中國崛起終結了美國世紀

In 1941 Time editor Henry Luce proclaimed “the American century”. Some now see this coming to an end as a result of the nation’s economic and political decline. Many point to the example of US failure to convince its allies to stay out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing’s rival to the World Bank; but this was more an example of a faulty decision than evidence of decline, which raises the question of what is the natural life cycle of a nation.

1941年，《時代》雜誌(Time)主編亨利•盧斯(Henry Luce)宣稱，“美國世紀”已經來臨。現在有些人認爲，隨着美國在經濟和政治上走向衰落，美國世紀正趨於結束。許多人援引美國未能阻止盟友加入亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（AIIB，簡稱：亞投行）作爲一個例子——亞投行是中國政府提議創立、與世界銀行(World Bank)爭風頭的一個機構。但這隻能表明一個錯誤的決定，而不能表明美國已經衰落。這引出一個問題：一個國家正常的生命週期有多長？

A century is generally the limit for a human organism but countries are social constructs. Rome did not collapse until more than three centuries after it reached its apogee of power in 117AD. After American independence in 1776 Horace Walpole, the British politician, lamented that his nation had been reduced to the level of Sardinia, just as Britain was about to enter the industrial revolution that powered its second century as a global power.

一個世紀通常是人類機體生存的極限，但國家是社會結構。古羅馬在公元117年達到實力的巔峯，但它隨後又延續了300多年才解體。1776年美國獨立後，英國政界人士霍勒斯•沃波爾(Horace Walpole)哀嘆道，他的國家已淪爲撒丁島（Sardinia，位於意大利半島的西南方，是地中海的第二大島——譯者注）的水平，可隨後英國開啓工業革命，在接下來的一個世紀裏仍然是全球強國。

Any effort at assessing American power in the coming decades should take into account how many earlier efforts have been wide of the mark. It is chastening to remember how wildly exaggerated US estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s were. Today some see the Chinese as 10ft tall and proclaim this “the Chinese century”.

要評估美國在今後幾十年的實力，就得考慮早先有多少評估不靠譜。別忘了，美國對上世紀70年代的蘇聯和上世紀80年代的日本都曾做出過離譜的高估，這足以令人引以爲戒。如今，一些人認爲中國人有10英尺高，並宣稱現在是“中國世紀”。

China’s size and relatively rapid economic growth will bring it closer to the US in terms of its power resources in the next few decades. But this does not necessarily mean it will surpass the US in military, economic and soft power.

就實力資源而言，龐大的規模和相對快速的經濟增長將讓中國在今後幾十年逼近美國。但這未必意味着中國將在軍事、經濟和軟實力方面超越美國。

Even if China suffers no big domestic political setback, many projections are simple linear extrapolations of growth rates that are likely to slow in the future. Moreover, economic projections are one dimensional. They ignore US military and soft power advantages, such as the desire of students around the world to attend US universities. They also overlook China’s geopolitical dis¬advantages in the Asian balance of power, compared with America’s relations with Europe, Japan and India, which are likely to remain more favourable.

即便中國國內沒有發生重大的政治挫折，許多預測也只是對經濟增長率作簡單的線性外推，而未來經濟增長是可能放緩的。此外，經濟預測只是一個方面。他們忽視了美國在軍事和軟實力方面的優勢，比如世界各地的學生都想到美國上大學。他們也忽視了，相對於美國與歐洲、日本和印度的關係（這些關係很可能保持在比較有利的狀況），中國在亞洲實力平衡方面的地緣政治劣勢。

It is not impossible that a challenger such as China, Europe, Russia, India or Brazil will surpass the US in the first half of this century but it is but not likely.

中國、歐洲、俄羅斯、印度或巴西等挑戰者在本世紀上半葉超越美國不是沒有可能，但可能性不大。

On the question of absolute rather than relative American decline, the US faces serious problems in areas such as debt, secondary education, income in¬equality and political gridlock but these are only part of the picture. On the positive side of the ledger are favourable trends in demography, technology and energy as well as abiding factors such as geography and entrepreneurial culture.

