得不償失的工業間諜活動
Normally, economists do not measure the antics of spies.
正常情況下，經濟學家不會衡量間諜行爲有多愚蠢可笑。
But these are not entirely normal times; or not as far as the American business community and US Department of Justice is concerned.
但現在並非完全正常的時期；或者說，至少對美國企業界和美國司法部(DoJ)而言是不正常的。
In recent months, the DoJ has pursued cases where American officials think that spies for China have been stealing commercial secrets from American companies.
最近幾個月，美國司法部一直在追查中國間諜案，美國官員們認爲，爲中國工作的間諜在竊取美國公司的商業機密。
This year, for example, the FBI apprehended Allen Ho, an American national born in Taiwan, and accused him of stealing nuclear technology for the state-owned China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN has stirred up controversy because it is one of the investors in the planned UK nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point).
例如，今年美國聯邦調查局(FBI)拘押了在臺灣出生的美國公民何則雄(Allen Ho)，指控他爲中國國有的中廣核集團(China General Nuclear Power Group)竊取核技術（中廣核引發爭議，因爲它是英國擬議中的欣克利角(Hinkley Point)核電站的投資者之一）。
Separately, the DoJ and FBI have accused Chinese-born nationals of stealing know-how from advanced underwater vehicle technology to military-grade carbon fibre.
另外，美國司法部和聯邦調查局指控華裔美國人竊取各種專業技術，從先進的水下潛航器技術到軍用級碳纖維。
They have even chased spies who tried to steal the technique for using titanium dioxide to make consumer goods appear ultra-white; this technology, owned by DuPont, is used for items ranging from the filling in Oreo biscuits to tennis court lines.
他們甚至追查一些間諜試圖竊取利用二氧化鈦讓消費品看上去顯得超白的技術；這種技術由杜邦(DuPont)擁有，用於各種產品，從奧利奧餅乾(Oreo)的餡料到網球場邊線。
US security officials say this is just the tip of an espionage iceberg — one that has forced the DoJ to switch its attention from traditional sleuthing to a keener focus on industrial spying.
美國安全官員們表示，這只是間諜活動的冰山一角，大量間諜活動已迫使美國司法部將注意力從傳統偵查轉向更密切關注工業間諜活動。
As John Carlin, assistant attorney-general for national security, observes : We still do the traditional spy cases.
負責國家安全事務的美國助理總檢察官約翰.卡林(John Carlin)認爲：我們仍在偵查傳統的間諜案件。
But a lot of the cases now are not traditional espionage, insofar as they’re not necessarily a trained member of the other country’s spy service.
但現在很多案件並非傳統間諜案，因爲涉案人員不一定是其他國家間諜組織受過訓練的成員。
Instead, they’re getting the information by cyber-enabled means or stealing it by bribing an insider.
他們通過網絡手段獲得信息或者通過收買內部人士竊取信息。
What has hitherto been missing from the DoJ policy shift, however, is a sense of economics.
然而，就美國司法部的政策變動而言，此前被忽視的一點是經濟學評估。
Although the FBI has estimated that industrial espionage costs American companies $19bn a year, nobody has examined the other side of the balance sheet: the impact on Chinese companies or anyone else.
儘管聯邦調查局估計，工業間諜每年給美國企業帶來190億美元的損失，但沒有人考察這個資產負債表的另一面：對中國企業或者其他方面的影響。
Business leaders and politicians should look at fascinating work just published by economists Albrecht Glitz and Erik Meyersson.
企業高管和政治人士應看看經濟學家亞伯雷希.格列茨(Albrecht Glitz)和埃裏克.邁爾森(Erik Meyersson)剛剛發表的一篇引人入勝的論文。
They examined the impact of one of the best-documented and systematically organised pieces of industrial espionage ever seen: the campaign by the East German Stasi to steal secrets from West German companies between 1969 and 1989.
他們考察了迄今記錄最完整、系統化有組織的工業間諜活動之一：1969年至1989年東德情報和祕密警察機構史塔西(Stasi)從西德公司竊取商業機密。
The researchers crunched 151,854 pieces of information in Stasi files that informants took from West German businesses.
研究人員研究了史塔西檔案中的15.1854萬條信息，這些信息是線人從西德公司獲取的。
All were sorted into 16 categories, of which office appliances, computing and electronics was the largest.
這些信息被分成16類，其中辦公室用具、電腦和電子產品最多。
The data were compared with statistics about East German productivity then adjusted to remove impact from indigenous innovation (or ideas which were not stolen).
研究人員把這些數據與東德生產率數據進行了對比，然後做出調整，排除了自主創新（或者並非來自竊取的創意）的影響。
Their conclusions are that East German companies enjoyed big productivity gains from spying.
他們的結論是，東德公司從間諜活動獲得大幅生產率提升。
For the East German economy, the immediate returns to industrial espionage were substantial.
對於東德經濟而言，工業間諜活動取得了立竿見影的顯著回報。
This is chilling for American companies.
這將令美國企業不寒而慄。
It also offers easy ammunition for China-bashing US politicians such as Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee.
它也爲敲打中國的美國政治人士提供現成的彈藥，例如共和黨總統提名人唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)。
But there is an important twist.
但這裏有一個重要的情節轉折。
After the Berlin Wall came down, East German industry collapsed.
在柏林牆倒下後，東德工業很快瓦解。
Economists have blamed this on problems such as an uncompetitive exchange rate.
經濟學家們一直將其歸咎於不具競爭力的匯率等問題。
Mr Glitz and Mr Meyersson by contrast suggest that, because the Stasi was addicted to industrial espionage, East German companies did not pay enough attention to original research and development.
相比之下，格列茨和邁爾森認爲，由於史塔西沉迷於工業間諜活動，東德公司沒有對原創研發投入足夠多的關注。
They conclude that spying may have proved productive [for East Germany] in catching up with its capitalist neighbours under a communist regime because it was done on such an industrial scale.
他們總結稱，間諜活動在幫助東德在共產黨政權統治下趕上資本主義鄰國方面可能被證明爲具有成效，因爲它是以工業規模展開的。
Yet in the long run this espionage actually hurt the economy.
然而，長遠來看，這種間諜活動實際上會損害經濟。
Could this happen in the case of the US and China? The academic research is limited and the parallels are not exact.
就美國與中國而言，是否可能會發生同樣的情況？這方面的學術研究有限，對比也不完美契合。
China has sophisticated intellectual capital of its own and is a vastly more successful economy than East Germany was.
中國本身擁有強大的智力資本，而且遠比當年的東德經濟成功。
Nevertheless, the next time Donald Trump, or anyone else, accuses China of stealing jobs and ideas, it is worth remembering this thought-provoking moral.
然而，下次當唐納德.特朗普（或者其他任何人）指責中國竊取就業和創意時，我們有必要記住這個發人深省的故事。
Yes, industrial espionage provides for powerful political rhetoric.
沒錯，工業間諜活動提供了強有力的政治說辭。
And, yes, it is likely to create drama at the DoJ in coming months.
同樣沒錯的是，它可能會在未來幾個月在美國司法部製造戲劇。
It has also hurt some US companies, as well as groups in Europe, Japan and South Korea.
它還損害了一些美國公司以及歐洲、日本和韓國的企業。
But, in the long run, a country’s best economic weapon is its ability to keep producing new ideas, over and over again.
然而，長遠來看，一國最好的經濟武器是不斷產生新創意的能力。
American politicians should feel both comforted and challenged.
美國政治人士應該既爲此感到欣慰，也有受到挑戰的憂患意識。
