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和平者思考 虛擬戰爭:福兮?禍兮?

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和平者思考 虛擬戰爭:福兮?禍兮?

Dictatorships and tyrannies may be casual about spilling their people's blood, but not democracies. When the people get to decide whether to go to war, they rarely do so willingly. This was why Immanuel Kant said the spread of democracy was the best guarantee of world peace. As he wrote in 1795, "if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game".

獨裁政權和專制政府也許會肆意殺害本國人民,但民主國家不會。當人們要決定是否參戰時,他們很少願意這樣做。正因爲如此,伊曼努爾•康德(Immanuel Kant)才說,民主的普及是世界和平最好的保障。他在1795年時寫道,"如果爲了決定是否應該進行戰爭而需要由國家公民表示同意,那麼最自然的事就莫過於他們必須非常深思熟慮地去開始一場如此之糟糕的遊戲。"

When contemporary thinkers such as Michael Doyle have tested Kant's intuition, they have had to add a significant caveat: democracies may not like fighting each other – which is why war has become unthinkable between EU and Nato countries – but they can be very warlike indeed towards tyrants and ethnic cleansers.

當現代思想家,如邁克爾•多伊爾(Michael Doyle)對康德的直覺進行檢驗時,他們不得不加上了一條重要的附加說明:民主國家之間或許不喜歡大動干戈——正因爲此,歐盟(EU)和北約(Nato)國家之間爆發戰爭才成爲一件無法想象之事——但對於專制統治者和實行種族滅絕的統治者,民主國家的確可以非常好戰。

Drones and cyberwarfare, the latest revolution in military technology, will force us to revise still further Kant's connection between democracy, peace and war. Virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.

軍事技術領域的最新革命——無人機和網絡戰爭——將迫使我們對康德有關民主、和平與戰爭三者之間關係的看法,作出進一步修正。虛擬技術會使得民主國家更加輕易地發動戰爭,因爲他們無需再承擔流血犧牲的風險,而以往,這種風險會讓民主國家的人民在決定發動戰爭時慎之又慎。

Virtual war in Kosovo meant piloted F-18s and precision air strikes. In Afghanistan, too, the Taliban was routed initially with precision air strikes guided by forward air controllers. Libya was the same story. Now democracies do not even have to put their pilots in harm's way. Cyberwar and drones offer Nato democracies enticing prospects of cheap, risk-free warfare – and not just democracies. A new arms race is already under way.

在科索沃,虛擬戰爭採取了有人駕駛的F-18戰鬥機和精確空襲的形式。在阿富汗,由於北約軍隊在精確空襲中配備了前進空中控制員(forward air controller),塔利班(Taliban)在戰爭初期被打得潰不成軍。利比亞的情況也差不多。如今,民主國家甚至都不用讓它們的飛行員承受危險。網絡戰和無人機讓北約的民主國家看到了一種極富吸引力的戰爭前景:這種戰爭不僅有着較低的經濟成本,而且毫無危險。但看到這種前景的不僅只有民主國家。一場新的軍備競賽已經展開。

Before succumbing to these technologies, leaders should remember how little virtual war has actually accomplished. Kosovo is still a corrupt ethnic tyranny; Libya will take years to put itself back together; and no one can see a stable state in sight in Afghanistan. Virtual war turned out to be the easy part. Democracies have little staying power for the hard part.

在向這些高科技"俯首稱臣"之前,領導人們別忘了,虛擬戰爭在實際中取得的效果是何等有限。科索沃仍然是一個腐敗滋生的民族專制政權;利比亞恢復元氣還需要若干年時間;在阿富汗,人們在短期內無法看到局勢穩定的跡象。事實證明,贏得虛擬戰爭只是相對容易的一面。而在應對更難的問題時,民主國家則缺乏持久力。

Looking at the options in Syria, drone attacks on regime tank formations and a cybercampaign to immobilise Bashar al-Assad's command and control would be the easy part. Creating a Syria free of sectarian warfare and ethnic political domination would be very hard.

看看敘利亞的情況,出動無人機對政府軍坦克編隊實施轟炸,以及發動網絡戰令巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)的指揮及控制系統陷入癱瘓,這並非難事。但要想建立一個沒有派系紛爭的敘利亞,讓各民族、各派系能夠共同分享政治權利,這又是何等之難事。

If war is the continuation of politics by other means, the chief factor limiting the use of these new weapons will be whether they help leaders to attain their political ends. Where these ends seem unattainable or futile, as in Syria, the weapons will remain unused.

