塔利班意圖逆襲政界,轉型爲政黨

Any assessment of Afghanistan’s prospects must consider what the Taliban will do after western withdrawal. Most public debate typically assumes it will continue its current strategy of violent conflict, exerting influence by killing soldiers, attacking officials and seeking to take over the country. But this might be wrong.

在評估阿富汗前景時，必須考慮在西方撤離後塔利班會怎麼做。在多數公開辯論中，人們通常認爲，塔利班會沿續現行的暴力衝突戰略，通過殺害士兵、攻擊官員和謀求控制整個國家顯示自身的影響力。但這種想法可能是錯的。

The Taliban is a political organisation; it chooses its methods by taking into account a range of factors: how the public interprets its actions, what it can afford and what its operatives are willing to do. All of these factors will change as the western presence diminishes and the economy adjusts to a steady drop in foreign aid.

塔利班是個政治組織，它在選擇行動方式時會考慮一系列因素：民衆會如何解讀它的行爲？它可以承受什麼代價？以及本組織內部人員願意做些什麼？隨着西方逐步撤離以及阿富汗經濟努力適應外部援助逐漸減少的局面，所有這些因素都會發生變化。

First, the optics of attacking the Afghan National Army will change when it is no longer so obviously allied with outsiders. Right now, the Taliban can credibly claim to be attacking a foreign proxy force when it strikes out at the ANA and Afghan National Police. That claim resonates because most Afghans are given regular, tangible reminders of the foreign presence as convoys of heavily armoured foreign military vehicles festooned with weapons and sensors roll noisily through their streets. But will the claim that the ANA is a tool of foreign occupiers still resonate when Nato convoys no longer pass through villages and down the main roads? Perhaps, but it will be a much harder sell.

首先，一旦阿富汗國民軍不再明顯與外部力量結盟，塔利班攻擊這支部隊帶給人的感覺就會發生變化。目前，塔利班在襲擊阿富汗國民軍和阿富汗國民警察部隊時，可以理直氣壯地宣稱其攻擊的是一支爲外國人效命的部隊。這種說法會得到認同，因爲每當外國軍隊載滿武器和探測裝置的重型裝甲車轟隆隆地列隊駛過阿富汗街頭時，都會生動地提醒當地民衆外國勢力的存在。而當北約軍隊不再從他們的村莊中、他們的大路上穿過時，阿富汗國民軍爲外國佔領者所利用這種說法還會有人買賬嗎？也許會有，但會更難叫人信服。

Second, the Taliban will also face a very different set of challenges as key sources of foreign support dry up. Most analysts believe that the Pakistani security establishment has tolerated Afghan Taliban leaders on its soil because it viewed them as a means of forestalling the consolidation of an Indian-allied pro-American state on its northern border. But that does not mean it wants the Taliban to win power.

其次，隨着關鍵的外部支持來源中斷，塔利班還將面臨許多不同於以往的挑戰。多數分析人士認爲，巴基斯坦安全機構能夠容忍阿富汗塔利班領導人藏身巴基斯坦，是爲了防止本國北部邊境上出現一個與印度結盟並且親美的統一國家。但這不代表巴基斯坦希望塔利班掌權。

Pakistan has little to gain from an ethnocentric Pashtun state next door, especially as it is fighting a militant Pashtun movement on its own soil. As the amount of military power the Taliban needs to prevent the Kabul government from controlling southern Afghanistan drops, so too will support from Pakistan. We can also expect a decline in Pakistan’s willingness to allow the Taliban havens in the border regions.

鄰境出現一個奉行種族中心主義的普什圖國家對巴基斯坦沒什麼好處，更何況巴基斯坦在本土正在與一個激進的普什圖運動做鬥爭。塔利班阻止政府控制阿富汗南部所需的軍事力量會比以往少，但與此同時巴基斯坦對其的支持也會減少。此外，巴基斯坦容許塔利班安然盤踞邊境地區的意願想必也會下降。

Third, the Taliban will lose revenue as the western presence declines. The organisation’s finances are, of course, opaque. But, right now, the group earns money by “taxing” logistics convoys supplying its enemies and charging fees to aid organisations seeking to work in conflict-ridden areas (the latter can be indirect, with the aid agencies paying security groups who then pay protection fees). As the foreign presence draws down, funding will dry up. Moreover, the Taliban’s ability to appeal to donors to support the fight against non-Islamic invaders will shrink.

