民主的危機與煽動家的逆襲
Are the political upheavals of 2016 — Brexit and America’s election of Donald Trump — a triumph of democracy or a threat to it? Democracies must respond to legitimate grievances.
2016年的政治動盪——英國退歐和唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)當選美國總統——是民主的勝利還是對民主的威脅？民主政體必須對合法的抱怨做出迴應。
Indeed, their ability to do so peacefully is among their strengths.
實際上，有能力和平迴應是它們的長處之一。
But the demagogue’s exploitation of such grievances threatens democracy.
但煽動家利用此類抱怨的做法威脅到了民主。
This has happened elsewhere.
其他地方已經出現了這種情況。
It would be foolish to assume western democracies are immune.
認爲西方民主政體不會受影響將是愚蠢的。
In 2016, fear and anger became dominant political emotions in the UK and the US — two of the most important, stable and enduring democracies.
2016年，擔憂和憤怒主導了英國和美國這兩個最重要、穩定、悠久的民主政體的政治情緒。
The fear was over downward mobility and cultural changes; the anger was against immigrants and indifferent elites.
擔憂是圍繞向下流動(downward mobility)和文化變遷，而憤怒是針對移民和冷漠的精英。
They came together in resurgent nationalism and xenophobia.
它們匯聚爲捲土重來的民族主義和仇外主義。
Some Brexiters and Republicans believe in the ideal of absolutely free markets.
一些英國退歐派人士和共和黨人相信絕對自由市場理念，
But that idea did not bring Brexit to the UK or Mr Trump to Washington.
但這種理念不會讓英國退歐或者讓特朗普當選總統。
The emotions were far more visceral and less attractive.
擔憂和憤怒要深刻得多，也更不吸引人。
For democrats, the outburst of such primal emotions is disturbing because they are so hard to contain.
對民主主義者而言，此類原始情緒的爆發之所以令人擔憂是因爲它們很難遏制。
Democracy is at bottom a civilised form of civil war.
民主政體本質上是一種文明的內戰。
It is a struggle for power contained by understandings and institutions.
它是一種受諒解和制度制約的權力爭鬥。
The understandings are that winners never take all.
諒解是贏家永遠不會拿走一切。
Opposition is legitimate, opinion free and power curbed.
反對派是合法的，可以自由表達觀點而且權力受到限制。
The values of the citizenry are a democracy’s most important asset.
公民價值觀是民主政體最重要的資產。
They must understand in their bones that it is illegitimate to make temporary power permanent by rigging elections, suppressing contrary opinions or harassing the opposition.
他們必須發自內心地明白，通過操縱選舉、打擊異見或者騷擾反對派讓臨時權力永久化是不合法的。
There exists no such thing as the people; this is an imaginary entity.
不存在什麼人民，這是想象出來的實體。
There are merely citizens whose choices not only may, but surely will, change.
只有公民，而他們的選擇不僅可能、而且必然會改變。
While a way must be found to aggregate those views, it will always be defective.
儘管必須找到方法整合公民的觀點，但始終會有缺陷。
Ultimately, democracy, or a democratic republic, provides a way for people with different views and even cultures to live side by side in reasonable harmony.
最終，民主政體或者民主共和國爲不同觀點乃至不同文化的人們提供了較爲和諧地比鄰而居的方式。
Yet institutions matter, too, because they set the rules of the game.
然而，制度也同樣重要，因爲它們設定了遊戲規則。
Institutions may also fail.
制度也可能失效。
The US electoral college has failed doubly.
美國選舉人團制度已經在兩方面失效。
Its selection of Mr Trump neither accords with the votes cast in the election nor reflects judgment of the candidate’s merits, as desired by Alexander Hamilton.
它促使特朗普當選不僅與選舉中的投票數不符，而且也沒有反映出亞歷山大.漢密爾頓(Alexander Hamilton)想要的那種對候選人德行的判斷。
This founding father argued that the college would both guard against the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils and ensure the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.
這位開國之父指出，選舉人團既會防範外國勢力想在我們議會中獲得不當影響力之心，又會確保總統之位永遠不會落到並非具備必要素質的傑出者那種人手裏。
The charges of Russian hacking and Mr Trump’s evident defects of experience, judgment and character show that the college has not proved the bulwark Mr Hamilton hoped for.
對俄羅斯黑客行爲的指控以及特朗普在經驗、判斷和性格上的明顯缺陷表明，選舉人團制度沒能佐證漢密爾頓希望的那種保障作用。
It is up to other institutions — notably, Congress, courts and media — and the citizens at large now to do so.
現在基本上只能依靠其他制度（尤其是國會、法庭和媒體）以及公民。
The more powerful the passions and the more uncontained the ambitions, the more likely the democratic system will collapse into despotism.
煽動家越是熱情洋溢和野心勃勃，民主體制就越有可能淪爲專制統治。
Demagogues are the Achilles heel of democracy.
煽動家是民主的軟肋。
There is even is a standard demagogic playbook.
現在甚至還出現了標準的煽動劇本。
Whether of left or right, they present themselves as representatives of the common people against elites and unworthy outsiders; make a visceral connection with followers as charismatic leaders; manipulate that connection for their own advancement, frequently by lying egregiously; and threaten established rules of conduct and constraining institutions as enemies of the popular will that they embody.
無論是左翼還是右翼，他們都標榜自己是反精英的大衆代表和不合適的局外人，並作爲魅力領導人與追隨者密切聯繫，他們往往通過彌天大謊來操縱這種聯繫，用以謀求自己的進步；他們威脅既有的行爲準則和約束性制度，把這些準則和制度描述爲他們所代表的民意的敵人。
Mr Trump is almost a textbook demagogue.
特朗普幾乎是教科書式的煽動家。
Nigel Farage, former leader of the UK Independence party, has not advanced so far because it has proved harder to capture the UK’s party-based institutions than it is the US presidency.
英國獨立黨(UKIP)前領袖傑爾.法拉奇(Nigel Farage)略遜一疇，就是因爲事實證明攻破英國基於黨派的制度比美國總統選舉更難。
Yet there are similarities between the demagogic elements of the Brexit campaign and the rise of Mr Trump.
然而，英國退歐運動和特朗普崛起中的煽動因素存在相似之處。
For both, opponents are enemies rather than fellow citizens who think differently.
對兩者而言，反對派是敵人而非觀點不同的同胞。
Both claim to represent the people against foreigners and traitors.
兩者都宣稱代表反對外國人和賣國賊的人民。
The demagogue’s campaign leads naturally to despotism — the tyranny of the majority that is a mask on the tyranny of one.
煽動家的運動自然導致了專制統治——多數人的暴政掩蓋了一個人的暴政。
As institutions are brought under dictatorial control, the opposition is driven into rebellion or acquiescence.
由於制度是在專制統治下制定的，那麼反對派就會被迫反叛或者順從。
Despots use the former as an excuse for repression and the latter to demand absolute obedience.
獨裁者利用前者作爲鎮壓的藉口，利用後者要求絕對服從。
A host of examples of the demagogic route to power exists, in both past and present.
無論是過去還是現在，都有一系列通過煽動攥取權力的例子。
Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler are case studies of demagogues turned into despots.
貝尼託.墨索里尼(Benito Mussolini)和阿道夫.希特勒(Adolf Hitler)就是煽動家變身獨裁者的經典例子。
It is not hard to think of recent examples, from Hugo Chávez to Viktor Orban and Vladimir Putin.
最近的例子也比比皆是，從烏戈.查韋斯(Hugo Chávez)到歐爾班.維克托(Viktor Orban)和弗拉基米爾.普京(Vladimir Putin)。