如果戰爭是政治在某種形式上的延續,那麼限制使用這些新式武器的首要因素就在於,它們是否能幫助領導人達到他們的政治目的。但凡是在這些目的看似無法實現,或是徒勞無益的地方,比如敘利亞,這些武器就不會動用。

The larger problem is that these new weapons are bound to escape political, and therefore democratic, control. Previous revolutions in military affairs, such as the coming of nuclear weapons, strengthened the hand of presidents and prime ministers. Drones and cyberwar technologies are so cheap that it will be impossible to keep them under the lock and key of the sovereign. The age of the super-empowered, and therefore super-dangerous, individual has arrived.

更重要的問題在於,這些新型武器必定會脫離政治和民主的控制。以往軍事領域中的重大變革,比如核武器的誕生,增強了政治領導人的控制力。無人機和網絡戰技術掌握起來是如此容易,主權國家不可能將它們完全封鎖起來。有些個人將會因爲擁有超強力量而變得極端危險,這種時代已經來臨。

In deciding how to control drone and cybertechnologies, it is worth remembering that democracies are resilient because they are free. Our cybersystems are now under constant attack and it is in responding to these attacks that they become more secure. States will have to allow the global community of coders and engineers who built and maintain the internet the freedom to keep the malware at bay and keep the system open for the rest of us.

在決定如何控制無人機和網絡技術的問題上,有一點值得我們牢記:民主國家之所以具備較強的適應力,因爲它們是自由的。如今,我們的網絡系統頻頻遭到攻擊,而隨之採取的應對措施使得我們的網絡系統變得更加安全。各國將必須讓構建及維護互聯網的全球程序員和工程師們享有自由,在阻隔惡意軟件的同時,向其他人開放網絡。

The new technologies are so easy and cheap to produce that the best international law and state action can hope for is to generate a limited set of shared norms to prohibit their most harmful uses. Even with these in place, drones and malware will fight our wars for us and serve our eternal human desire to inflict harm without consequences. They will be the mercenaries of the 21st century.

這些新技術開發起來是如此便捷,且成本是如此之低,以至於我們對於國際法和國家行動的最樂觀期待莫過於是,它們能夠促成一批數量有限的共同的行爲準則,從而阻止這些技術被應用於最具危害性的用途。即便有了這樣的行爲準則,無人機和惡意軟件還是會被用於戰爭,並服務於我們永恆的人性慾望——傷害他人,卻不用承擔後果。它們將成爲21世紀的僱傭兵。

In thinking about what can keep these technologies under control, we need to remember Kant's original bet on human prudence. Kant's insight was that human beings who can freely choose and reason know full well that if you inflict harm, it will come back to hurt you. Everything must be paid for. If you hit Iran with Stuxnet, you render your own nuclear systems vulnerable to the next hacker, individual or state. If you perfect the killing of individuals with drones, you had better confine your acts to bona fide enemies of your state; otherwise you expose your population as a whole to the same heaven-sent vengeance.

在思考如何纔能有效地控制這些技術時,我們需要記住康德關於"審慎"(prudence)的最初觀點。康德認爲,那些能夠自由選擇並作出思考的人清楚地知道,如果你傷害了別人,你就會遭到報應。所有事情都是有代價的。如果你用蠕蟲病毒Stuxnet攻擊伊朗,你自身的核系統將面臨黑客報復的危險,無論這種報復是出自個人還是國家。如果你利用無人機發動了一次"堪稱完美"的襲擊,奪走了平民的性命,接下來,你最好集中精力應對你們國家真正的敵人;否則,你會將你們國家的所有人民暴露在對手的復仇風險之中,這種復仇同樣也是天賜的。

These new technologies promise harm without consequence. Kant tells us there is no such thing. In this shared human understanding, even between adversaries, lies prudence, and in prudence – caution, care and restraint – lies hope.

這些新式技術似乎讓你可以在無須承擔後果的情況下,實施破壞。康德告訴我們,天底下沒有這樣的事。在人類的這種共識之中(即便是在敵手之間)有着一種審慎,在審慎——謹慎、顧慮和剋制——之中透露着一種希望。

The writer teaches human rights at the University of Toronto and is author of "Virtual War"

本文作者在多倫多大學(University of Toronto)教授人權學科,並著有《虛擬戰爭》(Virtual War)一書。