在美國絕對（而非相對）衰落的問題上，美國在債務、中學教育、收入不平等以及政治僵局等領域面臨嚴峻問題，但這些只是整個圖景的一部分。有利的一面是，美國在人口結構、技術和能源方面的有利趨勢以及地理和創業文化等長期有利因素。

The scenarios that could precipitate decline include ones in which the US overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inwards and thus cuts itself off from the strength it obtains from openness. Alternatively it could react by overcommitting itself, and wasting blood and treasure as it did in Vietnam and Iraq.

可能觸發美國衰落的情形包括，美國對恐怖襲擊反應過度，轉向閉關自守，切斷自己從開放獲取的力量。抑或它可能過度投入，浪費美國人的生命和財產，就像在越南和伊拉克那樣。

As an overall assessment, describing the 21st century as one of American decline is inaccurate and misleading. Though the US has problems it is not in absolute decline, unlike ancient Rome, and it is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in coming decades.

作爲一個總體評估，將21世紀稱爲美國衰落的世紀是不準確和誤導的。儘管美國存在種種問題，但它並沒有陷入絕對衰落——這與古羅馬不同——在接下來的幾十年裏它很可能依然比任何一個國家都更加強大。

The real problem is not that it will be overtaken by China or another contender but rather that it faces a rise in the power resources of many others — both states and non-state actors such as transnational corporations, terrorist groups and cyber criminals. And it will face an increasing number of global problems that will call on our ability to organise alliances and networks.

真正的問題不是美國將被中國或者另一個競爭對手超越，而是它面臨其它許多實體（包括國家和非國家實體，如跨國企業、恐怖組織和網絡罪犯）實力資源的上升。美國還將面臨越來越多的全球問題，需要我們有能力組建聯盟和網絡。

Contrary to the views of those who proclaim this the Chinese century, we have not entered a post-American world. But the American century of the future will not look the same as in previous decades. The US share of the world economy will be smaller than it was in the middle of the past century.

與那些宣稱21世紀是中國世紀的觀點相反，我們並未進入“後美國”世界。但未來的美國世紀看上去將與過去幾十年不同。美國在全球經濟中所佔的份額將小於上世紀中葉那段時期。

Furthermore, the complexity created by the rise of other countries, as well as the increased role of non-state actors, will make it harder for even America, the biggest power, to wield influence and organise action. Entropy is a greater challenge than China.

此外，其他國家崛起所導致的複雜性，加上非國家實體的角色上升，將讓即便身爲頭號強國的美國也更難施加影響和組織行動。無序是比中國更大的挑戰。

At the same time, even when the US had its greatest preponderance of power resources, it often failed to secure what it wanted. Those who argue that the disorder of today’s world is much worse than in the past should remember a year such as 1956, when the US was unable to prevent Soviet repression of a revolt in Hungary; or the Suez invasion by our allies Britain, France and Israel.

與此同時，即便在美國擁有最大實力資源的時候，它往往也無法得到自己想要的東西。那些辯稱當今世界的混亂遠比過去嚴重的人別忘了1956年，當時美國無力阻止蘇聯鎮壓匈牙利的起義，也未能阻止我們的盟友英國、法國和以色列入侵蘇伊士運河。

We must not view the past through rose-tinted glasses. Now, with slightly less preponderance and a much more complex world, the American century will continue for at least a few decades, but it will look very different from when Luce first articulated it.

我們不能透過玫瑰色的眼鏡看待過去。現在，隨着美國優勢略有下降以及世界變得更加複雜，美國世紀至少還會持續數十年時間，但它看上去將與當年盧斯宣告的那個美國世紀頗爲不同。

The writer is a professor at Harvard and author of ‘Is the American Century Over?’

本文作者是美國哈佛大學(Harvard)教授，著有《美國世紀結束了嗎？》(Is the American Century Over?)一書。