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薩科齊不是安倍第二

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From a distance, it may appear that the French mainstream right is on the road to political and organisational unity with Nicolas Sarkozy’s successful return to the helm of the opposition UMP. With the left in disarray and the far right National Front not – or not yet – credible enough to win, though more than strong enough to deliver a shock to the political system, the way is open for Mr Sarkozy’s comeback at the next presidential elections, non? Are we about to witness in 2017 the French equivalent of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s return to power in Japan, with a rebranding so powerful that his name became identified with a novel economic policy?

從遠處看,隨着尼古拉•薩科齊(Nicolas Sarkozy)重新執掌反對黨——人民運動聯盟(UMP),法國右翼主流勢力似乎正走在一條通向政治和組織團結的道路上。在法國左翼陷入混亂、而極右翼政黨國民陣線(National Front)的可信度不足以(或者說尚不足以)贏得大選(儘管該黨現在已足夠強大,能夠對法國政治體系造成衝擊)的情況下,薩科齊有可能在下次總統大選中再次獲勝,不是嗎?日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)重返政壇的情景是否會在2017年的法國重現?安倍晉三的“品牌再造”如此強大,以至於還有一項以他的姓氏命名的新穎經濟政策。

薩科齊不是安倍第二

It could happen but probably will not. Mr Sarkozy’s formidable drive remains intact and his competitors will have to contend with his ability to thrive under pressure, as he demonstrated at the peak of the global financial crisis or during Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008. Furthermore, he now has control of the UMP party machine, a major, possibly indispensable, asset.

這種情況可能會發生,但很可能不會。薩科齊那令人敬畏的進取精神還沒有發生動搖,他的競爭對手將不得不應付他那種在壓力之下超常發揮的能力,就像他在全球金融危機最嚴重時期或2008年俄羅斯向格魯吉亞開戰時期所展現的。另外,他現在控制着UMP的政黨機器,這是一項重要的(甚至可能是不可或缺的)資產。

However, powerful factors, which were not at play when he first ran for and won the presidency in 2007, will get into his way. He faces a host of legal challenges. One of the most recent, the so-called Bygmalion case – after the name of an events-organising company alleged to have served as a conduit for the funding of his unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2012 – represents a potentially serious threat during the run-up to 2017. (Mr Sarkozy denies any wrongdoing.)

然而,在2007年他首次參選並贏得總統大選時不存在的一些強大因素,將阻礙他的腳步。他面臨着諸多法律訴訟。最新一樁是所謂的Bygmalion案,此案以一家大型活動組織公司的名字命名,該公司被控在2012年薩科齊最終失敗的總統大選時充當籌款渠道,在2017年總統大選之前,此案將對他構成潛在的重大威脅。(薩科齊否認自己存在過錯。)

Then there is the former president’s polarising personality, a hallmark which on balance has helped more than hurt his political career. Voters appreciated his clear-cut choices in 2007, and he nearly won in 2012 despite the adverse economic and social legacy of the financial crisis. But to overcome the challenge from Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front who is almost certain to be present in the second round of the presidential elections, the mainstream right candidate will need to convince left and centre electors to back him in the second round.

接下來是薩科齊那種導致兩極分化的個性,迄今這一性格特點總的來說在更大程度上幫助(而非損害)了他的政治生涯。2007年,選民們賞識他的明確抉擇,而在2012年,儘管金融危機帶來種種不利的經濟和社會後遺症,但他仍差一點在大選中獲勝。但要應對來自國民陣線黨主席馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen,她幾乎肯定會進入第二輪大選投票)的挑戰,主流右翼政黨的候選人需要說服左翼和中間派選民在第二輪投票中支持他。

Opinion polls indicate that Alain Juppé would be a better bet in a second round run-off than Mr Sarkozy. The former prime minister is seen as a safe pair of hands who is respected well beyond the core conservative voter base. The former president will face an uphill struggle to win the primaries that the UMP is due to hold in 2016 to choose its candidate in the race for the Elysée Palace. The fact that a gifted but otherwise uncharismatic politician such as Bruno Le Maire, a former agriculture minister in the Sarkozy administration, managed to garner nearly 30 per cent of the UMP vote in the leadership contest, was a portent of the difficulties Mr Sarkozy will face. Mr Sarkozy’s inability to create a committee of former centre-right prime ministers shows how difficult it is for him to unite rather than divide his own party, let alone a broader electoral base.

