中國的民營企業像地溝油一樣可怕?

China's private businessmen are always beMoaning the fact that in the eyes of the state- run banking sector, they are chopped liver.

中國民營企業家經常抱怨，在國有銀行眼裏，他們就像是雜碎。

These days, with the economy showing more than a few signs of stress, maybe they're more like gutter oil, the much reviled second-hand cooking oil recovered from gutters and waste bins: Something that should be avoided at all costs if you care about your health.

現在隨着經濟顯現出不少困難跡象，或許他們更像是地溝油。地溝油是從下水道和垃圾桶裏面回收的二手食用油，人見人恨，如果你關心自己的健康，那應該是避之惟恐不及的。

Some 600 private enterprises, feeling the financial pinch amid a global economic slowdown, have petitioned the government in east China's Zhejiang province for help - saying that their bankers have been calling in loans and refusing to extend fresh credit, according to local media. They are pushing for three years of no cutbacks in lending.

據中國媒體報道，約600名在全球經濟減速之際遇到財務困難的民營企業家已上書浙江省政府求援，說銀行催促還款並拒絕發放新貸款。他們希望三年內不要降低貸款額度。

They are not the only ones who see official neglect - if not outright disdain - from the banking system for smaller firms.

見識到銀行系統對中小企業視而不見（如果不是公然藐視的話）的不只是他們。

'Smaller companies are just not getting loans,' said Liu Kegu, a researcher who as a former vice president of the state-run China Development Bank should know. These commercial minnows are often seen as a greater risk than state firms or too small to merit a bank's attention.

研究人員劉克崮說，中小企業就是拿不到貸款。作爲前國家開發銀行(China Development Bank)副行長，他應該是深有體會。銀行常常覺得這些中小企業的風險高於國有企業，或覺得它們的規模太小，不值得銀行去關注。

A recent research report by Standard Chartered Bank highlights the problems of the smaller private businesses. The report, authored by bank economist Stephen Green, quoted an unidentified Chinese banker describing the laborious process involved in making a loan to SMEs - or small- and medium-sized enterprises which are often privately owned. It also highlights how little trust there is for these companies.

渣打銀行(Standard Chartered Bank)前不久的一篇研究報告強調了小型民營企業面臨的這些問題。這份由渣打銀行經濟學家王志浩(Stephen Green)撰寫的報告引述一位沒有透露身份的中國銀行家的話，描給了給中小企業（通常也是民營企業）發放貸款需要經歷的繁瑣流程。報告還強調銀行對這些企業缺乏信心。

'Ok, so you know the SME has given you fake financials - that is usual for an SME. On our side, we need the financials to meet a number of internal hurdles too, so we go along with the financials if we think the firm is fundamentally sound. Once we have met the requirements there, we can do our own 'real' assessment. We look at the SME's utility bills and tax payments, and talk to its clients until we think we have a pretty good understanding of the borrower.'

報告中的這位銀行家說：反正你知道了，這家中小企業提供的是虛假財務報表──對於中小企業來說這是家常便飯。在我們這邊，我們也需要拿財報來滿足一些內部要求，所以如果我們覺得這家公司基本面穩固，那麼我們就接受它的財報。一旦滿足內部要求，我們就可以做我們自己的“真實”評估。我們看這家企業的水電賬單和納稅記錄，找它的客戶瞭解情況，直到我們認爲對這家借款人有了比較充分的瞭解。

The banker then goes on to say:

這位銀行家接着說：

'If we are OK, we will pass the local application to our credit people. The credit people then of course discount the sales and profit numbers by up to 60%, since they believe that most SMEs inflate their financials by such an amount.'

我們如果覺得可以，就會把申請轉給信用評估人員。然後，信用評估人員當然要把銷售額和利潤打個折，最高六折，因爲他們相信多數中小企業都會以這麼大的幅度虛報財務數字。

At the end of the banker's sad tale, the SME doesn't get the loan. Chopped liver or gutter oil - it's a toss up.

這個悲傷故事的結局，是那家中小企業沒有申請到貸款。雜碎？地溝油？或許都有可能。

Chinese officials have been talking up the need to get credits to these smaller companies but this is hard to do even when times aren't so tough. The state-run banks tend to look first to the state sector while other potential borrowers go to the back of the queue.

中國官員一直在強調爲這些中小企業提供貸款的必要性，然而即使是在形勢沒有現在這樣惡劣的時候，這也是一件難辦的事情。國有銀行往往先了解國有企業的情況，其他潛在借款人則不得不排到隊尾。

From the bank's point of view there are plenty of loans to small, private companies that are already at risk as China's economic growth slows. So far the national figures for the banking system have not shown any alarming trends in the bad debt department. Non-performing loans were a measly - and one might say suspicious-looking - 0.9% at the end of the second quarter, unchanged from the end of the first quarter, according to the China Banking Regulatory Commission. But regional and local figures are moving higher, particularly in places like Zhejiang, a hub of export-oriented private enterprise that is highly sensitive to fluctuations in the global economy.

從銀行的角度來看，隨着中國經濟減速，已經有很多貸給小型民營企業的款項面臨着風險。到目前爲止，銀行系統的全國性數據還沒有顯示出不良貸款方面出現值得警惕的趨勢。據中國銀行業監督管理委員會的數據，第二季度末不良貸款率才0.9%，顯得微不足道（也可以說是讓人生疑）。但區域數據和地方數據正在走高，特別是在浙江等地。浙江集中了一批出口型民營企業，它們對全球經濟的波動十分敏感。

The state-run China Construction Bank, reporting its first-half results, said its bad loans actually dropped to 1% as of June from 1.09% at the end of last year. More tellingly the bank, China's second-largest by assets, showed a 33% increase in loans that had interest payments that were more than three months late. That points to problems ahead.

中國第二大銀行（按資產規模計）中國建設銀行(China Construction Bank)在報告上半年業績時說，6月份不良貸款率實際上已從去年年底的1.09%下降到1%。更能說明問題的是，建行付息逾期三個月以上的貸款增加了33%，預示着將來會有問題出現。

Chen Zuofu, a vice president at China Construction Bank, warned this week that the bank's non-performing loans rose rapidly in the Yangtze River Delta in the first half of this year, adding that in some parts of Zhejiang, the bank's non-performing loan ratio topped 2%, hardly a critical level but perhaps a sign of more problems to come.

中國建設銀行副行長陳佐夫本週期警告說，今年上半年建行在長江三角洲地區的不良貸款率迅速上升，在浙江某些地區的不良貸款率超過了2%。這一水平說不上危險，但可能預示着將來會有更多問題出現。

China Citic Bank, the nation's seventh-largest lender by assets, also pointed an accusing finger at the same general region, saying that many of its bad loans were also from that area.

資產規模全國第七的中信銀行也怪罪於長三角。該行表示它的很多不良貸款也是來自這個地區。

We're likely to see more finger pointing if the economy weakens further. This could make it even tougher for smaller companies to avoid being given the gutter oil treatment.

如果經濟進一步走軟，銀行可能還會更多地把責任推給中小企業，而中小企業要避免受到地溝油式的待遇，可能就會更加困難。