中國也將成爲債癮受害者

Balance sheets matter. This is the biggest lesson of the financial crises that have rolled across the world economy. Changes in balance sheets shape the performance of economies, as credit moves in self-fulfilling cycles of optimism and pessimism. The world economy has become credit addicted. China could well be the next victim.

資產負債表很重要——這是席捲世界經濟的一場又一場金融危機所帶來的最大教訓。隨着信貸以自我實現的樂觀/悲觀週期起起伏伏，資產負債表的變化會影響經濟體的表現。世界經濟已變得對信貸上癮。中國很可能成爲下一個受害者。

If we think about balance sheets in the world economy of today, four questions arise. First, what determines vulnerability? Second, where are vulnerabilities now appearing? Third, how are countries coping with the legacy of old debt crises? Finally, can the world economy cope with the new vulnerabilities?

如果我們考慮當今世界經濟的資產負債表，就會面對四個問題。首先，是什麼決定了脆弱性？其次，眼下脆弱性在哪裏顯現？第三，各國正在如何應對老債務危機的後遺症？最後，世界經濟能夠應對新的脆弱性嗎？

Start with the sources of vulnerability. In economies with liberalised financial sectors, the driver towards disaster is far more often private than public imprudence. Rising property prices and expanded mortgage lending drive many credit booms. A deterioration in the public sector’s balance sheets usually then follows crises. Failure to recognise this link between private excess and public borrowing is wilful blindness.

首先來講脆弱性的來源。在具備自由化金融業的經濟體，導致災難的因素在更多情況下是私人部門（而非公共部門）的輕率。不斷上漲的房價和擴大的抵押貸款，推動着許多信貸繁榮。危機爆發後，公共部門的資產負債表狀況通常會惡化。不承認私人部門過分行爲與公共借款之間的這種聯繫，乃是故意視而不見。

In an update of work on debt and deleveraging, McKinsey notes that between 2000 and 2007, household debt rose as a proportion of income by one-third or more in the US, the UK, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. All of these countries subsequently experienced financial crises. Indeed, huge increases in private sector credit preceded many other crises: Chile in 1982 was an important example of this connection.

麥肯錫(McKinsey)在一份有關債務和去槓桿化的最新報告中指出，2000年至2007年間，美國、英國、西班牙、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙的家庭債務佔收入比例上升了三分之一或更多。所有這些國家隨後都經歷了金融危機。的確，其它許多危機爆發之前也曾出現私人部門信貸的大幅增加：1982年的智利是展示這種聯繫的一個重要例子。

Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley argues that the 30 most explosive credit booms all led to a slowdown, often a crisis. A rapid change in the ratio of credit to gross domestic product is more important than its level. That is partly because some societies are able to manage more debt than others; it is partly because a sudden burst in lending is likely to be associated with a sudden collapse in lending standards.

摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的魯吉•夏爾馬(Ruchir Sharma)提出，30場最具爆炸性的信貸擴張都導致了經濟放緩，往往還引發危機。信貸與國內生產總值(GDP)之比的快速變化，比信貸的絕對水平更重要。這部分是因爲某些社會能夠對付相對較多的債務；部分是因爲井噴式增長的放貸可能伴隨着放貸標準的突然崩潰。

Thus, in seeking new vulnerabilities, we need to look for economies that have had sharp rises in private debt. China leads the pack, with a rise of 70 percentage points in the ratio of corporate and household debt to GDP between 2007 and 2014 (see chart). If we add financial sector debt, the rise in gross private indebtedness is 111 percentage points. With government debt included, it is 124 percentage points.

因此，在尋找新的脆弱性時，我們需要尋找經歷了私人部門債務大幅上升的經濟體。中國在這方面一馬當先，2007年至2014年間企業和家庭債務與GDP之比上升了70個百分點（見圖表）。如果加上金融業的債務，則私人部門總負債程度上升了111個百分點。若包括政府債務，負債程度上升了124個百分點。

China’s huge credit boom has several disquieting features. Most of the rise in debt is concentrated in the property sector; “shadow banking” — that is lending outside the balance sheets of the formal financial institutions — accounts for 30 per cent of outstanding debt, according to McKinsey; much of the borrowing has been put on off-balance-sheet vehicles of local governments; and, above all, the surge in debt was not linked to a matching rise in trend growth, but rather to the opposite.

中國龐大的信貸繁榮有幾個令人不安的特點。大部分債務增加集中在房地產行業；麥肯錫數據顯示，“影子銀行”——即正規金融機構資產負債表外的放貸——佔未償債務的30%；相當大一部分借款由地方政府的表外工具承擔；最重要的是，債務激增並沒有帶來趨勢增長率的相應上升，而是相反。

This does not mean China is likely to experience an unmanageable financial crisis. On the contrary, the Chinese government has all the tools it needs to contain a crisis. It does mean, however, that an engine of growth in demand is about to be switched off. As the economy slows, many investment plans will have to be reconsidered. That may start in the property sector. But it will not end there. In an economy in which investment is close to 50 per cent of GDP, the downturn in demand (and so output) might be far more severe than expected.

