美國對華爲的擔憂究竟從何而來?大綱

Concerns about the potential for a national security threat posed by the Chinese networking concern Huawei have been simmering at a low intensity for some time. They burst out into the full glare of publicity today with the release of a report by the House Intelligence Committee saying that Huawei and another Chinese telecom-equipment concern, ZTE, pose sufficient security risks that government agencies should avoid buying their equipment.
關於中國電信網絡提供商華爲技術有限公司(Huawei Technologies Co.)可能對美國國家安全構成威脅的擔憂已經不溫不火地持續了一段時間。如今，由於美國衆議院情報委員會發布的一份報告，此類擔憂急劇升溫併成爲公衆關注的焦點。這份報告稱，華爲和另一家中國電信設備公司中興通訊股份有限公司(ZTE Corp., 簡稱:中興通訊)對美國國家安全構成了風險，爲此政府機構應該避免購買這兩家公司的設備。

There aren't a lot of specifics to get excited about in the 52-page report, though there are presumably some items of interest in classified portions of the report not released to the public. Huawei has had a difficult time showing to the satisfaction of Western sensibilities that its ties to China's People's Liberation Army are severed. If ordered, the thinking goes, Huawei gear could be turned into a valuable espionage tool in the event of war with the U.S. or another country.
這份長達52頁的報告中並沒有提供很多值得興奮的具體信息，不過，報告中未向公衆發佈的保密部分可能會有一些讓人饒有興趣的東西。華爲表明自己與中國人民解放軍的關係已經斷絕的努力一直難以讓西方人滿意。美國國會認爲，如果訂購華爲的設備，在中國與美國或其他國家交戰的時候，這些設備可能成爲重要的間諜工具。

The concerns on the part of U.S. lawmakers and the national security establishment are certainly valid, but not for the reasons you think. While Chinese actors have certainly been among the most active when it comes to attacking the networks of large U.S. corporations and stealing their secrets, the U.S. and its allies fret about letting Huawei in because they know from their own experience how imported electronics can be turned into a weapon of espionage and outright sabotage.
美國議員的擔憂和有關國家安全的說法毫無疑問是成立的，但原因並非你所想的那樣。儘管在攻擊美國大型公司的網絡和竊取這些公司的機密方面，中國參與者毫無疑問屬於最活躍的一羣，美國及其盟友不願讓華爲進入美國是因爲他們自己的經驗告訴他們，進口的電子設備可以成爲進行間諜和破壞活動的武器。

Remember that it was intelligence agencies of the U.S., in partnership with Israel, that turned deep knowledge of the numerous variants of Microsoft's Windows operating system combined with specialized knowledge of industrial control systems to create the Stuxnet worm that damaged the Iranian nuclear research program. Later discoveries included other U.S.-Israeli cyber weapons called Flame and Gauss. Taken together, they amount to evidence that the countries had mounted a less-than-covert military campaign against Iran that could in time have significant unintended consequences.
人們應該記得，正是美國的情報機構與以色列合作，憑藉對微軟Windows操作系統各種版本的深入瞭解以及對工業控制系統的專業知識，才創造了蠕蟲病毒震網(Stuxnet)，並利用這種病毒破壞了伊朗的核研究項目。人們後來還發現了美國和以色列製造的其他網絡武器，如Flame和Gauss。所有這些證據表明，這兩個國家已經發動了針對伊朗的不那麼隱祕的軍事行動，這些行動最終可能引發始料未及的後果。

Prior efforts include a largely forgotten 1982 campaign of electronic sabotage against the natural gas pipeline being built by the Soviet Union that caused so large an explosion that U.S. military forces briefly thought it was an early sign of a nuclear attack. The episode was documented in the book 'At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War' by Thomas Reed, the late former secretary of the Air Force under President Reagan.
人們很可能已經忘了1982年發生的針對蘇聯天然氣管道進行的電子設備破壞行動，這次行動引發了大規模的爆炸，以至於美國軍隊一時以爲這是核襲擊的早期信號。這個情節被記錄在了《在深淵：一名知情者講述的冷戰史》(At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War)一書中，作者是已故的里根時代前空軍部長裏德(Thomas Reed)。

Another incident, this one not as well documented but the subject of a great deal of informed speculation, concerns a 2007 Israeli air strike against what was at the time a suspected nuclear weapons research facility in Syria. A report by the IEEE Spectrum the following year traced reports that a French chip company that supplied the manufacturer of Syrian radar defense gear included a 'kill switch' that allowed Israeli bombers to carry out their attack undetected.
另一起事件則沒有被很好地記錄下來，不過這件事也引發了諸多消息靈通人士的猜測。2007年以色列空軍襲擊了當時被懷疑是核武器研究機構的敘利亞的一處設施。第二年，《IEEE波譜雜誌》(IEEE Spectrum)的一篇報道追蹤到的消息顯示，一家法國芯片公司提供給敘利亞的雷達防禦設備中包含一個“切斷開關”(kill switch)，使敘利亞無法監測到以色列轟炸機正在執行的襲擊活動。