第三，隨着西方從阿富汗逐步撤出，塔利班將會失去收入來源。當然，塔利班的財務狀況是不公開的。不過該組織現在有兩條收入來源：一是向爲敵方運輸給養的後勤隊伍“抽稅”，二是向試圖在衝突多發地帶開展工作的救援組織收費——後者可能採取間接方式，即救援機構付錢給安全組織，後者再向塔利班支付保護費。隨着外國勢力逐漸撤出，以上資金來源也會枯竭。另外，塔利班也將更難用支持其抵抗非伊斯蘭入侵者的名義吸收捐款。

The changes will make it harder for the Taliban leadership to control its organisation. Press reports in 2010 and 2011 revealed that Taliban leaders in Pakistan had problems convincing mid-level commanders to fight as aggressively as they would like because the risks were so great during the US “surge”. More recent reports suggest there is scepticism among rank-and-file fighters about their leaders’ recent decision to open an office in Doha to explore reconciliation with the Afghan government. Just like any political organisation, Taliban mid-level operatives and fighters have their own interests and must be motivated to follow orders.

上述這些變化將使塔利班領導層更難以控制本組織。2010年和2011年就有媒體報道說，塔利班在巴基斯坦的領導人難以說服中層將領全力作戰，因爲在美國增兵期間形勢變得很危險。更近的報道指，普通戰士中間對於領導人近期做出的在多哈設辦公室探討與阿富汗政府和解前景的決定抱着懷疑態度。與所有政治組織一樣，塔利班中層及普通戰士也有自身利益，他們要有動力纔會服從命令。

Exactly how the Taliban leadership responds to this environment will be a critical factor in determining Afghanistan’s political future. The nascent negotiations in Qatar are an encouraging sign that the group may shift into less violent methods, using the threat of force to win policy concessions without violence. But other outcomes are possible. They could mirror the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Palestine Liberation Organisation, conducting periodic terrorist attacks to gain policy concessions. Alternatively, the Taliban could splinter as the sources of external funding that give central leaders leverage disappear. At some point, the central leadership may no longer be able to follow through on its commitments and will then become largely irrelevant as peace – or war – is made between a string of local commanders and Kabul.

塔利班領導層在這種環境下會如何行事，將是決定阿富汗政治前景的一個關鍵因素。剛開啓的卡塔爾談判是一個令人鼓舞的跡象，表明塔利班可能轉向不那麼暴力的方式，以自身擁有的力量相威脅，不訴諸暴力而取得政策上的讓步。但也可能出現其他結果。他們可能會效仿愛爾蘭共和軍臨時派(Provisional Irish Republican Army)以及巴勒斯坦解放組織(Palestine Liberation Organisation)的發展道路，不時發動恐怖襲擊，以此獲得政策讓步。還有一種可能是，隨着使塔利班核心領導層獲得權力砝碼的外部資金來源中斷，塔利班可能會走向分裂。在某個時候，核心領導層可能再也無力履行其承諾，而當一批地方指揮官和阿富汗政府走向和平或開戰，核心領導層可能會變得不那麼有分量。

The group’s leaders therefore face a narrow window of opportunity to lead the Taliban into Afghan politics. Right now, the differences between local commanders’ political interests and those of the central leadership in Pakistan are small – and the leadership still has the resources to make sure that most of its followers do, well, follow. But it must make the leap before the flow of money starts to decline and local commanders no longer see much point in following through on commitments their leaders make at the bargaining table.

因此，塔利班領導人目前有一個狹窄的機會窗口來帶領塔利班躋身阿富汗政壇。眼下，地方指揮官與身處巴基斯坦的核心領導層在政治利益上分歧不大，領導層也仍然有財力確保大多數追隨者聽命行事。但是，在資金流開始減少、地方指揮官不再認爲值得遵守領導人在談判桌上許下的承諾之前，塔利班領導層必須完成上述飛躍。

Right now, all sides have strong reasons to strike a deal and the power to enforce it. Here’s hoping they do so.

眼下，各方都有充足理由達成一項協議，也有力量將協議加以落實。但願他們會這麼做。