這並不意味着中國可能會經歷一場失控的金融危機。相反，中國政府擁有遏制一場危機所需的全部工具。然而這確實意味着，一個需求增長引擎將要被關掉。隨着經濟放緩，許多投資計劃將不得不被重新考慮。這可能會從房地產行業開始，但不會止於該行業。在投資佔GDP近50%的中國經濟，需求（乃至產出）的下滑可能比預期嚴重得多。

Now consider the state of countries that suffered huge crises since 2007. McKinsey notes that none has deleveraged overall. Yet non-financial private sectors have deleveraged in some cases, notably the US, UK and Spain. The financial sector has also deleveraged substantially in the US, though not in Spain or the UK. In these cases, however, the rise in government debt has been bigger than the decline in private gross debt. As a result, gross debt has risen relative to GDP in all the high-income economies examined by McKinsey, with the exception of Israel. In many high-income economies, even private indebtedness has continued to rise: Canada and France are two noteworthy examples of this experience.

現在來考慮自2007年以來遭遇了重大危機的國家的狀況。麥肯錫指出，沒有一個國家在整體上出現了“去槓桿化”。然而，某些國家的非金融私營部門出現了去槓桿化，特別是在美國、英國和西班牙。美國的金融業也已大幅去槓桿化，西班牙和英國則沒有出現這種情況。不過，在所有這些國家，政府債務的增加遠遠大於私人部門總債務的下降。其結果是，在麥肯錫研究的所有高收入經濟體中，近年總債務相對於GDP都出現上升，只有以色列例外。在不少高收入經濟體，就連私人部門債務也在繼續上升：加拿大和法國就是兩個值得注意的例子。

The substitution of public borrowing for private borrowing in the aftermath of a crisis makes sense. In most cases, the public sector, a close-to-eternal borrower, is far more creditworthy than those who had borrowed excessively. Nevertheless, some limit certainly exists to the process.

危機過後，用公共借款來替代私人部門借款是有道理的。在多數情況下，公共部門作爲一個近乎永恆的借款人，信用可靠度遠遠高於那些已經舉債過度的借款人。然而，這個過程肯定是存在某種限制的。

Moreover, in the past, countries that expanded public sector debt in the immediate aftermath of a crisis were subsequently able to generate debt-free growth via exports. This is not a generalisable strategy when much of the world is struggling with excessive debt. Some mixture of financial repression, monetisation, inflation and debt restructuring now seems certain in many countries. The faster economies grow, the less likely such outcomes are. Given its demographics and high debt, Japan’s task is particularly challenging.

此外，在過去，在危機過後緊接着擴大公共部門債務的國家，隨後能夠通過出口產生無債務的經濟增長。然而，在這麼多國家苦苦應對過多債務的當今世界，這不是一種普遍適用的戰略。在許多國家，混合使用金融抑制、貨幣化、通脹和債務重組現在似乎是沒有懸念的事情。經濟體增長越快，這種結果就越不可能出現。鑑於日本的人口結構和高債務，該國的任務特別具有挑戰性。

Yet this is for the longer term. The more immediate question is what happens if the world has at last run out of countries able or willing to run large asset-price fuelled credit booms. A plausible consequence might be that global economic growth will be substantially slower than many now hope. Another, discussed last week, is that economies that are emerging from the aftermath of credit bubbles will be enticed into new ones: the US and UK come to mind. This would surely be a dismal outcome.

然而，這是比較遠期的課題。更直接的問題是，如果世界終於沒有了能夠（或者願意）運行資產價格助燃的龐大信貸繁榮的國家，那會發生什麼？一種可能的後果是，全球經濟增長將比許多人現在期待的水平低得多。另一個後果是上週討論過的，那就是剛剛擺脫信貸泡沫後遺症的經濟體，將被新的信貸泡沫所吸引。就此而言，美國和英國躍入腦海。這肯定是一個令人沮喪的結果。

The world desperately needs new ways to manage its economy, ones that support demand without creating unmanageable rises in indebtedness. If the affliction is now affecting China, then it will have befallen all the large economies. With debt continuing to rise, it is likely to spread further. In the absence of radical reforms, the world economy depends on generating fragile balance sheets. Better alternatives are imaginable. But they are not being chosen. In their absence, expect crises.

世界迫切需要新方法來管理經濟，這些方法在支持需求的同時，不催生負債的失控上升。如果說這種苦惱正在影響中國，那麼它會降臨所有大型經濟體。隨着債務繼續上升，這種苦惱有可能進一步蔓延。在沒有徹底改革的情況下，世界經濟依賴於形成脆弱的資產負債表。更好的選擇是可以想象的。但它們沒有被選擇。沒有它們，人們只能預期危機到來。