如何修補奧巴馬主義的不足

Jeffrey Goldberg’s brilliantly composed portrait of Barack Obama’s foreign policy mindset in the The Atlantic is a landmark achievement. It also helps to explain why the US is today a halting and uncertain power in global politics.

傑弗裏•戈德堡(Jeffrey Goldberg)在《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic)中對巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)外交政策思維的精彩描述，是一項具有里程碑意義的成就。它還有助於解釋美國現在爲何變成了全球政治中一個遲疑不決且不確定的大國。

Mr Obama will leave office with important international achievements in place, among them the Iran deal, a historic climate change pact and the Asia and Europe trade agreements. He has also conducted himself with grace and dignity in office.

奧巴馬卸任時，將在身後留下國際事務方面的一系列重要成就，包括伊朗核協議、具有歷史意義的氣候變化協議、以及美國與亞洲和歐洲的貿易協議。此外他在任時一直表現得大度和莊重。

The US president was right to focus his conversations with Mr Goldberg on perhaps the most difficult question in American foreign policy: when should presidents order the military to intervene in wars beyond our borders and when should they not? In doing so, however, he seems determined to contest principles that recent presidents have found vitally important in the exercise of American power. Here is where the emerging “Obama Doctrine” often comes up short.

這位美國總統在與戈德堡的談話中聚焦於美國外交政策中可能最困難的問題，即：總統何時應該命令軍隊干預發生在境外的戰爭，何時又不應該？他將談話的重點放在這個問題上是對的。然而，在這麼做的過程中，他似乎打定主意要挑戰美國最近幾屆總統認爲在發揮美國影響力過程中至關重要的原則。以下就是新誕生的“奧巴馬主義”(Obama Doctrine)往往不完善的地方。

We know that American diplomacy is most often effective when it is backed by a strong military. This is why Mr Obama’s defence of his decision to pull back from striking Syrian military targets in 2013, after having drawn a “red line” against Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, is so troubling. He rejects the notion that his restraint diminished US credibility in the region.

我們知道，美國外交通常在得到強大的軍隊支持時最有效。這就是爲何奧巴馬爲他2013年的一項決定所做的辯護如此令人困擾的原因。那一年，在巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)逾越了美國劃出的“紅線”、使用化學武器後，奧巴馬卻決定放棄打擊敘利亞的軍事目標。如今，他否認這種看法：他當初的剋制削弱了美國在該地區的可信度。

However much Mr Obama may believe the old rules do not apply, it is an ancient truth that a great power has to back up its threats if it wishes to be respected by its friends and feared by its adversaries.

不管奧巴馬有多麼相信舊的規則不適用，這仍是一個古老的真理：如果一個大國希望得到友邦的尊敬並讓對手恐懼，它必須讓自己的威脅算數。

If Mr Obama did not intend to honour his threat, he should never have made it. The result was inevitable — American credibility is undeniably diminished in the Middle East, while that of Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been enhanced.

如果奧巴馬不打算言出必行，那麼他原本就不應說出威脅的話。結果是不可避免的：美國在中東的可信度毋庸置疑地削弱了，而弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領導的俄羅斯的可信度卻提高了。

We also know that America’s vast network of alliances and security partnerships in Europe and Asia is a key element of its global strength. That is why the president’s criticism of two of America’s closest allies, Britain and France, as “free riders” in their prosecution of Nato’s Libya campaign in 2011 was so counterproductive.

我們還知道，美國在歐亞的巨大盟友和防務夥伴網絡，是美國全球實力的關鍵因素。正因如此，奧巴馬對英國和法國的批評產生了巨大的反作用。奧巴馬稱美國的這兩個最親密盟友在2011年北約(Nato)利比亞行動的執行中“搭便車”。

Americans sometimes forget that the US military accounts for roughly 75 per cent of all Nato defence spending. It may not be fair but Nato has always been a US-led alliance. The real mistake in Libya was Mr Obama’s decision to allow the US to take a secondary role in an important Nato mission for the first time in its history.

美國有時會忘記，美國軍隊開支約佔北約全部國防支出的75%。這或許不公平，但北約一直是一個以美國爲首的聯盟。發生在利比亞的真正錯誤，是奧巴馬決定讓美國在北約一項重要任務中發揮次要作用，這是歷史上頭一次。

US presidents have also learnt that it almost never works to embarrass a friend publicly. Mr Obama’s remarks about the Saudi royal family were inappropriate. He should have directed his darts not at America’s friends but at its true adversaries — Iran, Hizbollah, the Syrian government and Russia. You should argue with your allies behind closed doors rather than in the press.

美國的總統們還有一個教訓是，公開讓友邦難堪幾乎從沒起作用過。奧巴馬有關沙特皇室家族的言論是不合適的。他本不應把美國的朋友當成靶子，而是應瞄準美國真正的對手：伊朗、真主黨 (Hizbollah)、敘利亞政府和俄羅斯。你應該與盟友私下理論，而不是在媒體上鬥嘴。

The US is not fated to fall from grace in the decades ahead but much will depend on the determination of its leaders. To paraphrase John F Kennedy, America can be as big as it wants. Mr Obama’s emphasis on what the US should not do rather than on what it should, suggests the limitations he has placed on policy.

美國並非註定要在未來幾十年衰落，但這將在很大程度上取決於美國領導人的決心。套用約翰•肯尼迪(John F Kennedy)的話，美國有多大雄心，就可以有多偉大。奧巴馬關注的是美國不應做什麼，而不是美國應該做什麼，這表明他對政策施加的侷限。

He is right about one thing, however: this is a time to return to diplomacy. He still has time to present a larger, more expansive view of what America can and should achieve in the world. It would be reassuring, though, if the president acknowledged that combining diplomacy with military strength is not a relic from an antiquated “Washington playbook”. On the contrary, it is the surest way for a great power to find success and peace in a complicated and dangerous world.

不過，他有一點是正確的：現在是迴歸外交的時候了。他仍有時間就美國在這個世界上能夠以及應該實現的成就，提出一種更有意義且更全面的觀點。然而，如果奧巴馬承認，把外交與軍事實力結合起來並非從過時的“華盛頓手冊”(Washington playbook)中找出來的老古董，這將讓人放心。相反，把外交與軍事實力結合起來，是一個大國在複雜且危險的世界裏找到成功與和平的最保險途徑。