國際時事:埃及政變的餘波

It was not just the tumultuous crowds in Tahrir Square that cheered last week’s implosion of Mohamed Morsi and mainstream Islamism in the Arab world’s most populous country. As the coup d’état in Cairo unfolded, Bashar al-Assad was doing a war dance on the Muslim Brotherhood’s grave.

埃及總統穆罕默德•穆爾西(Mohamed Morsi)被罷黜，阿拉伯世界人口最多國家的主流伊斯蘭主義發生內爆，這些事引發的歡呼聲不僅來自開羅解放廣場(Tahrir Square)上喧囂的抗議人羣。隨着埃及政變的爆發，敘利亞總統巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)在穆斯林兄弟會(Muslim Brotherhood)的墳墓上跳起慶祝勝利的舞蹈。

“What is happening in Egypt is the fall of what is known as political Islam,” the Syrian president gloated to a newspaper mouthpiece of his regime, which is locked in savage combat with a rebellion that is being hijacked by Sunni Islamist groups.

阿薩德幸災樂禍地對其政權的喉舌報紙表示：“埃及正在發生的事情，是所謂‘政治伊斯蘭’(political Islam)的垮臺。”阿薩德政權正與叛軍陷入一場野蠻戰爭，這場反叛正被遜尼派伊斯蘭主義團體劫持。

There is no doubt the pan-Islamist Brotherhood, a mythic movement since its foundation in 1928, has spectacularly self-destructed barely a year after Mr Morsi was elected president by a narrow majority.

毫無疑問，泛伊斯蘭主義的穆兄會在穆爾西以微弱多數當選總統一年後，引人注目地自我毀滅了。自1928年創建以來，穆兄會一直是一個神祕組織。

The Islamist political bandwagon, which picked up speed once the Arab spring upheavals placed the Brotherhood and like-minded groups at or near the centre of political gravity, has definitely seized up. Does the hubris of the Brotherhood in the land of its birth herald a setback for political Islam across the broader Middle East?

伊斯蘭主義的政治潮流確實已經碰壁。在“阿拉伯之春”抗議活動讓穆兄會和志同道合的團體處於或接近政治重心時，這股潮流曾經洶涌澎湃。穆兄會在其誕生地的驕傲自大，是否預示着“政治伊斯蘭”將在整個中東地區受挫？

The Morsi meltdown was as extraordinary as his ascent. He was only the second choice of the Brothers after Khairat al-Shater, their deputy supreme guide, was banned from running – and instead ended up as the go-to head of a shadow Brotherhood government.

穆爾西的倒臺與他當時上臺一樣不同尋常。他只是穆斯林兄弟會的第二選擇，此前，該組織副首領海拉特•沙特爾(Khairat al-Shater)被禁止參加總統競選。結果，沙特爾成了在幕後活動的穆兄會影子政府的頭頭。

These pan-Islamists, with their siren call that “Islam is the solution”, were supremely organised as a semi-underground opposition. Yet once in power they seemed unable to find the levers of governance, instead devoting energy to a march through the institutions, with loyalty and secretiveness rather than efficiency and accountability as their watchwords.

這些泛伊斯蘭主義者（他們提出的蠱惑人心的口號是“伊斯蘭是解決方案”）作爲半地下的反對派勢力時組織極其出色。然而，一旦掌權，他們似乎找不到治理的操縱桿，只能把精力投入在各個機構安插自己人，把忠誠與祕密（而非效率和責任）當作箴言。

In the chaos after the 2011 revolution that overthrew the army-backed dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak, Mr Morsi ended up in contest with an ancien regime holdover. While that meant he could only win with the support of liberals, leftists and secular youth activists, he decided against including them in a coalition for change, instead promoting a sectarian power grab behind a rambling discourse of impertinent paternalism. Mr Morsi and the Brotherhood’s biggest bet, paradoxically, was that they could co-opt the army, by ringfencing its privileges inside the Islamist-inspired constitution they rammed through in November. But the Brothers – and their gerontocrat leaders – misjudged the diversity of a young society. Egypt’s flexible generals did not make that mistake, and their action rearranged the regional furniture.

在2011年爆發革命、推翻了胡斯尼•穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)得到軍方支持的獨裁政權後的混亂局面中，穆爾西在選舉中與前政權遺留的勢力展開較量。儘管這意味着他只是在自由派、左翼勢力以及年輕的世俗活動人士的支持下才獲勝，但他決定不去團結他們，以形成一個推動改革的執政聯盟，而是在雜亂無章的、盛氣凌人的家長式話語背後，沉迷於宗派權鬥。諷刺的是，穆爾西以及穆斯林兄弟會的最大賭注是，他們可以籠絡軍方——具體手段是在去年11月強行通過以伊斯蘭主義爲藍本的憲法，保障軍方的特權，但穆兄會（及其老年領導人）錯判了一個年輕社會的多元化程度。埃及反應靈活的將軍們沒有犯這個錯誤，他們的行動重畫了該地區的版圖。

Saudi Arabia, built on an alliance of absolute monarchy and Wahhabi Muslim absolutism, greeted the coup with unusual alacrity, delighted at the failure of a rival brand which purported to combine Islam and democracy. The United Arab Emirates, in the middle of a crackdown on the Brotherhood, could scarcely contain its glee. Sultan al-Qassemi, an Emirati commentator, tweeted that “Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak tried to get rid of the Brotherhood. Only Morsi succeeded”.