So it's not from out of nowhere that such national security concerns arise about a Chinese telecom concern.
因此，擔心中國的一家電信公司可能威脅國家安全並非空穴來風。One fundamental failure of all this official hand-wringing is that it neglects the fact that many if not most of the components, with the exception of certain higher-value chips like those from Intel, are manufactured in China. Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks in the U.S., Alcatel-Lucent in France and Ericsson in Sweden, all use Chinese-made parts and carry out at least some portion of the final assembly of their equipment in China.
美國官方對國家安全威脅的擔憂存在一處根本性的疏忽，那就是它忽視了這樣一個事實，即除英特爾(Intel)芯片等某些價值更高的芯片外，很多、甚至可以說大部分電信設備組件都是在中國製造的。美國的思科系統(Cisco Systems)和瞻博網絡(Juniper Networks)、法國的阿爾卡特朗訊(Alcatel-Lucent)和瑞典的愛立信(Ericsson)都使用中國生產的零部件，並且設備的最終組裝至少有部分是在中國進行的。

Huawei certainly hasn't done itself any favors. While its most senior U.S. employee described the company as 'an open book' in a surprisingly short segment on CBS's '60 Minutes' last night (see the video below), its founder and chief executive, Ren Zhengfei, has never sat for an interview with a Western media outlet. And the precise ownership of the company's shares are murky. U.S. regulators have prevented it from making certain acquisitions, and in Australia it was blocked from bidding on portions of a project to build a national broadband Internet network.
華爲無疑也沒有給自己帶來任何助益。儘管在週日晚間CBS電視臺“60分鐘”(60 Minutes)節目一個出奇短的環節中，華爲級別最高的美國員工將該公司描述爲一個“讓人一目瞭然的公司”，但該公司創始人兼首席執行長任正非卻從未接受過西方媒體機構的採訪。此外，該公司股份的確切所有權也晦暗不明。美國監管機構阻止其進行某些收購，在澳大利亞，華爲被禁止競標國家寬帶網絡建設項目的部分工作。

It hasn't gotten to be the world's largest telecom equipment concern for nothing. Wireless phone networks in Africa rely heavily on inexpensive gear sold by Huawei. There are suspicions about its dealings in this area too, though they are mostly economic. Huawei has a history of undercutting Western rivals in competitive bids by as much as 5 percent to 15 percent, raising suspicion that it is the benefactor of state-sponsored subsidies. However, it's also to the benefit of these rivals to stoke the national security concerns as much as possible.
華爲成爲世界上最令人擔憂的電信設備公司自有原因。非洲的手機網絡嚴重依賴華爲銷售的低價設備。有人還對華爲在非洲的業務表示懷疑，不過大部分是經濟方面的懷疑。華爲歷來在競標時出價比西方競爭對手最多可低5%至15%，這令人懷疑該公司是政府補貼的受益者。不過，這些競爭對手也會從儘可能地爲國家安全擔憂推波助瀾中獲得好處。

All told, it's not as though there is no reason to be suspicious of Huawei, if only because the U.S. and its allies know too well from their own actions in recent years about the potential for electronic espionage, surveillance and warfare.
總之，華爲並非毫無值得懷疑的地方，美國及其盟友從近年來自身行動中就已經深刻理解到了可能出現的電子間諜、偵察和戰爭。

For its part, Huawei defended itself and attacked the report in a response today (read it in full here). The company said the committee's report, an 11-month effort, 'failed to provide clear information or evidence to substantiate the legitimacy of the Committee's concerns' and 'appears to have been committed to a predetermined outcome' and 'employs many rumors and speculations to prove non-existent accusations.'
華爲週一爲自己進行辯護，在一份迴應中對美國會報告進行了反擊。該公司說，委員會經過11個月的調查得出的報告未提供明確信息或證據來證明委員會的擔憂是合理的，報告似乎是在爲預先設定的結論自圓其說，使用了很多傳言和猜測來證明無端的指控。

Without having read the classified portions of the report, which are said to contain more specifics - it mentions only vague instances of 'beaconing,' which is intended to mean sending data back to China - it's hard to argue with Huawei's position.
在未看到報告保密部分內容的情況下（據說包括更多詳情），很難反駁華爲的立場。報告只提到一些隱約的“信標”活動，“信標”活動指的是向中國傳回數據。

Nor is it easy to dismiss the committee's fears out of hand. Which brings us to the possible unintended result of all this: Might China respond with its own restrictions against U.S. telecom firms like Cisco and Juniper? Is this the first shot of a telecom trade war? We'll see.
當然，我們也難以完全忽略委員會的擔憂。這就讓我們可能面臨這樣一種意想不到的結果：中國是否可能做出迴應，針對思科和瞻博網絡等美國電信公司推出限制措施？這是否意味着一場電信貿易戰打響了第一槍？我們將拭目以待。

If that happens, expect Cisco to be hurt more than Huawei. U.S. sales account for only 4 percent of its overall revenue, whereas Cisco's operations in Asia, the Pacific Rim and China account for more than 16 percent, and China was its second fastest-growing market in that region after Japan.
如果發生電信貿易戰，預計思科將比華爲更受傷。美國銷售額僅佔華爲總收入的4%，而亞洲、環太平洋地區和中國業務卻佔了思科總業務的16%以上。此外，中國是思科在該地區僅次於日本的增長速度第二大快的市場。