Euan Graham)表示：“美國的挫折在於，東南亞國家（可能除了菲律賓）不想在中國和美國之間做出選擇，這兩個國家一個是它們的主要貿易伙伴國，另一個則是該地區主要的安全保護傘。”

The second problem is that each of these countries has occupied its own islands, and some are doing their own land reclamation. At the Shangri-La security summit last month, Mr Carter called on all parties to stop land reclamation. Last year a similar appeal by the US went unheeded by all but the Philippines, and subsequently collapsed.

第二個問題在於，這些國家本身全都在南中國海佔有島嶼，一些國家還在填海造島。在上月舉行的香格里拉安全峯會期間，卡特呼籲所有各方停止填海造島。去年美國做出了類似的呼籲，但除了菲律賓以外其他國家全都置之不理，最終不了了之。

Diplomatic efforts include a common “code of conduct” among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — four of which have claims in the South China Sea — which would put a commitment not to reclaim land in legally-binding language and place additional diplomatic pressure on China.

外交方面的努力包括，東盟(Asean)成員國（其中4個國家宣稱在南中國海擁有主權）簽署共同“行爲準則”，該準則將讓各國以具有法律約束力的語言承諾不填海造島，而且對中國施加額外的外交壓力。

Asean is split between those countries that do not have claims, which are more China-friendly, and those that do. Meanwhile, China is seeking to deal separately with each claimant.

東盟內部也有分歧，一些國家沒有提出主權主張，與中國關係較爲友好，而另一些國家則提出了主權主張。與此同時，中國正尋求與每一個提出主權主張的國家逐一談判。

“In crude terms some might say they are doing divide and rule,” says Ong Keng Yong, former Asean secretary-general and now deputy chairman of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

前東盟祕書長、如今擔任新加坡南洋理工大學拉惹勒南國際問題研究院(S Rajaratnam School of International Studies)副主席的王景榮(Ong Keng Yong)表示：“粗略來說，一些人可能會說，他們正在各個擊破。”

Meanwhile, as China builds up its islands, others such as Vietnam and the Philippines continue their own island-building efforts. The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei each claim some of the Spratlys, while China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the whole chain. Vietnam, for example, occupies many more islands than China does.

與此同時，隨着中國填海造島，越南和菲律賓等其他國家也繼續它們自己的填海造島。菲律賓、馬來西亞和文萊全都宣稱對南沙羣島的某些島嶼擁有主權，同時中國大陸、臺灣和越南宣稱對整個南沙羣島擁有主權。例如，越南佔據的島嶼比中國還多。

However, China’s dredging efforts, which appear to be aimed at creating military facilities including a 3km runway capable of handling fighter jets, dwarfs the others. US analysts fear the next step is for China to claim airspace over the South China Sea by declaring an air defence identification zone once the runway is finished.

然而，中國的填海造島行動讓其他國家相形見絀——中國似乎打算建設包括一個可供戰鬥機起降的3公里跑道在內的軍事設施。美國分析人士擔心，一旦建成跑道，中國下一步將會劃設一個防空識別區，從而對南中國海領空主張主權。

Faced with such a prospect and indecision among its friends, US officials admit they need to do more to challenge Chinese muscle-flexing but there is no consensus yet within the Obama administration about how to respond.

由於面臨這樣的前景，加上美國盟友猶豫不決，美國官員承認他們需要採取更多舉措來對抗中國的力量展示，但迄今奧巴馬政府沒有就如何迴應達成共識。

Washington recently raised the temperature in the South China Sea by inviting a CNN crew on board a surveillance flight over islands claimed by China, and broadcasting radio challenges by Chinese military on the ground.

華盛頓最近邀請美國有線新聞網(CNN)工作人員隨美軍偵察機赴中方宣稱擁有主權的島嶼偵察，並播放了島上中國軍方通過無線電發出的警告，這讓南中國海緊張局勢升溫。

The administration is also considering conducting “freedom of navigation” exercises where it would send warships into the waters around the reclaimed Chinese land features. The objective would be not to contest the specific territorial claims, about which the US says it remains neutral. Instead, the US would be showing that it does not recognise the sandbanks as islands with their own territorial waters. Under international law, nations control 12 nautical miles around islands and coasts.

奧巴馬政府也在考慮實施“航行自由”行動，派遣軍艦進入中國宣稱擁有主權的島嶼附近海域。其目的並不是對具體的領土主張提出異議——關於這一點，美國表示將依然保持中立。相反，美國將以此表明，它不會承認這些礁石是各國的領海島嶼。按照國際法，海岸線12海里以內屬於各國的領海。

However, the concern within the administration is that an overly aggressive US response could escalate tensions, alienate allies and partners in the region or even lead to an altercation with Chinese naval vessels. Bonnie Glaser, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, says while freedom of navigation patrols do not hinge on “buy in” from regional powers, broader diplomatic efforts do.

然而，奧巴馬政府的擔憂在於，美國過於激進可能加劇緊張局勢，疏遠該地區的盟友和合作夥伴，甚至與中國海軍艦船發生衝突。華盛頓國際戰略研究中心(Center for Strategic and International Studies)的葛萊儀(Bonnie Glaser)表示，儘管航行自由巡邏並不取決於地區主要國家的“入夥”，但更爲宏大的外交努力卻需要。

“It’s important for the US to have support for its actions in the South China Sea, if not from all Asean members then from a key core group,” she says. “In the absence of adequate consultations, diplomatic initiatives fail.”

她說道：“重要的是，美國在南中國海的行動要獲得支持，即便不是所有東盟成員國的支持，那也得是核心國家的支持。如果不進行充分的協商，外交動議將會失敗。”

But such co-operation remains a distant goal, says Mr Graham. “Southeast Asia for the US is something of a fickle audience because no one wants to get too far out in front — everyone has a different idea of the sweet spot they’d like to occupy between the US and China.”

但格雷厄姆表示，達成此類合作目標依然遙遙無期。“對美國來說，東南亞是反覆無常的觀衆，因爲沒有人希望衝得太靠前——對於自己應該在中美之間佔據什麼位置纔是最好的，各方有不同看法”。