民調顯示,在第二輪決勝投票中,相對於薩科齊,法國前總理阿蘭•朱佩(Alain Juppé)是一個更好的選擇。朱佩被視爲一位可靠人選,即使在保守派核心選民基礎以外也深受尊敬。UMP將於2016年選出黨內候選人角逐法國總統職位,要贏得黨內初選,薩科齊將面臨很大困難。曾在薩科齊任期內擔任法國農業部長的布魯諾•勒梅爾(Bruno Le Maire)這樣有才華但缺乏領袖魅力的政治人物,在UMP黨主席選舉中成功收穫近30%的選票,這一事實預示着薩科齊前路艱難。薩科齊無法創建一個由中右翼前任總理組成的委員會,這表明他很難團結(而非分裂)他所在的政黨,更別提團結更廣泛的選民了。

Finally, Mr Sarkozy’s attempted comeback embodies the crisis of trust which is at the heart of the negative mood pervading the French body politic. Largely unconstrained by a constitutionally weak parliament or by the constraints of coalition politics, the French president enjoys exceptional powers compared with other European leaders.

最後,薩科齊試圖重返政壇反映出一種信任危機,這個危機處在瀰漫於法國人民心中的負面情緒的核心。與其他歐洲領導人相比,法國總統基本上不受在憲法上實力弱小的議會或聯合執政侷限性的約束,享有較大權力。

This has undoubted attractions – but also some disadvantages. When key campaign promises are not honoured, the public reaction can be ferocious. When he won in 2007, Mr Sarkozy had a strong mandate, and arguably the political wherewithal, to engage in structural reform, including the scrapping of the 35 hour-work week. He preferred to work around the reform agenda rather than implementing it. His Socialist successor François Hollande’s perceived “betrayal” of his leftwing promises has had the same effect on the other side of the spectrum.

這一點具有毋庸置疑的吸引力,但也有一些壞處。當關鍵的競選承諾未被兌現時,公衆反應可能會非常激烈。2007年大選獲勝時,薩科齊有着強大的民意授權和政治資本來實施結構性改革,包括廢除每週35小時工作制。但他更喜歡繞着改革議程打外圍戰,而不是實施改革。在另一邊,他的社會黨繼任者弗朗索瓦•奧朗德(François Hollande)對其左翼承諾的明顯“背叛”也產生了同樣的效果。

This sense of being taken for a ride is one of the causes of the rise of the National Front, an untested party which has not yet had the opportunity to betray the public’s trust. Thus, at every stage of the campaign trail, Mr Sarkozy will face the charge that he did not keep his promises when he had an opportunity to do so.

這種被忽悠感是國民陣線崛起的原因之一,該黨未經考驗,還沒有機會背叛公衆的信任。因此,在競選的每個階段,薩科齊都將面臨這一指責:當初他有機會履行承諾時卻沒有這麼做。

This basic lack of credibility may explain the modesty of his current reform platform: tinkering with the retirement age (raising it to 63 instead of 62), devolution of the “35 hours” issue to sectoral dialogue between trade unions and employers associations, the capping of public expenditure at 50 per cent of gross domestic product with little indication of how this would be done, and a fudge about increasing wages while lowering taxes. Sarkonomics are not with us yet.

這種基本可信度的缺乏,也許可以解釋他當前的有限改革平臺:微調退休年齡(從62歲提高到63歲)、將每週“35小時”工作制問題下放到工會與僱主協會之間的行業對話去解決、將公共支出佔國內生產總值(GDP)的比例上限設在50%(但沒有說明如何實施),以及提高薪資同時降低稅收的含糊承諾。薩氏經濟學(Sarkonomics)還沒有出現。