建立在絕對君主制與瓦哈比派穆斯林絕對主義結盟基礎上的沙特阿拉伯，對此次政變做出了不同尋常的爽快反應，對一個號稱要將伊斯蘭與民主體制結合起來的競爭品牌的失敗感到高興。正在打擊穆兄會的阿聯酋也幾乎難以抑制喜悅。阿聯酋評論人士蘇丹•阿爾卡塞米(Sultan al-Qassemi)在微博客網站Twitter上發帖稱：“納賽爾(Nasser)、薩達特(Sadat)和穆巴拉克曾試圖除掉穆斯林兄弟會。只有穆爾西成功了。”

As the Saudis, Emiratis and Kuwait pledge $12bn to Egypt, the Brotherhood’s former financial sponsors in Qatar and Turkey look to be the main losers, as region-wide tremors ripple from Gaza to Rabat.

沙特阿拉伯、阿聯酋和科威特承諾爲埃及提供120億美元援助，穆兄會以前在卡塔爾和土耳其的財務後臺看上去將成爲主要的輸家。從加沙到拉巴特（摩洛哥城市——譯者注），整個地區都感受到餘波的震盪。

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the emir behind Qatar’s activist Arab spring policy, abdicated last month in favour of his son – who has fired a prime minister identified as sympathetic to the Brotherhood. Persistent reports say Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an influential preacher close to the Brotherhood, is no longer welcome in Doha. The gas-rich emirate is pilloried on Twitter in a caricature showing the deposed Mr Morsi scurrying towards a Qatar Airways flight under a fusillade of shoes.

曾經積極支持“阿拉伯之春”的卡塔爾國王謝赫•哈馬德•本•哈利法•阿勒薩尼(Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani)上月將王位傳給兒子，新國王已辭掉被指認爲穆兄會同情者的卡塔爾首相。不斷有報道稱，與穆兄會關係親密、頗具影響力的傳道者謝赫•阿爾卡拉達維(Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi)在卡塔爾不再受歡迎。Twitter上的一幅漫畫嘲諷天然氣儲量豐富的卡塔爾，漫畫中，被罷黜的穆爾西在衆人向他扔鞋之際，狼狽跑向卡塔爾航空(Qatar Airways)航班。

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the neo-Islamist prime minister of Turkey, who has cast his country’s lot with Syria’s rebels, was also a Morsi ally. “There cannot be such a thing as a democratic coup,” he said, mindful of the overmighty Turkish generals he has brought to heel. But like Mr Morsi, Mr Erdogan stands accused of interpreting a majority at the ballot box as authority to ride roughshod over society. For Turkey’s prime minister, last month’s Taksim Square rebellion was an internationally orchestrated prelude to a coup; unsurprisingly, he summoned all his top aides to an emergency meeting last week on the events in Cairo.

土耳其的新伊斯蘭主義者總理雷傑普•塔伊普•埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)支持敘利亞叛軍，他也曾是穆爾西的盟友。他表示：“不存在民主政變這種事。”他顯然留意着他已“搞定”的土耳其軍方。但就像穆爾西一樣，埃爾多安面臨的指責是，將贏得選舉解讀爲獲得肆意凌駕於民意之上的授權。對於土耳其總理而言，上月伊斯坦布爾塔克西姆廣場(Taksim Square)爆發的抗議活動，是一場國際勢力策劃的政變的前奏；不奇怪的是，他上週就埃及政變召集所有高級助手召開了緊急會議。

But if mainstream Islamism is found wanting in the 21st century, there is no evidence Arabs believe Wahhabism is the face of their future. The way the Saudis and their allies throw their billions of dollars around (as well as how Qatar deployed its wealth) shows they know that too – and that they are not immune to a Tahrir or a Taksim.

然而，如果說主流伊斯蘭主義在21世紀被發現存在不足，那麼也沒有證據證明，阿拉伯人認爲瓦哈比主義是面向未來的出路。從沙特阿拉伯及其盟友拋出鉅額援助的手筆（以及卡塔爾動用其財富的方式）表明，他們明白這點——他們也可能遭遇類似解放廣場或塔克西姆廣場的抗議。

They want to drive the Brothers back into the catacombs and radicalise the way Islamists view democracy, as a western trick to keep them from power. The message they want to send is what Essam al-Haddad, Mr Morsi’s foreign policy adviser, wrote on Facebook last week as the coup unfolded: that this “message will resonate throughout the Muslim world loud and clear: democracy is not for Muslims”.

他們希望把穆兄會趕下地獄，並讓伊斯蘭主義者對民主的看法變得激進，把民主視爲西方讓他們永遠不能掌權的伎倆。他們希望傳達的信息，正是穆爾西的外交政策顧問哈達德(Essam al-Haddad)在政變爆發時在Facebook上的留言：這一“信息將響亮而清晰地傳遍穆斯林世界：民主不適合穆斯林”。